HOME AND AWAY

THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE OF WAR 1618-1721

Proceedings of the 2017 Helion and Company 'Century of the Soldier' Conference

Edited by

SERENA JONES

The experience of war is never confined to those who participate militarily: whilst soldiers defend their homes or fight far from them, the consequences of warfare ripple out across their immediate families and communities, and the lives of countless civilians the combatants will never meet. In the seventeenth century, as in any era, soldiers' wives and children could become destitute or endangered in the absence of their menfolk, and many sought refuge elsewhere or followed the army on its travels. Meanwhile complex military and administrative machines were created to arm, feed and clothe the combatants, and to maintain distant territories – frequently by force. The speakers at Helion's third 'Century of the Soldier' conference focussed on a variety of subjects, relating to both personal experiences of warfare, in distant conflicts and by domestic hearths, and the Herculean efforts required to keep conflict going.

Keynote speaker Professor Peter Gaunt, focusing on the English Civil Wars of the 1640s, explores what is arguably the most gruelling and uncertain aspect of warfare, besides battle itself: the necessity of travel, often for great distances and to unfamiliar or even hostile places. Using case studies focusing on different parts of the country, Professor Gaunt draws upon surviving letters and printed or archival first person accounts to recount and analyse the experience of moving around during the wars, whether to pursue their objectives or to flee from their effects. The Lostwithiel campaign in Cornwall in 1644 took both King Charles's and the Parliament's armies on a lengthy trek to the furthest extent of England: Simon Marsh examines the disastrous consequences of the campaign on the Earl of Essex's army, nearly destroyed as a fighting force, and yet how within two months it was able to recover and fight with distinction against the King's forces at the Second Battle of Newbury. Mr Marsh also examines how effective the Parliamentarian supply system had become by 1644; logistics are critical to the survival of any army or any body of people in a defensive situation, and Rachael Abbiss takes us forward to the Indian War of 1688, to remind us that whilst the British Isles only underwent short periods of internal warfare, its colonies in North America permanently required armed defence and the vast cross-ocean administration that entailed. Given the comparatively small European populations in the colonies at the time, and the continual threat from both hostile locals and European colonial rivals such as France, warfare was no distant event but a daily issue of personal survival; back in Engand, however, the necessity of soldiering for your country was perhaps not felt as keenly, and many men avoided it: Stephen Ede-Borrett's paper examines "deserters' notices" in the *London Gazette* in the 1680s, published by the authorities in an attempt to retrieve missing recruits. These advertisements give us an extraordinary amount of information about the men who made up the rank and file of the British Army at the time. Where men did see out their service, however, their families had to decide whether to follow the army or remain at home: using archival evidence, Laurence Spring looks at the experience of soldiers' wives in Britain and Europe during the first half of the seventeenth century, both those who stayed, and those who took to the road. War affected great households as much as the small: Basing House, a substantial house belonging to the Royalist Marquess of Winchester, was extensively besieged and eventually destroyed. Alan Turton, who

lives adjacent to the house's remains, brings together a range of sources including recent archaeological investigations, to offer a fresh picture of wartime events at this magnificent but doomed location. While Basing's defenders fought to save it, the London authorities encircled the City and suburbs with fortifications: these works, and many others in England and abroad, were recorded in details for posterity thanks to the extraordinary talent of occasional London resident Wenceslaus Hollar. David Flintham explores the life and works of this prodigious Czech sketcher and engraver. Defending entire regions was not as simple as building walls, however, and Jon Day takes us to Ireland with an account of how the lawyer, politician and parliamentarian soldier Michael Jones ruthlessly helped put down the remnants of the Royalist cause in Ireland in 1647–1649.

Serena Jones is the author of *No Armour But Courage: Colonel Sir George Lisle, 1615–1648*, and delivered a paper on Lisle and military professionalism at the 2016 Helion English Civil War Conference; she also edited the collected conference papers, published as *A New Way of Fighting: Professionalism in the English Civil War*. A professional editor, she edits for Helion and also runs her own publishing business, making primary seventeenth-century texts available for modern researchers.

Serena is currently working on two commissioned books about the English Civil War (one as a contributor), and is editor of the Pike and Shot Society's journal, *Arquebusier*.

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Helion & Company Limited

Helion & Company Limited
Unit 8 Amherst Business Centre
Budbrooke Road
Warwick
CV34 5WE
England
Tel. 01926 499 619
Email: info@helion.co.uk
Website: www.helion.co.uk
Twitter: @helionbooks
Visit our blog at http://blog.helion.co.uk/

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List of Contributors

Peter Gaunt
Peter Gaunt is Professor of Early Modern History at the University of Chester. A past chairman and current president of The Cromwell Association, he has written and published extensively on the military and wider history of the Civil Wars in Wales, England and Wales and Britain as a whole, on Oliver Cromwell as soldier, politician and statesman and on the political history of the Cromwellian Protectorate. The author or editor of fourteen books and well over sixty articles, chapters and short papers, most recently he revised and prepared a new edition of Barry Coward's *The Stuart Age*, published by Routledge in February 2017, and is working on a full-length study of the personal experiences of war, as reflected in surviving first personal accounts, to be published by Helion.

Simon Marsh
Simon Marsh has a lifelong interest in the British Civil Wars and is an active member of the Battlefields Trust, chairing its Mercia Region and coordinating its battlefields research and threats work. He co-authored with Stephen Porter *The Battle for London* (Amberley, 2010), an examination of the impact the opening campaign of the war, and edited the *Accounts of the Earl of Essex's Train of Artillery November 1642–September 1643* (Pike and Shot Society, 2016). He has also written for the *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, *Arquebusier* (the journal of the Pike and Shot Society) and the Battlefields Trust magazine and e-journal.

Rachael Abbiss
Rachael Abbiss has worked as a Visiting Lecturer at the University of Chester and University Centre Shrewsbury teaching modules covering early modern and modern military and political subjects. Rachael has curatorial and educational experience in the museum and heritage sector and has worked for organisations such as Buckingham Palace, the Assault Glider Trust and Northampton Museums & Art Gallery. She completed her PhD under the supervision of Professor Keith McLay and Professor Peter Gaunt and is currently working on turning her doctoral research into a monograph.

Stephen Ede-Borrett
Stephen Ede-Borrett is the Chairman of the Pike and Shot Society. He discovered the English Civil War at age fifteen when he read Peter Young's *Edgehill* and from that developed an interest in the men, uniforms and equipment of the armies of the First Civil War and the last English armies before the Union of 1706, as well as a passion for military flags. A re-enactor for twenty-five years and a wargamer for forty-five, he has written several books on the armies of the seventeenth century. His first book for Helion, *The Army of James II: The Birth of the British Army*, was published in 2017.

Laurence Spring
Laurence Spring is a qualified archivist and works at the Surrey History Centre. He has researched the early seventeenth century for many years and has written on various aspects of the English Civil War, including the armies of Sir William Waller and the Earl of Manchester. Having an archival background means that he prefers to search through archives for various interesting facts, rather than relying on secondary sources, which enables him to give a vivid insight to the subject.

Alan Turton
Alan Turton is a military historian, who specialises in the English Civil War and the period up to the mid eighteenth century. From 1987–2011 he was the curator of the English Civil War site of Basing House, Hampshire. Alan is a keen re-enactor of the seventeenth century, and a pioneer of Living History. Since 1981, Alan has been a Presenter for the Mary Rose Trust. Alan has written many books, including his recent publications, *The Civil War in Wessex* and writing with Chris Scott, *Hey for Old Robin*.

He has also appeared in or advised on a number of TV, film and radio productions, such as Digging for Britain, Timewatch, Two Men in a Trench, Decisive Weapons, Simon Schama's History of Britain, and Channel 4's Time Team (Basing House and Hooke Court). Also a number of historical dramas: *Battle of the Brave*, *By the Sword Divided*, and *To Kill a King*.

David Flintham
David Flintham is a military historian specialising in seventeenth century fortifications and sieges. During his ongoing research into London's ECW defences, a chance discovery of sketches of Hyde Park Fort led David to look further at the military-themed engravings of Wenceslaus Hollar. The results of this research have appeared in *Fort* (vol. 39, 2011) and *Arquebusier* (vol. 32, no. 5, 2011). David has also contributed a chapter to the University of Toronto book *New Perspectives on Wenceslaus Hollar*, published by Brepols in 2018. Hollar's works also feature prominently in David's *Civil War London: A Military History of London under Charles I and Oliver Cromwell*, published by Helion in 2017.

Jon Day
Sir Jon Day retired as a senior civil servant in 2016 after more than 35 years in the Ministry of Defence, NATO and the Cabinet office, latterly as chair of the Joint Intelligence Committee. He now works with Southampton and Exeter Universities, and is a trustee of the Battlefields Trust. In 2007 he published *Gloucester & Newbury 1643, The Turning Point of the Civil War* based on research during a sabbatical at Harvard. He is currently writing a history of Michael Jones' command of Parliament's Leinster army in Ireland from 1647 to 1649.

Introduction

Serena Jones

Our keynote contributor, Professor Peter Gaunt, introduces this collection of papers by giving us a flavour of the experiences of civilians and soldiers on both sides during the Wars of the Three Kingdoms, of those who took the war to their enemies and those to whom the war was brought; our theme is 'home and away' but how do we define 'home' and 'away'? They are subjective words: one person's 'home' was another's 'away', and whatever the personal perspective, the consequences of encountering individuals from the opposite side, however briefly, could be devastating.

The definitions are clear cut in our first paper. As Simon Marsh examines the activities of the Earl of Essex's Parliamentarian army, 'away' in Cornwall in summer 1644, we might also consider the effect of its presence on the Cornish 'at home': Royalist trooper Richard Symonds reported that the visiting soldiers plundered local churches of silver, money, and cloth, 'a great reake of oates' was burned at Tiverton, and nearly £2,000 was stolen.[1] Robbery and destruction were the typical accompaniment to any moving army of the period, but in this case there was payback: when Essex's infantry, defeated, was forced to return through the same territory, the local people participated in looting the force, and reportedly it arrived at Poole depleted and destitute.

In respect of European settlers in North America in the late seventeenth century, the definitions of 'home' and 'away' are a particularly sensitive subject. We might see the Europeans, as colonists representing a larger national entity and perhaps having only a tentative purchase on new territory, as being both home *and* away; many failed in their attempts to colonise, and if they survived the experience returned to their place of origin. However, those who gained a toehold and committed everything they had to the new land would solely call it 'home', and as Rachael Abbiss shows us, they were determined to fight for control and possession of it; this, of course, was at the heart of the violent conflicts with the indigenous peoples whose home it absolutely was.

On the face of it, for a soldier the distinction might seem clear, yet for those serving part time in militia units their purpose was to defend their 'home', without going

1 Richard Symonds, *Diary of the Marches of the Royal Army during the Civil War*, Charles Edward Long (ed.) (London: 1859), p.41.

away. This was certainly the perspective of the London Trained Bands, who during the English Civil War were apt to simply desert back to the Capital regardless of the hole they left in the army they had served. It seems they faced little sanction for doing so, but later in the century, as standing armies became the norm, the army became a soldier's de facto 'home' and he could be vigorously pursued for leaving it without permission. Stephen Ede-Borrett brings us some extraordinary examples of 'deserters' notices', placed in the press by senior officers determined to recover a particular man to the encircling arms of the miltary.

As Laurence Spring describes, some soldiers had their wives and children with them, effectively making them transient: 'home' became a hut in an army camp wherever that army rested, even though it was 'away' on campaign. Countless other families endured long separation, however, and the distance between 'home' and 'away' was keenly felt, often intolerable. Spring includes impassioned letters from several wives imploring their husbands to return; Professor Gaunt also refers us to the death of a soldier in Essex's army whose death was particularly poignant, having 'received a Letter but a few dayes before to returne home'.

In most cases, the looting or even complete destruction of homes by visiting soldiers was incidental to a wider event, such as a town siege or other local violence. Basing House, however – home of the Royalist 5th Marquess of Winchester – was a deliberate focus of destruction, the story of its demise brought to us here by Alan Turton. Reputedly once the largest private house in England, it was fortified and stubbornly garrisoned by the Marquess until virtually ruined by enemy action, surrendering in October 1645. It is thought possible that the Bohemian artist and engraver Wenceslaus Hollar was at that siege; although an engraving of the event is no longer believed to be his, he specialised in drawing siegeworks, town plans and permanent military fortifications across Europe. David Flintham presents us with Hollar's career: like Europe's countless armies of the time he was peripatetic, travelling the Continent and witnessing the struggles of those soldiers in strange lands, and the people and places they either fought against or were forced upon.

North America and Continental Europe were not the only sites of long-term conflict involving the British. Ireland had long been a battleground within the British Isles on colonial, religious and political fronts. In our final paper Jon Day details the career of the oft-overlooked Colonel Michael Jones, whose activities in Ireland prepared the ground for the arrival of Oliver Cromwell in 1649. Although Ireland was a realm of the British Crown, and fell under the umbrella of 'home', arguably it was treated as an unruly colony, its Catholicism feared and sections of its popoulation portrayed as violent and alien. Of all the conflicts contributing to the British experience of war in the seventeenth century, perhaps the Irish situation most underlined the difficulties of defining 'home' and 'away'.

Far and Away: Fighting, Campaigning and Travelling During the English Civil War

Peter Gaunt

Sister Margaret,

I think it is full time either for me to go to Haggerston, or for you to come to Crosby, otherways we may shake hands, in fancy, at this distance, and bid farewell old acquaintance. I have seen all the world twice over, at the least, since you and I saw one another. And for my own part, as I am not very confident I shall know you, so I do know, for certain, there must be two witnesses (at the least) at our meeting, to persuade you to believe that I am Brother Blundell. I remember there was a young fellow not far from Haggerston, that told a friend of ours, who would gladly have drawn him into the wars, that it was a great pity so good a like man as he should be knocked o' th' head. And truly I have just such thoughts upon my own metamorphosis. For you well remember what a pretty, straight, young thing, all dashing in scarlet, I came unto Haggerston, when you saw me last. But now, if you chance to hear a thing come – thump – thump – up your stairs (like a knocker, God bless us, at midnight) look out confidently, and if you find it have one long heel and no other, a gross full body (of an ell or more in the waist) with an old peruke clapped on a bald pate, do not you fear for all that, the thing is no goblin; but the very party we talk on. 'By my truly', you will say, 'and that is a great pity'. And by my troth, sister, it is so. But we will talk more of this when you see it … I am your most affectionate brother and your humble and faithful servant,

W.B.[1]

1 M. Blundell, *Cavalier: Letters of William Blundell to his Friends* (London: Longmans, Green, 1933), pp. 39–40; G. Baker & N. Martin-Smith (eds.), *The Letters of William Blundell the Cavalier* (Record Society of Lancashire and Cheshire 152, 2016), p. 75.

For William Blundell of Crosby Hall in south-west Lancashire, the political and military turmoil of the 1640s had turned his world upside down and his personal engagement with the conflict between king and parliament had changed his life profoundly and in some ways for ever. A member of the landed elite who had inherited the family estates in the late 1630s, as a Catholic and a strong supporter of the Stuart monarchy Blundell had actively supported the King's cause from the outset. Unlike his friend's acquaintance, who had declined to become involved in war as he saw injury or death as the likely consequence, during the opening months of the conflict Blundell had volunteered for service and in December 1642 he had been commissioned a captain in a local Royalist dragoon regiment in Lancashire. At 22, he had been a young and keen Royalist officer and perhaps it was at this stage, in his new military outfit – 'a pretty, straight, young thing, all dashing in scarlet' – that he paid the visit to his sister-in-law Margaret and to his wife's family at Haggerston in northern Northumberland, close to the English–Scottish border, recalled in this letter. But his military service had been brief and inglorious, for he had been captured and briefly imprisoned by Parliamentarians at Preston on 9 February 1643, and although he was back in the King's army by mid March and took part in an advance on Lancaster, during that operation on 18 March his thigh had been shattered by a Parliamentarian musket ball. He never fully recovered and thereafter had a deformed leg and hobbled badly for the remainder of his life. Although unable to play any further part in the fighting, as a Catholic, an active Royalist and a former Royalist army officer, he was a marked man and, to avoid harassment or imprisonment at Parliament's hands, he spent the mid 1640s in the Royalist heartlands of North Wales, followed by much of the later 1640s in self-imposed exile on the Isle of Man. In his absence, his Lancashire estates were first plundered and then seized by Parliament and although he was clearly back living in his home patch by the early 1650s, when he wrote this letter to his sister-in-law, not until 1653 was he able to repurchase his Crosby estate. His engagement in the Civil War had left Blundell physically maimed, separated for long periods from his wife and family and from his home, and financially almost ruined and plunged heavily into debt. When he wrote to his sister-in-law in February 1651 – by which time the civil wars of the mid seventeenth century were drawing to a close – suggesting that they should meet up again, perhaps for the first time in almost a decade, he was at pains to warn her of the marked change in his appearance since their previous encounter, his own 'metamorphosis'. He had become goblin-like and probably unrecognisable to her, he thought. Although still only 30, he had aged rapidly and prematurely, becoming bald and fat, with a waistline of an ell – 45 inches – or more. Above all, his deformed leg, a direct legacy of his service in the war, caused him to hobble and to stagger or 'thump' up and down stairs. In later life, he was apparently nicknamed 'Halt Will'.

But for all his sufferings and misfortunes, William Blundell was not destroyed by the Civil Wars. He was a survivor and, bad leg or not, he stomped his way around England and Wales, Scotland and Ireland and parts of the Continent. He had already travelled quite widely as a young man, before the Civil War, for in the 1630s and while still in his teens he had met and married his wife in southern Scotland. After

his brief and shattering experience of fighting in central and northern Lancashire, he spent time in exile in Royalist North Wales between 1644 and 1646, hankering unsuccessfully to be allowed to consult doctors in Royalist Chester. He was present at a siege of Hawarden Castle, probably the Parliamentarian siege of the Royalist garrison there in early 1646. Once North Wales had fallen to Parliament, he moved on to the Isle of Man and spent much of the later 1640s there, compiling a detailed and still valuable account of the history, topography, economy, society, politics and law of the island. Thereafter he revisited Scotland during the 1650s and in later life he travelled extensively around Britain and parts of the Continent. He lived to see monarchy restored in spring 1660, travelling to Charles II's exiled court at Breda in the Netherlands and returning across the Channel as one of the King's triumphant seaborne entourage, while on board measuring his own height against that of the new king. He lived to pay off his debts and to recover full possession of his estates in the early 1660s, thus restoring his comfortable social position and his leisured lifestyle. While his hopes that the restored monarchy might grant him greater rewards and also deliver religious liberties for Catholics were alike largely unfulfilled and while his own strong Catholicism continued to make him a figure of suspicion in times of trouble, he lived to enjoy a long, comfortable and productive marriage, he and his wife having 14 children, 10 of whom survived into adulthood. He lived to continue his travels, enquiries and writings, amassing a large and varied collection of letters, papers, treatises and notebooks, at least one of which he called 'Hodge Podge', a good reflection of his lively mind and wide-ranging interests. He outlived Charles II and the reign of his ill-fated brother James II, dying at Crosby Hall on 24 May 1698, a few weeks short of his seventy-eighth birthday.[2]

By the time of Blundell's death, most of his contemporaries and most of that generation of men – and women – who had lived through and in many cases had actively participated in the English Civil Wars had themselves passed or were rapidly passing from the world. This chapter is about them, that English and Welsh generation who had both the good fortune and the bad to witness, to live through and, willingly or unwillingly, for good or ill, to participate in the conflicts of the 1640s. Blundell was just one of around five million men, women and children who were alive in England and Wales during the 1640s, all of whom were affected in some way, great or small, by the Civil Wars. Many fought in the wars, for it has been suggested that one in 10 adult males in England and Wales were in arms at the height of each of the main campaigning seasons of 1643, 1644 and 1645 and that somewhere around a quarter of all adult males in England and Wales were in arms at some stage during the principal war of 1642-46. Many perished in the wars, for probably around 200,000 people died in England and Wales as a direct or indirect consequence of the hostilities. Many

2 See Blundell, *Cavalier*; M. Gratton, 'Blundell, William (1620–1698)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* [hereafter *ODNB*]; and G. Baker, *Reading and Politics in Early Modern England: The Mental World of a Seventeenth-Century Catholic Gentleman* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2010).

were caught up in the fighting, for around 200 English and Welsh towns and villages were garrisoned and attacked or suffered substantial war damage, as well as scores of castles, manor houses and churches which were garrisoned and often damaged or wrecked. Even those who largely escaped or avoided direct involvement in the fighting were deeply affected by the conflict, for they were governed by new wartime county administrators holding wide powers to conscript, to billet and to requisition goods and property and were also hit hard in the pocket and compelled to pay new, regular and much higher taxes to finance the Royalist or Parliamentarian war efforts.

This chapter explores the wartime experiences of a small selection of soldiers and civilians who, like Blundell, found themselves on the move around England and Wales in the course of the Civil War, focusing on those travels and on their voluntary or enforced movements around parts of the country during the war years. Privileging surviving first person accounts written by those individuals, this chapter draws on the letters and journals, the diaries, commonplace books and autobiographical sketches of some of those who lived through the Civil War in order to reconstruct and to convey a flavour of the ways in which many people were moving around the country during the war years and, like Blundell, were often far and away from home.

Probably the best-known military traveller and travelogue of the First Civil War is Richard Symonds and his so-called *Diary of the Marches of the Royal Army*. Hassled out of his native Essex because of his clear Royalist sympathies, in spring 1644 Symonds slipped away to Oxford and joined the King's mounted lifeguards, as a trooper not an officer. From then onwards he campaigned with the King and the main Royalist army, until he left the Lifeguards in autumn 1645, campaigning in the Midlands for a few months more before surrendering and being allowed to return home in March 1646. His wartime marching diary spans the period April 1644 to February 1646, so a little under two years, and provides a lot of information about the movements of the King and about the state and actions of Charles's main army over that period – Symonds gives quite detailed accounts of the battle of Cropredy Bridge and the wrapping up of Essex's army in Cornwall in summer 1644, a shorter but still useful account of the second battle of Newbury, a full account of the storming of Leicester in summer 1645, but only a brief mention of the resulting catastrophic Royalist defeat at Naseby – as well as lots of additional military information, including lists of Royalist garrisons and leading supporters, mention of spies and references to the intermittent execution of deserters, mutineers and plunderers.[3]

However, reflecting Symonds's keen historical and antiquarian interests, his wartime account also provides a mass of information about the counties, towns and villages

3 C.E. Long (ed.), Richard Symonds, *Diary of the Marches of the Royal Army* (Camden Society, old series 74, 1859), reissued in 1997 with a new and additional introduction by I. Roy. See also I. Roy, 'Symonds, Richard (*bap*. 1617, *d*. 1660)', *ODNB*.

through which he passed during two years of marching and campaigning. Symonds was clearly fascinated by churches and by the stained glass, funerary monuments and other bits and pieces they contained. Here he is on Fladbury church in Worcester, which he visited in early July 1644:

> This is a mother church to five or six hamlets. In the east window of the chancel the pictures, notwithstanding being broken about a fortnight before by Waller's men, these six following coates [of arms], very faire and old … [he describes the six coats of arms of old local families, dating from the fourteenth century, many of whom had fought in the earlier civil war of the mid thirteenth century] … Upon a flat stone in the chancel, the picture of a churchman, and with this coate and inscription …

Symonds quotes the Latin inscription, which identifies the churchman as Thomas Mordon, rector of Fladbury in the first half of the fifteenth century, and he goes on to describe an altar tomb bearing a brass image of a medieval knight in armour, which Symonds thought resembled that of the Black Prince, and his wife, various other inscribed stones and, 'under the three steps which ascend the east end is a faire charnel house with many bones'.[4] There are scores of similar descriptions of churches in Symonds's account, and of the odd cathedral – he was particularly impressed with Exeter, Salisbury and Hereford, with page after page describing the glass and the tombs he saw in all three.[5]

From time to time Symonds provides us with briefer descriptions of the countryside through which he was moving. Thus of the Kidderminster area he noted 'this is an inclosed county, small pastures and corne fields, a narrow way, most part of it stony, the quarries of stone of a brickish colour'; of Brackley he recorded the presence of 'a large greene or downe called Bayards Greene, where often is horse-raceing, six myle long'; and he found the Staffordshire Moorlands to be 'a woody enclosed country all the way, except the moores on the top of the hills; a black earth where they digg and cutt a heathy turfe; a rebellious place'.[6] Leicestershire he thought to be 'generally champaine pastures and arable, little or no waste, and small wood; some quick hedges, and the parishes stand less than one myle distant'.[7] In Herefordshire he noted the growing of rye, oats and peas, but little timber.[8] Towards the end of his time with the King, marching over the Welsh hills from Presteigne to Newtown and on to Chirk, Symonds recorded the bleakness of that area – 'we saw never a house or church, over the mountaynes. They call it ten myle, but twenty till we come to Newtowne'.[9]

4 Long, *Richard Symonds's Diary*, pp. 25–6.
5 *Ibid*., pp. 83–93, 129–40, 197–202.
6 *Ibid*., pp. 13, 22, 176.
7 *Ibid*., p. 186.
8 *Ibid*., p. 203.
9 *Ibid*., p. 241.

Symonds was also particularly interested in building stone, repeatedly commenting upon whether it was poor or fine in the areas he passed through – thus Honiton he thought 'a very poore built towne' and nearby Crediton 'a great, lowsy towne'[10] – and in building materials in general. Of Bradninch in Devon he noted that 'almost all the howses be clay, without any timber in the wall, except the doores, roofe and windowes, which is the fashion of the country', and in Cornwall he several times commented on the local habit of slate hung walls, with slate over stone.[11] The principal building stone of Fyfield in Oxfordshire was 'a grey pibble stone of great bignes … they breake them and build their howses of them and walls', giving rise to the local nickname of 'Grey weathers, because a far off they looke like a flock of sheep', and leading Symonds on to muse on the differences between the building stones of Dorset, Somerset, Devon and Cornwall.[12] In a different vein, he also makes odd comments about local customs. Thus near Llandaff, he noted that 'in the orchard … , under an old ewe tree, is a spring or well within the rock called Saint Faggin's Well; many resort from all parts to drinke it for the falling sicknes, and cures them at all seasons'.[13] He was also aware of the local economy. He noted that Bewdley relied almost entirely on the 'making of capps called Monmouth capps. Knitted by poore people for 2d a piece … First they are knitt, then they mill them, then block them, then they worke theme withe tasells, then they sheere them'.[14]

If we plot out a rough map of Symonds's itinerary, from marching out of Oxford with the King in spring 1644 until he left the royal Lifeguards in autumn 1645, shortly after the failed attempt to relieve Chester, he had crossed large parts of England and Wales, from Doncaster in the North to Truro and Fowey in the far South West, from Huntingdon in the East to Chester in the North West, also taking in much of the borderlands of eastern Wales, from Cardiff, Monmouth and Raglan in the south, via Brecon, Radnor and Presteigne in the middle, up to Newtown, Chirk and across the border to enter Chester in the north. However, the most concentrated and frequently crossed areas were in, around and south of the Royalist capital of Oxford and also back and forth across the Cotswolds north-west of Oxford, to the Vale of Evesham, Worcester and the Severn Valley. During his time serving in the King's Lifeguards at the height of the Civil War, Symonds had ridden well over 2,000 miles and probably nearer 3,000 miles in total.

A more intense impression of the life of a soldier on campaign is provided by the series of letters, also quite well-known, which Nehemiah Wharton, a Londoner who

10 *Ibid*., pp. 37, 40.
11 *Ibid*., pp. 39, 46.
12 *Ibid*., p. 151.
13 *Ibid*., p. 215.
14 *Ibid*., p. 14.

served as sergeant in a Parliamentarian foot regiment during the Edgehill campaign, wrote between mid August and early October 1642, addressed to his master back in London.[15] Although conditions may have been particularly rough and ready during this very early stage of the war, the correspondence nevertheless gives a valuable impression of the experience of campaigning with a marching army and of 'the passages of my pilgramage', as Wharton called his new life at one stage.[16] The letters detail his life over this eight-week period, as he marched out of the capital, across the southern Midlands, as far as Hereford and Worcester. Some days were spent marching, he claimed up to 20 miles on one occasion, though usually over shorter distances and generally no more than 10 miles a day. Others were passed on guard duty or training or at leisure in various towns where they halted for a while, including Coventry, Northampton and Worcester. The letters reveal at least one overnight march, setting off from Coventry at 2:00 a.m. en route for Northampton, as well as several nights spent either on routine guard duty or called out to stand guard and to be at the ready in response to alarms and warnings of imminent Royalist attack – almost always false alarms, as it turned out. When not on night guard, as a junior officer Wharton usually managed to secure half-decent overnight accommodation, even if just sleeping on floors or tables in houses, 'in beds whose feathers were above a yarde long' as he put it,[17] even when his men had to sleep in churches or in the open. Several times Wharton and his regiment had to march on beyond their intended venue for an overnight halt as nothing was available there; for example, in one small town 'we could get no quarter, neither bread nor drinke', because another Parliamentarian regiment got there first.[18] On at least one occasion, however, Wharton had no choice but to spend the night in the open with his men, with 'small comfort for it rained hard. Our foode was fruite, for those that could get it; our drinke water and beds the earth; our canopy the clouds; but we pulled up the hedges, pales and gates and made good fiers … [and] thus we continued singinge of psalmes untill the morninge'.[19]

The letters highlight the harsh nature of army life, with repeated references to marching 'long miles', to 'a longe and tedious jorney wantinge both bread and water', to

15 The original letters survive in The National Archives [hereafter TNA], SP 16/485, 491, 492. A fairly accurate transcript, albeit with spelling generally modernised, appeared in H. Ellis, 'Letters of a subaltern officer of the Earl of Essex's army written in the summer and autumn of 1642', *Archaeologia*, 35 (1853) and, with additional commentary and contextual material, in S. Peachey, *The Edgehill Campaign and the Letters of Nehemiah Wharton* (Leigh on Sea: Partizan Press, 1989). Over the period August to October 2012, on the anniversaries of the dates upon which the originals were written, Gavin Robinson posted new transcriptions of these letters on his blog 'Investigations of a Dog' (now closed, but archived and at time of writing still accessible at http://www.ioad.drgavinrobinson.uk/archive-list/), in the process correcting some of the mistranscriptions made by Ellis and generally followed by Peachey. See also I. Pells, 'Wharton, Nehemiah (*fl.* 1641–1649?)', *ODNB*.

16 Letter of 30 August in TNA, SP 16/491/138.

17 Letter of 16 August in TNA, SP 16/491/119.

18 Letter of 26 September in TNA, SP 16/492/21.

19 Letter of 26 September in TNA, SP 16/492/21.

marching 'neare 12 miles, without any sustenance, insomuch that many of our soildiers dranke stinkinge water' and to arriving in towns or villages where 'we could get no quarter, neither meate, drinke nor lodginge'.[20] On one occasion the arrival of carts carrying provisions from Banbury raised their spirits and on another Wharton felt it worth noting that, in passing through one settlement, 'wee had a suply of drinke, which upon a march is very rare and extreordinary welcome'.[21] He several times referred to the additional unpleasantness caused by 'foul weather', by 'such fowle wether that before I had marched one mile I was weet to the skinne', and 'the wether wet and the way very fowle … raine and snow and extreamity of could' en route from Worcester to Hereford so that one of his men died by the road presumably from exposure and hypothermia.[22] Despite all of this, the letters make reference to only one passing incidence of ill-health, when one morning he was 'exceedinge sick and the pallet of my mouth fell downe', though he quickly recovered when a fellow officer gave him some pepper.[23] Towards the end of the surviving correspondence he noted that 'I am in good health and by the goodnesse of God supplyed with strength beyond expectation'.[24]

As well as guard duty by day and by night and accompanying some ammunition waggons in the early part of the journey, Wharton and his men were involved in various minor skirmishes, especially around Southam in Warwickshire, where he was present as the two sides exchanged cannon shot, and he noted in his correspondence the dead and dying Royalist soldiers and horses left behind as the enemy fell back.[25] A little later, he took a keen interest in the battle of Powick Bridge, trying to discover details of the event and including a biased and not very accurate account of the engagement in one of his letters,[26] though his surviving correspondence closes before Wharton himself was involved in any significant field engagements. But his letters do make clear the generally shaky military discipline at this early stage of the war, including mutinies within the Parliamentarian army, and that he and his soldiers were prone to being ambushed and robbed by groups of fellow Parliamentarians. His own strong religious motivation also shines through the letters. He lovingly noted the 'famous' godly sermons he heard, as well as taking pride in outbreaks of iconoclasm – in contrast to Symonds, Wharton visited parish churches mainly to strip out or deface coloured glass in the windows, images and other features and adornments which he viewed as papist – and the harassing and plundering of Catholic property-owners en route.[27] More general plundering,

20 Letters of 26 August in TNA, SP 16/491/133 and of 3 September in TNA, SP 16/492/2.
21 Letters of 26 August in TNA, SP 16/491/133 and of 26 September in TNA, SP 16/492/21.
22 Letters of 26 August in TNA, SP 16/491/133, of 26 September in TNA, SP 16/492/21 and of 7 October in TNA, SP 16/492/321.
23 Letter of 3 September in TNA, SP 16/492/2.
24 Letter of 7 October in TNA, SP 16/492/321.
25 Letter of 26 August in TNA, SP 16/491/133.
26 Letter of 26 September in TNA, SP 16/492/21.
27 See, for example, letter of 16 August in TNA, SP 16/491/119.

rustling and living off the land enabled Wharton and his men to get by in the face of the shortages in, or complete failure of, army rations.

However, one other feature which emerges very clearly from Wharton's surviving correspondence is his keen interest in the countryside of England, which he seems to have been visiting and observing for the first time and which, had it not been for the war, he and many of his fellow-soldiers may never have seen. Buckinghamshire he thought 'the sweetest Country that ever I saw, and … so also is the people', while Coventry he found 'invironed with a wall co-equall if not excedinge that of London for breadth and height; the compas of it is neare 3 miles, all of free stone', complete with '4 stronge gates, stronge battlements stored with towers', 'magnificent churches and stately streetes', and 'within it ther are also severall sweete and plasant springes of water built of free stone, very large, sufficient to supply many thousand men'; 'it is also very sweetly Cituate[d]'.[28] In contrast, Northampton, with its '4 steeples, 3 churches, 2 parishes', he believed 'for Cituation, circuit and statelynese of buildinge exceeds Coventry, but the walls are miserably ruined, though the cuntry abounds in mines of stone'.[29] He also took an interest in features outside Warwick associated with the medieval legend of Guy of Warwick, for 'I veiwed the antiquities about one mile on this [side of] Warwick, as S[i]r Guyes cave, his Chappell and his picture in it, his stables all hewed out of the maine Rock, as also his garden and the 2 springinge wels wherat he [drank]'. Marching through Warwick itself too quickly to gain much of an impression of the town, he 'only had a sight of the Castle, which is very stronge built upon a mighty rock, wherof ther are store in this Cuntrey'.[30] However, Wharton had the time and inclination to explore both Worcester and Hereford, and while he disliked their inhabitants, believing them to be ignorant, ungodly and given to vice, swearing and Sabbath-breaking, he admired the towns.

Worcester, the largest town visited since leaving London:

> … abounds in outward thinges of all kinds … It is pleasantly seated, exceedinge populous and doubtlese very rich. It is scituate[d] on the east banke of that famous river Severine. The wals in the forme of a triangle, the gates seaven, the Bulwarkes five but much decayed; no Castle, only a mount of earth. In this City there is a very stately Cathedrall, called St Maries, in which there are many stately monuments; but amongst the rest in the middle of the quire is the monument of Kinge John, all of white marble, with his picture [effigy] theron to the life. On the South side, King Arthurs tombe [actually that of Prince Arthur, short-lived elder son of Henry VII] of Jette, but no picture [effigy] theron. This Citty hath also a stronge stone Bridge over the Severne, consistinge of sixe arches, with a gate on the middle of the bridge, as stronge as that on London Bridge, with a p[or]tcullis.[31]

28 Letters of 16 August in TNA, SP 16/491/119 and of 30 August in TNA, SP 16/491/138.
29 Letters of 3 September in TNA, SP 16/492/2 and of 7 September in TNA, SP 16/492/5.
30 Letter of 26 September in TNA, SP 16/492/21.
31 Letter of 30 September in TNA, SP 16/492/28.

Hereford he felt to be:

> … well scituate[d], and seated upon the river Y, invironed with a stronge wall, better then any I have seen before, with 5 gates and a stronge stone bridge of sixe arches over the river, surpassing Worsester. In this City there is the statlyest market place in the Kingdome, built with Cullumnes, after the maner of the Exchange [in London]. The minster every way exceedinge that at Worcester, but the City in Circuit not so large … Many here speake Welsh.[32]

The highlight for Wharton was Worcestershire, 'a pleasant, fruitfull and rich Cuntrey, aboundinge in corne, woods, pastures, hils and valleyes, every hedge and heigh way beset with fruite, but especially with peares, wherof they make that pleasant drinke called Perry, which they sell for a penny a quart, though better then ever you tasted as London'.[33] He clearly loved the Malvern hills and visited and climbed them at least twice. He felt that 'for height and length and breadth [they] doe many degres exceede all that ever I see. I nominate them because they are famous, for on the top of them there is a very brave chase for many miles together, a large ditch and springs also, all on the very top …' At the request of his captain and other commanders, he paid a return visit with them a few days later, leaving their horses in the town of Malvern and then continuing on foot:

> After much toyle, we asscended the hills which indeede are a very Curious prospect, for the day beinge cleare wee could see neare thirty miles round. All the valley betweene us and Woster, though five miles broad and many miles longe (inclosed with hedges) semed unto us but a garden with a few knots in it (though indeede they are very large pastures). At the bottome of these hils is Malverne Church, the statlyest parrish Church in England, adorned with varieties of rarities which I want time to expresse.[34]

There survive a handful of rather more prosaic day-by-day accounts of London units in Parliamentarian armies on the move and on campaign, written by officers and printed and published as pamphlets within a few weeks of the events they describe. Although they contain enough information for us to be able to reconstruct the routes and itineraries followed by their authors, some contain little more than passing reference to the towns and countryside en route and have far less of a topographical feel than the accounts of Symonds and Wharton. For example, Lieutenant Elias Archer of the London Trained Bands wrote and had published a daily account of events from his departure from London in mid October 1643, when he and his men joined Sir

32 Letter of 7 October in TNA, SP 16/492/321.
33 Letter of 30 September in TNA, SP 16/492/28.
34 Letters of 30 September in TNA, SP 16/492/28 and of 7 October in TNA, SP 16/492/321.

William Waller's field army, until his safe return to the capital a few days before Christmas.[35] After remaining close to London for a while, at the end of October they marched to Farnham, where they halted for several days. Several further days were spent marching around eastern Hampshire to little effect, where they were compelled to spend one night 'quartered in the fields … a very cold night and very tedious to many of our men which never were accustomed to such lodgings', and with plans disrupted 'by the extremity of wet and snow'.[36]

Waller's main objective was the Royalist garrison of Basing House, before which he and his men, including Archer, arrived on 6 November, setting up artillery and beginning to bombard the stronghold. But the initial operation made little headway, and despite capturing some Royalist supplies stored in barns and outhouses, much of the army pulled back into Basingstoke, seeking rest and shelter 'in respect of the extremity of hard service and cold weather', Archer noted.[37] The operation resumed in mid November, but was marked by Parliamentarian ill-discipline and errors, exacerbated by further bad weather. Little wonder that Archer recorded that in the light of 'the present foulnesse of the weather (for it was a very tempestuous morning of wind, raine and snow)', the Parliamentarians returned to Basingstoke, 'where we refreshed our men and dried our cloaths'.[38] There followed an interlude of almost four weeks of much reduced activity, as Archer and his men pulled back to Farnham, where they had 'much Provision of Victuals and strong waters … which was very thankefully received, although (thanks be to God) we had no great scarcity before'[39] – indeed, while Archer referred to bad weather quite often in his account, he did not give the impression that he and his men ever went hungry or short of victuals. The last significant action in which Archer and his men were involved was the successful attack upon part of Sir Ralph Hopton's Royalist army quartered at Alton in mid December, before marching back to London via Farnham in triumph, carrying with them much plunder and around 300 Royalist prisoners. However, despite providing interesting and valuable military details of campaigning in the field, overall Archer seems to have shown no great interest in the towns and countryside through which he and his colleagues were passing and his account gives little attention to Alton, Basingstoke and Farnham or to the rural environment through which he marched.

Broadly similar in style though a little fuller in topographical detail is Henry Foster's narrative of the marchings and actions of the London Trained Bands as part of the Earl of Essex's Parliamentarian army sent to the aid of besieged Gloucester in summer 1643. Covering the five weeks from his marching out of London on 23 August until

35 E. Archer, *A True Relation of the Marchings of the Red Trained Bands of Westminster, the Green Auxiliaries of London and the Yellow Auxiliaries of the Tower Hamlets under the Command of Sir William Waller, from Munday the 16 of Octob. To Wednesday the 20 of Decemb. 1643* (1643).

36 *Ibid*., p. 3.

37 *Ibid*., p. 5.

38 *Ibid*., p. 6.

39 *Ibid*., p. 7.

his safe return on 28 September, Foster provided accounts of the various military engagements in which the army was involved: skirmishing with Royalists as they crossed the Cotswolds en route to Gloucester; further skirmishes in Gloucestershire after the town had been relieved; the substantial Royalist cavalry attack around Aldbourne as the army returned eastwards; the major battle fought outside Newbury on 20 September, with Foster supplying a detailed and valuable narrative of the role of the London Trained Bands in the opening stages of the battle; and the subsequent attack on their rearguard as the army moved on towards Aldermaston.[40]

Foster gives us some feel for the countryside through which he and his colleagues were moving. For example, he described a stormy dark night in the Cotswold hills as they approached Gloucester, during which much of the army was on guard and jumpy for fear of a Royalist attack, with each man 'fearing his fellow Souldier to bee his enemy', and 'one young man of the Colonel's company was shot in this confusion upon this hill' – by friendly fire, Foster strongly implied – 'whose death will be much lamented by his Parents and Friends, from whom he received a Letter but a few dayes before to returne home'. He also noted that the Earl of Essex and part of his army had approached Gloucester via 'a high mountaine or hill, called Presbury-hill', in order to see and be seen by the Parliamentarian defenders in the town below.[41] But the strongest impression gained from Foster's account, to which returned time and again, is not of the topography and geography but of how he and his men suffered through bad weather and shortage of food and drink. Although at the start of the expedition he commented that he and his men 'were well accommodated for Beere, having great plenty', as 'two or three hundred of us' settled down for a night in a barn, things quickly changed. By the end of August, he noted 'little provision either for Officers or souldiers', while after a long march to Stow hopes of rest and refreshment were dashed by being called out on overnight guard in response to an alarm, so that 'our Regiment stood in the open field all night, having neither bread nor water to refresh our selves, having also marched the day before without any sustenance, neither durst we kindle any fire though it was a very cold night', despite it being early September. The following night they again 'lay all in the open field, upon the plowd-land, without straw, having neither bread nor water'. Foster commented that for the moment the men's spirits held up, but they drooped the next night when they were again out in the open, on the hills above Gloucester, on duty guarding part of the waggon train. He wrote that they 'were constrained to lye all night upon the top of this mountaine [rather an exaggeration], it being a most terrible tempestuous night of winde and raine, as ever men lay out in, we having neither hedge nor tree for shelter, nor any

40 H. Foster, *A True and Exact Relation of the Marchings of the Two Regiments of the Trained-Bands of the City of London, being the Red and Blew Regiments, as also of the Three Regiments of the Auxiliary Forces, the Blew, Red and Orange, who Marched Forth for the Reliefe of the City of Glocester from August 23 to Sept. 28* (1643).

41 *Ibid*., unpaginated.

sustenance of food or fire'. By this stage the troops were so desperate, he claimed, that they 'would run halfe a mile or a mile …, [to] where they heard any water was, such straits and hardship our Citizens formerly knew not'. They came down off the hill the following morning 'being wet to the very skin, but could get little or no refreshing, every house being so full of Souldiers'. During the day the London troops 'began to complaine pitifully, being even worn out and quite spent for want of some refreshing, some complaining that they had not eat or drunke in two dayes, some longer time'. The following evening they simply refused an order to march five miles through 'a very dark night'.

After refreshing in and around Gloucester and, following an overnight march of 17 miles, capturing Royalist supplies in Cirencester at the start of the return journey, things improved for a while, but criticisms soon resurfaced. Around Cricklade the London troops endured 'a wet march' and were then forced to stand on guard overnight because of 'a false alarm'; the following night, they could 'get no accommodation either for meat or drink, but what we brought with us in our snapsacks [and] most of us quartred in the open field, it being a very cold, frosty night'; halting outside Hungerford 'we were much distressed for want of sleep as also for all other sustenance; it was a night of much raine [and] we were wet to the skin'; and the following night, as they approached Newbury, the whole army 'quartered in the open field; we had no provision but what little every one had in his snapsack', Foster recorded.[42] The sufferings and hardships of an (early) autumn campaign seem to have caught the author's attention far more than the urban and rural landscapes through which he was moving.

In a similar style is Richard Coe's account, again of the London Trained Bands regiments who marched with Waller's Parliamentarian army, this time in spring and early summer 1644, leading up to the battle of Cropredy Bridge. It spans the seven weeks from mid May, when Coe and his men joined Waller's main army at Farnham, until early July, when the account peters out shortly after the battle.[43] Although there are a couple of references to heavy or extreme rain as well as to a night spent in an Oxfordshire wood 'where we burnt (it being rainy weather) I believe 50 pounds worth of wood if not more', there is far less notice of bad weather, such that nights when they 'lay in the fields' were noted without further comment or complaint.[44] Equally, there is no mention of shortage of food and drink – the very opposite, in fact. At Bagshot they found 'plenty of mutton, veale and lambe, some venison and good water, but neither bread nor beere', at Sudeley they captured the castle and with it '100 quarters of graine' and cattle, together with horses, plate, money, 32 pieces of cloth and feather beds and

42 All the quotations in this and the preceding paragraph are from *ibid*., unpaginated.

43 R. Coe, *An Exact Diarie, or a Briefe Relation of the Progresse of Sir William Wallers Army since the Joyning of the London Auxilliaries with his Force, which was the Twelfth of May 1644, untill their Returne to Neward on Thursday the 11 of Iuly Following, Relating the Perticulars of Every Skirmish, Battle and March dureing the Said Time* (1644).

44 *Ibid*., pp. 3, 5.

bedding, while near Dudley they were sent 'mutton, bread, cheese and beere'.[45] At Droitwich, which Coe referred to under its old name of 'Saltwich', they 'lay that night … in salt Cellers [and] grew so drie that we drunke the Towne drie'.[46] Later, they set out from the Gloucester area across the Cotswolds, heading for Stow, but 'we lost our way and went backward and forward within a mile of where we lay before'[47] – hardly surprising, given the very primitive and unhelpful maps then available. Coe closed his account shortly after the battle of Cropredy by noting that he and his London colleagues had marched over 500 miles since they joined Waller at Farnham – he is one of very few contemporaries to attempt an overall figure for distances they covered in the course of a campaign or a fighting season – as well as that they had lost very few killed during the campaign, and that the only two senior officers who had perished, a colonel and a captain, had succumbed to illness since they left the Banbury area and had not died in action.[48]

Overall, these contemporary accounts written by soldiers in marching armies reveal the hardships and sufferings but also the joys and pleasures of life on campaign and on the move. For some, including Symonds and Wharton, there was certainly an element of adventure and an opportunity to view new sights. Thus one Parliamentarian officer claimed – though perhaps in jest, as it seems unlikely that Londoners would not have been familiar with cows, huge numbers of which were driven into the capital on the hoof, to be slaughtered and butchered close to the London meat markets – that in the course of the Cheriton campaign, 'you should have seen the Londoners run to see what manner of things cows were. Some of them would say they had all of them horns and would do great mischief with them, then comes one of the wisest of them crieth "Speak softly"'.[49] Many took advantage of their new power to plunder and to rustle, to exercise their new-found liberty to acquire food and drink, apparel and other functional or valuable items which may well have been beyond their normal reach in peacetime. However, this is more than balanced by accounts stressing the hardships of campaign, the gnawing shortages of food, drink and sleep, the nights and days spent in the open and in bad weather, the sufferings of men who were cold, wet, tired and hungry. Indeed, an emphasis on the coldness and harshness of the English weather is a recurrent feature of the accounts of Wharton, Archer and Foster, even though they were not campaigning during or writing about the traditional winter months of December to March. Similarly, several times London-based writers exaggerated the heights and harshness of the rising ground they encountered, Foster repeatedly describing Cotswold hills as mountains and Wharton noting that the Malverns were by far the highest, longest and broadest range he had seen in his life; presumably,

45 *Ibid*., pp. 1, 4, 5.
46 *Ibid*., p. 4.
47 *Ibid*., p. 5.
48 *Ibid*., p. 7.
49 Historical Manuscripts Commission, *Fourteenth Report, Appendix Part II. The Manuscripts of His Grace the Duke of Portland, Volume III* (London, 1894), p. 107.

they had no experience or real conception of the true mountains and mountainous terrain to be found, for example, in North Wales or the Lake District. Together, these accounts certainly bring out that soldiers in a Civil War army did a lot of marching and that men covered significant distances on campaign, some excitedly noting the new sights, buildings and landscapes as they did so, though others apparently paid them little attention.

Civil War armies generally did not march great distances per day, nor did they march every day. Typically, for a marching army comprising horse and foot 10 miles was a fair distance to cover in a day and in bad weather or over bad roads artillery drawn by horses or oxen would struggle even to keep up with that pace. As the accounts just examined make clear, soldiers needed and expected days of rest intermingled with days of marching, so unless there was an overriding requirement to push ahead at speed – such as Essex's desire in late summer 1643 first to relieve Gloucester as quickly as possible and then to try to get back to London before the Royalists could block his route – the itinerary would include plenty of halts. Examination of the armies led by senior commanders, such as those of the King, Rupert and Waller, suggests that they would march and be on the move on around 40–50 percent of the days – or, occasionally, nights – spent away from their base and out on active campaign. Between March 1645, when he left London, and May and June 1646, when he was in attendance at the siege of Oxford, Oliver Cromwell was almost continuously on campaign as second-in-command of Parliament's New Model Army, returning to London and to Parliament, in which he sat as an MP, just once and briefly in spring 1646, and also returning to his home bases in Huntingdon and Cambridge only once, for a fortnight in early June 1645. Other than that, the only other occasions upon which he spent more than two or three nights in a single place related directly to military operations in which he was then engaged – the sieges of Bridgwater, Sherborne, Bristol, Winchester and Basing House during the latter half of 1645 and those of Exeter and Oxford during the first half of 1646. For most of this period, Cromwell was frequently on the move, campaigning across large areas of the central and eastern Midlands, the Home Counties, central southern England and the South West, in the process travelling as far north as Leicester and as far west as Truro. His campaigns, including setting out from London and returning to the capital, involved him covering around 1,200 miles during 1645 and around 600 miles during the first half of 1646.[50] As a cavalry officer and a senior army commander, Cromwell – like Symonds – would have travelled on horseback, whereas Wharton, Archer, Foster and Coe would have covered the ground on foot.

50 See P. Gaunt, 'A Cromwellian landscape? Oliver Cromwell and the urban and rural environment of Britain', in J. Mills (ed.), *Cromwell's Legacy* (Manchester: Macnhester University Press, 2012), especially pp. 73–6 and map 3.

So much for soldiers and their wartime movements. What of civilians during the war years? Did they travel, voluntarily or otherwise, while the Civil War was in progress?

However much they kept their heads down, those living in the heavily-fortified capital could not avoid being affected by the war to some extent. The lawyer and diarist John Greene, who spent most of the war years in the City, recorded in his personal account, often interleaved within printed almanacs, a wide range of personal and family events and experiences during that period.[51] He noted his wedding and the births and deaths of various children in his family – not least the birth and baptism of his first three children between spring 1644 and early summer 1646, the excited father recording their development and progress, especially the appearance of teeth – plus some more mundane personal experiences, including sermons he had attended and heard, his losses at cards, his own and his father's assessments for various taxes and impositions, the settling of bills with his apothecary and others. He made observations about the weather – including the 'extreme sharp' frost of early 1646 which caused the Thames to freeze over so that 'on Westminster side … some went over the Thames, as I heard' – he noted his studies of astronomy – in 1643 he and his brother-in-law began to 'learne astronomy and the use of the globes' – and he mentioned bouts of minor ill-health – he reported that he was 'extreme weary and ill' the day after playing tennis and at another point 'my teeth ache, not very much, only my gums sore and my face swelled very much, soe I stir not out in very cold weather', though eventually he had to call in a doctor who 'let my gums bleed, put something in my eare and gave me somewhat to snuffe up in my nose', but 'I thinke he did but little good [for] my face was swelled 3 or 4 dayes after'.[52] But his account also records that he and his family did move around during the war years, while keeping safely within Parliamentarian-controlled areas of the South East and East Anglia, including occasional jaunts south to Sussex and north to Cambridgeshire and Norfolk, plus a lengthy visit of around three months to the family home of Blois Hall in Essex during late spring and summer 1644, complete with careful notes of the bills he ran up there. Probably escaping the plague more than any wartime deprivations in the capital, Greene and his family – in total 17 members of his extended family stayed there in the course of the summer – passed what was evidently a very enjoyable few months in rural north Essex. Examining the resulting costs, Greene was alarmed to see that his party had got through around 10 stone of beef, a barrel of beer and eight shillings-worth of bread per week during their stay, and once back in London in September 1644 he noted with dismay that the jaunt had cost him £54 in total and he was wondering whether he might recoup some of that outlay by asking members of his extended family who had stayed with him in Essex to repay some of the costs.

51 E.M. Symonds, 'The Diary of John Greene (1635-57)', *English Historical Review*, 43 (1928). See also B. Coates, 'Greene, John (1606–1659)', *ODNB*.

52 Symonds, 'Diary of John Greene', pp. 291, 599, 601.

Nonetheless, it had clearly been a thoroughly enjoyable and relaxing summer break, all in the midst of a bitter civil war.[53]

Civilian town life could be more precarious in a provincial market or county town, particularly in a contested area or in one which came under attack. For example, before the war the elderly spinster Joyce Jeffreys rented a house and conducted much of her successful business, principally money-lending, in the county town of Hereford. Her surviving detailed financial accounts reveal that the onset of the Civil War badly disrupted both her professional and her personal life.[54] Her money-lending activities dwindled, as did her financial position, for she was often unable during the war to collect interest on existing pre-war loans or to recover her capital. A Royalist sympathiser and supporter, in September 1642 she contributed cash 'towards the biinge of armor and weapons and artillery to streinthen the cityy against the Parliament' as well as continuing to pay for the training of a member of the local militia, now supporting the King's cause, and helping to equip others who 'went to souldier'.[55] Accordingly, she fled Hereford later in the month 'for feare of the coming of the Parliaments army from Worcester to Heriford' and shortly before units from Essex's main Parliamentarian army duly rolled into the city, instead taking up residence in the countryside nearby.[56] She did not escape unscathed, for some of her goods, including cash, two horses, both of them 'bay coache mares', timber and 'much linin', were taken from her by the Parliamentarians, who plundered known Royalists.[57] She did not return to Hereford until the end of the year, once the Parliamentarians had withdrawn, whereupon she managed to recover some of her lost property – redeeming 'my 2 black beaver hatts and 2 gould bands, out of the theefes or plunderers hand' cost her 21s 6d – plus other goods which were still in her house there or were being held for safe-keeping by various friends in and around Hereford – such as a neighbour who was paid by her 20s for 'keeping my beds and trunks and boxes from the plunderers'.[58] She moved out of Hereford shortly afterwards and so was not there and did not suffer too much when the city was briefly regained and occupied by Waller's Parliamentarians in spring 1643. However, the two Parliamentarian occupations had cost her more money, for she reckoned that over £70-worth of her food, livestock and other goods had been taken and consumed by Parliamentarian troops which had billeted in her house during 1642–43[59] and she had to lay out smaller sums to have repaired the

53 *Ibid*., pp. 599–601.
54 J. Spicksley, *The Business and Household Accounts of Joyce Jeffreys, Spinster of Hereford, 1638–1648* (Oxford, 2012).
55 *Ibid*., p. 227.
56 *Ibid*., p. 228.
57 *Ibid*., p. 230.
58 *Ibid*., pp. 228-9.
59 *Ibid*., p. 238.

minor damage which her house, standing close to one of the city gates, had sustained during Waller's attack upon and capture of Hereford.[60]

Although Hereford was held fairly securely by the King's men after Waller's departure in May 1643 until spring 1645, Jeffreys incurred further expenses over that period in billeting soldiers from the Royalist garrison, as well as contributing to other costs of the garrison. In 1644 she paid 1s 8d towards 'work done in making bulwarks to defend the city of Hereford from invasion', but she drew the line at having her store of timber removed for that purpose and subsequently tipped 'an honest carpinder, for preserving my tymber from the Governers knowledge'.[61] Jeffreys herself did not return to Hereford, other than for very brief and fleeting visits – her house was, after all, now occupied by soldiers – and she spent the rest of the war living in friends' houses in the Herefordshire countryside or at her own rural property of Ham Castle. In spring 1645 she attempted hurriedly to sell other properties she had in the Hereford suburbs, ahead of an anticipated attack or siege by Parliament's Scottish allies, while late in 1645, around the time that English Parliamentarians commanded by Colonel John Birch surprised and captured Hereford, her main residence of Ham Castle may have been threatened, for Jeffreys had some of her valuables hidden, buried in one or more trunks the grounds.[62] The Civil War had not destroyed Jeffreys – she lived on until the end of the 1640s and her accounts from the post-war period show that she still enjoyed quite a comfortable lifestyle – but it had badly disrupted her life for several years, had forced her to leave Hereford and shuttle around the county and surrounding area, had cost her plenty of money and had undermined her money-lending business.

The contrasting fortunes and lives of two families who spent most or all of the war in the northern half of England also highlight the differing experiences of civilians during the war. According to a history of his family written by Jonathan Priestley towards the end of the seventeenth entury, the Priestleys were a minor gentry family who had long held land in the Halifax area of Yorkshire.[63] They supported Parliament when war broke out and as such their house at Goodgreave, Sowerby, was 'ransacked and plundered over and over again' by Royalist troops during the war, forcing them out.[64] Jonathan's father, Jonathan senior, took most of the family west, into the relative safety of Lancashire, within the first few months of the war, though for a time his wife and youngest children remained behind in West Yorkshire. Returning to see them before heading to London, Jonathan senior stumbled into a group of Royalist soldiers in an early morning mist and was brought prisoner to Halifax. Refusing to pay £80 to secure his release, he was instead held 'at the corner house in the South Gate' in

60 See, for example, *Ibid*., p. 250.

61 *Ibid*., p. 253.

62 *Ibid*., p. 267.

63 J. Priestley, 'Some memoirs concerning the family of the Priestleys written at the request of a friend by Jonathan Priestley … 1696', in C. Jackson, ed., *Yorkshire Diaries and Autobiographies in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (Surtees Society 77, 1883).

64 *Ibid*., p. 9.

Halifax, supplied with regular clean linen and money by his family. For a while, his health and stamina fortified him and his fellow prisoners, but 'being a strong active man, not used to confinement, he fell sick', and although he was moved to another house and attended by a family servant, 'in a few days it pleased God to take him to Himself'. 'He was interred [during 1643] behind the font in Halifax church, as decently as was possible for a man in his circumstances, and as the calamity of those times would permit.'[65]

Most of his children, the narrator's siblings, played no direct part in the war. One of them, Thomas, 'very painful and industrious [who] bent his mind much to trade', continued working as a cloth merchant throughout the Civil War, buying up cloth in West Yorkshire and carrying it by horse southwards towards London, often met in Northamptonshire by another brother who travelled up from London and then carried the cloth to the capital and sold it there for a considerable profit. Despite repeatedly passing through potentially hostile territory during the war, Thomas was 'never taken, he or his horses or goods, all that dangerous time'.[66]

The only sibling who played a military role in the Civil War was Samuel. He joined up to fight for Parliament under the Fairfaxes, taking leave of his mother, who tried but failed to persuade him to keep out of the war and to stay at home, meeting her pleas with the counter-argument that if he did so he could 'follow no employment, but be forced to hide myself in one hole or another, which I cannot endure; I had rather venture my life in the field and, if I die, it is in a good cause.' He campaigned with the Fairfaxes in Yorkshire, for a time serving in a regiment based at Heptonstall. His death was the result of 'an act of compassion to the enemy' for, repulsing a Royalist attack and pursuing the King's men back towards Halifax, he 'saw a wounded man in the water, ready to be drowned; being an object of pity, he went into the water in his boots and drew him out to dry land'. As a consequence of remaining on duty in wet boots all night, he caught a cold, 'fell, I think, into a fever, and died in about three weeks after'. He died in the family home and, 'perceiving his end approaching', he prayed with his mother and then immediately 'departed this life, in the flower of his age, about 22'. 'He was attended to his grave by many friends, then in exile, with the neighbours about us', and was interred in Rochdale churchyard.[67]

Alice Thornton, in contrast, was pro-Royalist, having been born in 1626 into a Yorkshire landed family with strong Royalist connections – her father was a close friend of Sir Thomas Wentworth, first Earl of Strafford, and had himself briefly served as lord deputy of Ireland before his death in 1640. The family escaped from Ireland in the wake of the Irish Rebellion, settling first in Chester and then on their estates or with relatives of Alice's mother in Yorkshire. According to Alice's later autobiographical account, on returning from Ireland they were initially welcomed in

65 *Ibid*., pp. 18–19.
66 *Ibid*., p. 23.
67 *Ibid*., pp. 26–7.

Chester and treated well by 'the gentry of the cittie' who were 'exceeding courteous and civill to my deare mother and my selfe … and such pittie and favour we found that she wanted nothing in that place'.[68] But life did not remain so pleasant, for by summer 1643 Sir William Brereton began harassing the city. On one occasion, Alice was up in a turret in the Chester house they were occupying when, 'as I looked out at a window towards St Marie's church, a cannon bullett flew soe nigh the place where I stood that the window sudainly shutt with such a force the whole tirritt shooks; and it pleased God I escaped without more harme, save that the wafte tooke my breath from me for the present and caused a great feare and trembling, not knowing from whence it came'. Around the same time, her brother fell sick with smallpox and, although he recovered, 'he was very much disfigured, having bin a very beautifull child'. Alice herself then fell dangerously ill, probably also from smallpox, though she too recovered, but another boy who was living with them slowly died of the disease.[69]

In late August 1643 the Thorntons decided to move on to Yorkshire, travelling through war-torn and divided territory, via Parliamentarian Warrington, where they witnessed an alarm of a possible Royalist attack, or perhaps just an exercise to keep the defenders on their toes, and on to Wigan, which had been 'sorely demolished and all the windowes broaken', where they were received with some suspicion.[70] Attempting to cross into North Yorkshire, they were stopped by Parliamentarian guards at Downham, near Clitheroe, subjected to 'harsh language and abusis by a Parliament corporall and his gang', arrested, threatened 'we should be striped' and held overnight in 'a pittifull house for shelter', before a Parliamentarian colonel and distant relative heard of their plight, confirmed their pass and ordered that they be allowed to travel on unmolested.[71] For a year or more, they lived quietly with relatives in a small North Yorkshire village, also visiting another relative nearby in Richmond, troubled by nothing more than occasional family illnesses. One brother, Christopher, went off to school in York, but thoughts of the whole family moving to York in spring 1644 were abandoned at the onset of the Parliamentarian siege. Hearing news of a possible battle on Marston Moor, they feared for Christopher's safety and another brother, George, was sent to fetch him; 'he happiely mett him riding out of the towne to see the fight' and took him up on his horse and carried him away, for a time 'pursued by a party of horrse of Scotts', though the pair arrived home safely at midnight, 'out of those great dangers of beeing murdered', as Alice rather dramatically put it. Her brother George, newly returned from France in fact, was wrongly suspected of being a Royalist army officer and so he was forced to move on and 'lived obscured from all people' for a while.[72]

68 C. Jackson (ed.), *The Autobiography of Mrs Alice Thornton* (Surtees Society 62, 1873), p. 32. See also A. Hughes, 'Thornton [née Wandesford], Alice (1626–1707)', *ODNB*.

69 Jackson, *Autobiography of Alice Thornton*, pp. 33–4.

70 *Ibid*., p. 37.

71 *Ibid*., pp. 37–8.

72 *Ibid*., p. 42.

The rest of the family, including Alice, stayed on in now Parliamentarian-controlled Yorkshire, living mainly at Hipswell near Richmond. However, as known Royalist sympathisers, their life became tougher, for they were harassed by mainly Scottish troops, occasionally plundered 'of meate and drink', compelled to pay £25 per month to support the Parliamentarian war effort and required to take in 'a troope of Scotts on free quarter'.[73] The family became hard pressed financially and was forced to borrow money to cover costs and expenses. Alice herself, now in her late teens, kept out of the way of the Scottish soldiers as much as possible, but one day she was surprised in her mother's chamber by a Captain Innis, whose eye she clearly caught and who 'began to be much more earnest and violent to have staied in the house'.[74] The family managed to get him out, 'who was so vild a bloody looked man that I trembled all the time he was in the house', though he then approached Alice's aunt with an offer of marriage to her niece, only to be rebuffed there.[75] Alice hid herself elsewhere when he paid a return visit to their home, causing 'this villaine captaine' to threaten cruelty. Financial demands increased and, with his troops, the captain, 'most vile and crewell in his oaths and swearing' against mother and daughter, returned and demanded more money and led off their cattle.[76] The family suffered other losses in the mid 1640s, including the lingering death of Alice's only sister, who was buried quickly and during the night in Masham church 'by reason of the parliament sett and Scots, who would not let a sermon be preached'.[77] But Alice and her mother survived the Civil War and were still living together with some of her brothers in Yorkshire as the main war ended and as the Scots pulled out.

Lastly, straddling the divide between soldiers and civilians were ministers who were attached to an army, regiment or garrison for at least part of the war – some of them quite briefly – and who either officially or unofficially might be said to have played the role of an army chaplain. Sadly, those who acted in this capacity on the Royalist side seem to have left little record of their war-time activities and roles, but a handful who served with Parliamentarian forces have left surviving autobiographies, journals or diaries. Once more, they provide evidence of enforced travelling and in some cases quite substantial war-time movement around and across the country.

In the autobiographical account which he wrote later in life, ostensibly for the benefit of his son, the Yorkshireman John Shaw recalled how he served as a preacher and minister in several parts of England during the 1630s, including Derbyshire and Devon, enjoying the patronage of future Parliamentarian the Earl of Pembroke. By the

73 *Ibid*., p. 43.
74 *Ibid*., p. 44.
75 *Ibid*., p. 45.
76 *Ibid*., pp. 45–6.
77 *Ibid*., p. 53.

later part of the decade he was back preaching in his native county and by the outbreak of the Civil War he was minister at Rotherham.[78] At the start of the war and with the allegiance of much of Yorkshire uncertain and disputed, he and his wife sought shelter in more solidly Parliamentarian Kingston upon Hull, but he was not welcomed by the governor and instead led a rather precarious life during the opening months of the war, preaching at Beverley and to Lord Fairfax's Parliamentarian troops at Selby and eventually returning to Rotherham.[79] When the town was surrendered to the Earl of Newcastle's Royalists in May 1643, Shaw was surprised to find himself picked out for a heavy fine and imprisonment – 'it seems that the sharpest and bitterest resolutions (to say no worse), tho' causelessly, were against me' – but he eluded capture by hiding first in the church steeple and then at his house – 'the soldiers sought me diligently, plundered my house and came five or six several times into the very room where we were; we could see them and have touched them; we were visible enough to them if the Lord, in mercy to us, had not shut their eyes'.[80] Eventually, he fled overnight to Manchester, where his wife joined him shortly afterwards.

Shaw became a weekly preacher in Manchester, where he took a house, but through the intercession of the commander of the Cheshire Parliamentarians, Sir William Brereton, he was also assigned the living of Lymm, travelling there on Saturdays, holding services on Sundays and then returning to Manchester on Mondays. For a time, in spring 1644, he became an active and reforming minister at Cartmell in northern Lancashire. But after the battle of Marston Moor and with Parliament back in control of almost the whole of Yorkshire, Shaw and his family returned. During the latter half of the war, he became chaplain and clerk to various Parliamentarian administrative and military committees which sat in York, not only ministering to them but also maintaining their records, though he noted that after the Restoration he 'burnt the papers, since this late turne of the times'.[81] At the request of Lord Fairfax he also became minister of Scrayingham, outside York, though soon after he returned to Kingston upon Hull and became minister there, claiming with God's support to do good work in establishing firmer church discipline and inculcating 'purer' practices in the town and often preaching to the Parliamentarian garrison based there, while still travelling back to York from time to time in order to serve the committees meeting in that city.[82] By the end of the war, in spring 1646, he was also acting as chaplain to the members of a Parliamentarian committee overseeing and coordinating the siege of Newark.[83]

Adam Martindale was another northerner, born and brought up in south Lancashire, who wrote an autobiography towards the end of his life recording, among other things,

78 C. Jackson (ed.), 'The Life of Master John Shaw', in C. Jackson (ed.), *Yorkshire Diaries and Autobiographies of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (Surtees Society 65, 1877).
79 *Ibid*., pp. 135–6.
80 *Ibid*., pp. 136–7.
81 *Ibid*., p. 140.
82 *Ibid*., p. 141.
83 *Ibid*., pp. 142–3.

his work for Parliamentarian troops and garrisons during the Civil War and the wartime dangers and dislocations he suffered as a result.[84] After a rather scrappy education during the 1630s and failing to enter university, during the early 1640s – both before and after the outbreak of war – he earned a precarious living as a young schoolteacher in south Lancashire. As he later recalled, the whole Martindale family was soon badly affected by the onset of war, for his father and two of his brothers had earned a living as housebuilders and, as Martindale noted, 'who would [now] either build or repaire an house when he could not sleepe a night in it with quiet and safetie?', so their trade 'was quite dead'.[85] Another brother tried to keep his head down for fear of being compelled to serve in the Earl of Derby's Royalist army being recruited in the area and sought shelter in pro-Parliamentarian Bolton, while a further brother, in whom his father had invested, found his business in difficulties as trade collapsed.[86]

Adam himself was aware that he, too, was 'liable to the danger of dancing attendance at the Generall Musters' and, in an attempt to avoid military service, he became a schoolmaster at Upholland in Lancashire, though he encountered many problems there, including the irregular attendance of the children 'in those dayes of constant alarmes', his own lodgings in a public house 'to which many papists and drunkards did frequently resort', the disturbances caused by soldiers being quartered 'amongst us to the depriving us of our beds and chambers' and his own harassment at the hands of Royalist troops stationed in the area who knew that his brother was at Bolton and thus suspected him of Parliamentarian sympathies, despite his attempts to convince them otherwise 'by swearing and debaucherie'.[87] Soon moving on and following an equally disturbed spell as a schoolmaster in nearby Rainford, where, 'though I excused my self as a piece of a clergy-man', he feared being forced to join the Royalist forces, he was animated by a godly sermon preached by the minister of St Helens.[88] He did not immediately seek to become a full-time preacher and instead accepted a clerical job in the Parliamentarian garrison at Liverpool, initially as clerk to the governor himself, though he found the family 'such an hell upon earth as was utterly intolerable … a packe of arrant thieves', and then as clerk to the infantry regiment and its quartermaster based there.[89] Martindale recalled this period with affection in his autobiography, for his work was quite light, apart from wearing a sword 'for fashion sake' he was not required to bear arms and he had plenty of time 'to read scriptures, to confer of good things and to pray together', enjoying the 'sweet communion with the religious officers of the company'.[90]

84 R. Parkinson (ed.), *The Life of Adam Martindale, Written by Himself* (Chetham Society 4, 1845). See also C. Nunn, 'Martindale, Adam (1623–1686)', *ODNB*.
85 Parkinson, *Life of Adam Martindale*, p. 31.
86 *Ibid*., pp. 31–3.
87 *Ibid*., pp. 34–5.
88 *Ibid*., p. 35.
89 *Ibid*., p. 37.
90 *Ibid*., p. 37.

The arrival of Prince Rupert's Royalist army in south Lancashire in spring 1644 brought an abrupt end to this interlude of calm. Two of his brothers lost most of their possessions when Bolton was stormed and captured, though they survived the ensuing massacre – one took his new wife and fled for safely to the Parliamentarian garrison at Warrington – but his elderly father was taken prisoner there by the Royalists, who 'used him most barbarously, forcing him to march in his stockings, without shoes, and snapping his eares with their firelocke-pistolls', as well as thoroughly plundering him.[91] Although seeking appointment as schoolmaster in Sefton, Adam himself was still serving with the garrison in Liverpool when it was attacked and captured and so was 'in as great dangers and straits as any single man could likely fall into'.[92] Although he was also thoroughly plundered, he counted himself lucky to have been granted quarter and so escaped with his life and he was released after two months' imprisonment. He became a schoolmaster at Over Whitley in Cheshire, where he remained, in part educating himself in preparation for full-time ministry, until very near the end of the Civil War.[93] With the end both of the fighting and of an outbreak of plague in the North West, in the mid 1640s there were greater opportunities for preaching and preachers and, having preached at Middleton and St Helens, he accepted an invitation to become the regular minister at Gorton Chapel in Manchester. In the wake of his own and his family's wartime struggles and his work on the fringes of the Parliamentarian war effort, as the Civil War ended Martindale embarked upon a ministry through which he became one of the more prominent churchmen in the North West during the later 1640s and the 1650s.

Despite fairly humble origins, Ralph Josselin claimed that from an early age he had a strong desire to become a clergyman and, following a spell at Cambridge University in the mid 1630s, he spent the next few years holding a variety of curacies and schoolmaster posts, before becoming vicar of Earls Colne in Essex in 1641, where he stayed for the remainder of his career and life. His surviving diary, which provides an overview of his early years but which becomes much fuller and more detailed from summer 1644 onwards, makes clear his godliness and opposition to the religious policies of Charles I, his broad support for the Parliamentarian cause and his keen interest in the progress of the war.[94] During summer 1644 Josselin attended a military rendezvous in Northamptonshire[95] and in early June 1645, in the build-up to Naseby, he assisted with the muster of the local cavalry regiment and accompanied it part-way across the county, in the course of which 'I sung psalmes, prayd and spake to our souldiers…; the Collonel was pleased to honor mee to be his Comrade [and] I shall

91 *Ibid*., p. 39.
92 *Ibid*., p. 40.
93 *Ibid*., p. 41.
94 A. Macfarlane, ed., *The Diary of Ralph Josselin, 1616–1683* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976). See also A. Macfarlane, *The Family Life of Ralph Josselin, a Seventeenth-Century Clergyman* (Cambridge, 1970) and J. Walter, 'Josselin, Ralph (1617–1683)', *ODNB*.
95 Macfarlane, *Diary of Ralph Josselin*, p. 15.

never forgett his great love and respect', though he did not accompany the regiment beyond Essex and was not present at Naseby itself.[96]

Later in June 1645 Josselin was formally appointed as salaried chaplain to this Essex-based regiment.[97] His diary reveals that during late summer and early autumn 1645 he accompanied his regiment for a month or so as it marched around East Anglia and the East Midlands in response to the King's approach. This took Josselin to Cambridge, Huntingdon and Stamford, into Rutland and Leicestershire and on as far as the fringes of Derbyshire. He recorded several 'alarms', which generally proved to be false, and most of the injuries he saw were as a result of accidents – 'one horse shott in the legge through a mistake', 'one hurt with his own pistoll upon the guard' and 'the Major had a fall [presumably from his horse, but] God preserved him'. However, at Ashby in Derbyshire in mid September he was present at and witnessed an attack on the Royalist garrison there, in which two men were killed. Shortly afterwards, he narrowly escaped an ambush, in which 'one of the men was slaine on the ground where I had stood closely a little before, not knowing of the pardue [a soldier or soldiers occupying a dangerous or concealed position] in the ditch, who shott this man presently after'. In the course of this expedition, Josselin had just a brief taste of the hardships of military life – 'a hard egg, and tough cheese, and pretty coarse lodging', 'pittiful blacke bread [but] I gott a white loafe crust [and] our lodging was upon straw and a quilt in our clothes', 'our meat smelt' and 'I pocketted 2 white loafes against the worst'. Having preached and ministered regularly to the officers and soldiers of the regiment, Josselin left them in Cambridgeshire and returned home, apparently for good, his active service in the war over, on 23 September 1645 – 'returned safe to Colne to my deare wife and friends, my place [as the village's minister] supplyed in my absence I praise God'.[98]

Many people found themselves on the move and far and away from home during the Civil War, often as a direct consequence of that conflict. Non-essential travel, purely for pleasure or interest, was probably curtailed during the war years. Perhaps the best known 'professional' traveller and travel writer of the early Stuart decades, the poet and writer John Taylor, was unable to embark upon any of his jaunts across England and Wales, spawning part-verse and part-prose printed accounts of his adventures, between a journey he undertook along the Thames and Severn valleys in the still fairly settled summer of 1641 and a trip from London to the Isle of Wight and back in autumn 1648, just as the Second Civil War was drawing to a close. As a Royalist sympathiser, Taylor was harassed in and forced from London in the early months of the war and sought refuge in Royalist Oxford, but while he found employment in the

96 *Ibid*., p. 41.
97 *Ibid*., p. 42.
98 *Ibid*., pp. 44–7.

Royalist capital and continued to write in the Royalist cause for the remainder of the war, his travels and resulting travelogues were put on hold.[99] Moving around during the war years, in a country that was divided, militarised and on edge, was clearly difficult for civilians. The accounts drawn upon here of the troubles encountered by the Thornton and Priestley families, as well as by John Shaw and Adam Martindale, reveal how civilians who tried to move around often found themselves intercepted by bodies of troops or running into garrisons and were liable to be stopped, questioned, harassed or threatened by soldiers in arms. We have also seen how the danger of enforced and unwelcomed conscription might be an incentive for some adult male civilians of fighting age to move around, but also necessitated great caution while on the road and about their intended destination.

More broadly, the militarisation of the country could impel some civilians to move. Thus the pro-Royalist Thorntons relocated from the North West into the (for a time) more congenial environs of Yorkshire, while the Parliamentarian sympathies of some members of the Priestley family and of John Shaw encouraged them to cross the Pennines in the other direction during the war. None of these people were moving around for pleasure, enjoyment or the excitement of visiting new environs. The only one of our sample of civilians about whom that might be said was the Londoner John Greene, who, with his family, did undertake various wartime trips and visits, though it is noticeable that he always stayed within Parliamentarian-controlled territory and did not risk visiting areas of active fighting or crossing frontiers around which control was divided and disputed. Greene's main concern on these occasions was the cost of his excursions and bucolic rural breaks, not the fear of combat or of finding himself caught up in active fighting. His wartime experience was thus a world away from that of the spinster Joyce Jeffreys, who had her ordered life in Hereford turned upside down and who temporarily moved away from the county town and her long-time place of residence. In contrast, although we get few details in the surviving family account, two Priestley brothers were reportedly able to maintain their long-distance trade throughout the war, repeatedly moving themselves and their cloth between West Yorkshire and London unmolested, even though they would have had to cross or at least pass close to contested and divided areas.

The war had a much more direct impact, of course, upon those who were attached to or members of Civil War marching armies. They found themselves moving around the country on campaign and passing through areas which they had probably not visited before and might never have travelled through were it not for the exigencies of war. While the contemporaneous published accounts of the London Trained Bands members Elias Archer, Henry Foster and Richard Coe – much like the many surviving war-time letters of Oliver Cromwell – enable us to reconstruct their itineraries and

99 See B. Capp, 'Taylor, John [*called* the Water Poet] (1578–1653)', *ODNB* and J. Chandler, ed., *Travels Through Stuart Britain. The Adventures of John Taylor, the Water Poet* (Stroud: Sutton, 1999).

to chart their movements on campaign in some detail,[100] they do not provide much of a feel for the landscape; Archer, Foster and Coe focus far more on the privations on life on campaign than on the towns, villages and countryside through which they were passing. Far more enlightening in this respect are the letters of Nehemiah Wharton, who evidently did engage with and was from time to time enraptured by the urban and rural environments through which he was passing, and the so-called diary of Richard Symonds, revealing that his extensive military campaigns around England and Wales at the height of the Civil War enabled him to give full vent to his antiquarian, architectural and ecclesiastical interests. Thus while Archer and Foster emphasise the suffering caused by bad weather and lack of food, drink and shelter while far and away from home, Wharton and Symonds reveal that life on campaign might also bring topographical enjoyment and real pleasure. Despite all the death, suffering and destruction which it undoubtedly wrought, for those who found themselves far and away from home the Civil War also brought with it potential opportunities and enrichment of many kinds.

100 For Cromwell's wartime movements see Gaunt, 'A Cromwellian landscape?' and P. Gaunt, *The Cromwellian Gazetteer. An Illustrated Guide to Britain in the Civil War and Commonwealth* (Stroud: Sutton, 1987), pp. 224–35.

1

'This Disarmed Multitude'

The Impact of the Lostwithiel Campaign on the Earl of Essex's Army and its Reconstitution for Second Newbury

Simon Marsh

Whilst the orders of battle for the Royalist and the Earl of Essex's Parliamentarian armies at the battles of Lostwithiel and at Second Newbury have been published[1] no detailed attempts seem yet to have been made to use the Exchequer papers in The National Archives to validate and refine Essex's orders of battle and to make estimates of the numbers of common soldiers engaged in these battles. But it is not just for the battles that we should be interested in the changing size of Essex's army. Variations in its strength over the summer and autumn of 1644 provides an indication of the impact of campaigning, rather than fighting, on an army of the period, particularly one which, by all accounts, was attacked by the local populace, allegedly suffered desertion of officers, lacked provisions and, presumably, was affected by the poor weather experienced before and after the disaster at Lostwithiel.[2] Moreover the re-emergence of Essex's regiments at Second Newbury in the actions around Speen and the supply measures enacted to restore that army provides insights into Parliament's ability to regenerate its forces. This paper examines the changing fortunes of Essex's army over the period, including the London Trained Band regiments and other locally raised forces, as these were important elements operating with the army during the campaigns. A note on methodology is at Annex A.

The 1644 Campaign

The 1644 campaign for Parliament opened with manoeuvring between Sir William Waller and Sir Ralph Hopton which culminated in the battle of Cheriton (29 March 1644) in Hampshire. Hopton's defeat there allowed Waller to join forces with the

1 Stephen Ede-Borrett, 'The Royalist Army At The Second Battle of Newbury 27 October 1644', *Journal for the Society of Army Historical Research*, 77 (Winter 1999), pp.240–249; Stephen Ede Borrett, *Lostwithiel 1644* (Pike and Shot Society: Farnham, 2004), pp. 61–75; Malcolm Wanklyn, *Decisive Battles of the English Civil War* (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2006), pp. 136–158; Christopher Scott, *The Battles of Newbury* (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2008).

2 Sir Edward Walker, *Historical Discourses* (London, 1705), p. 80.

Earl of Essex and move to besiege Oxford, the Royalist headquarters. But the strong antipathy between Waller and Essex made combined army operations difficult and the King was able to slip away from Oxford with his cavalry and 2,500 musketeers in early June. On 6 June, Waller and Essex met at Chipping Norton and Essex took the fateful decision to march his army into the west to relieve Lyme whilst Waller followed the King. Although unhappy with this decision, as too was the Committee of Both Kingdoms which was directing the Parliamentarian war effort at this time, Waller pursued the King through the Cotswolds. Charles was able to return to Oxford and join the remainder of his army. Across the Cherwell around Cropredy Bridge the two armies clashed on 29 June 1644. Waller's was badly mauled and disintegrated in the following weeks, allowing the King to turn and pursue Essex into the West.[3]

In the West the King's nephew Prince Maurice had withdrawn from his positions before Lyme and moved to Exeter at Essex's approach, who then advanced to capture Weymouth and Bridport before marching into Devon, arriving at Tavistock on 23 July. Essex next moved to raise the siege of Plymouth by a Cornish army under Sir Richard Grenville. Grenville fell back before the Parliamentarians into Cornwall and Essex pursued, encouraged by Lord Robert's view that his local influence – Robert's family seat was at Lanhydrock, north of Lostwithiel – could turn Cornwall to the Parliamentarian cause.

Essex marched to Lostwithiel on 2 August and secured the coastal village of Fowey with the aim of linking up with the fleet under the Earl of Warwick. A day later the King ordered Granville to proceed toward Lostwithiel and, with the Oxford and Prince Maurice's armies advancing from the east, by 11 August the Parliamentarians were largely surrounded in the town. In operations over the next three weeks the Royalists closed the net around Lostwithiel which culminated in Essex ordering his cavalry to break out on 30 August and a withdrawal of his infantry and artillery train to the coast in the hope of relief from the sea on 31 August. But the Royalists pursued Essex closely and in a confused battle over the hedged fields south of Lostwithiel the Parliamentarians were driven back and forced to surrender the next day. The Royalists disarmed the 6,000 infantry that were reported to have been captured and, without the means to maintain them in captivity, sent them on their way. Despite a Royalist escort the defeated Parliamentarians were attacked and pillaged by local people and suffered heavy losses; the King's secretary, Sir Edward Walker, suggested that only 1,000 reached Poole, although he did not say how many returned to Southampton. From Portsmouth, Essex directed the re-equipping of his army, which steadily moved into the city from Southampton and Poole through September. Essex's army departed

3 For an account of the Cropredy campaign see Margaret Toynbee and Peter Young, *Cropredy Bridge 1644* (Kineton: Roundwood Press, 1970).

Portsmouth on 17 October and rendezvoused with other Parliamentarian forces at Basingstoke on 21 October.[4]

The combined force then advanced to Thatcham, east of Newbury, arriving there on 25 October. Following skirmishing around Clay Hill to the north east of the town on 26 October, the Parliamentarian commanders decided to split their forces in an attempt to envelop the royal army occupying the open fields to the north of the town. Essex had no involvement in this decision as he was sick at Reading. Overnight Essex's and Waller's armies with a London militia brigade and elements of the Earl of Manchester's army marched around the north of the Royalist position and, in the mid-afternoon attacked Royalist forces defending the village of Speen from the west.[5]

The Earl of Essex's Army During the 1644 Campaign

On 20 May, at the beginning of the 1644 campaign, Essex appears to have had around 5,500 infantry and just over 2,200 cavalry excluding officers. These were divided into eight regiments of foot and six of cavalry. The infantry regiments were commanded by Colonels Edward Aldrich, Harry Barclay, Adam Cunningham (who on his death at the start of the campaign was replaced by Edward Fortescue), William Davies, Thomas Tyrell, Sergeant Major General Philip Skippon, Lord Marshal John Lord Robert and the Earl of Essex himself, though his regiment was placed under John Boteler's command and was referred to in this way during the campaign. The cavalry regiments were under Lieutenant General Sir William Balfour, Commissary General Hans Behre, Quartermaster General John Dalbier, Colonels James Sheffield and Sir Robert Pye with Lieutenant General Sir Philip Stapleton nominally commanding the Earl of Essex's own regiment of horse, though Lieutenant Colonel Richard Greaves is most likely to have led the unit as Stapleton commanded Essex's 120 strong lifeguard troop of cuirassiers. A company of dragoons was also attached to Essex's Regiment of Horse and was commanded by Captain Jeremiah Abercromy, who also captained a troop of horse in the regiment. A more detailed breakdown of the units is at Annex B.

Included within these overall manpower totals were four additional cavalry troops mustering overall around 170 men under Major William Urry, Captain Richard Stevens, Captain John Innes and Captain Alexander Ramsay that did not participate in the Lostwithiel campaign. Robert Bruce, Innes' lieutenant, took command of that troop on 6 June.[6]

4 For a detailed account of the Lostwithiel campaign see Ede-Borrett, *Lostwithiel 1644*; Walker, p.80; W.D. Hamilton (ed.), *Calendar of State Papers Domestic Charles I* [*CSPD*]*, 1644–45* (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1890), pp. 52, 62, 67.

5 For recent detailed accounts of Second Newbury and the build-up to the battle, see Wanklyn and Scott; Hamilton, *CSPD 1644–45*, p. 73.

6 The National Archives (TNA), SP28/16 ff.28, 33, 39 and 52; British Library MS Harley 166 f.140b; W.D. Hamilton (ed.), *Calendar of State Papers Domestic* [*CSPD*] *Charles I, 1644* (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1888), pp.324–325; Toynbee and Young, p. 102.

The composition of Essex's train of artillery at this time is more difficult to discern as no records for it appear to survive. Royalist estimates for the number of pieces of ordnance captured at Lostwithiel vary from 36 by the King's Secretary of War, Sir Edward Walker, to 50 by Sir Richard Bulstrode, a cavalry officer. The Royalist Richard Symonds, a trooper in the King's Lifeguard of Horse, suggests 42 pieces and a mortar were taken in Cornwall. If the latter figure is accurate it is remarkably close to the number of artillery pieces that Essex took with him for the relief of Gloucester in the summer of 1643. That train of artillery consisted of three 12-pounders, two culverins and four demi-culverins, five Dutch 6-pounder sakers, eight 6-pounder saker cuts, seventeen 3-pounder drakes and four multi-barrelled case drakes; 43 guns in total. Essex left three of his larger guns at Gloucester, but had been issued with four brass minion drakes in March 1644. At least three demi-culverins were lost at Lostwithiel, so a combination of six or more battering pieces of 9-pounder shot or greater with the remainder being 6- and 3-pounders and the lighter case drakes seems to be how the train was constituted.[7]

This was the force that entered Reading on 19 May 1644 and the estimated unit strengths can be calculated based on the muster that took place there on 20 May, though payments were not made until early June. Four cavalry troop warrants, those belonging to Captain Jeremiah Abercromy in the Earl of Essex's Regiment, Major William Balfour and Captain Brice Semple in Lieutenant General Sir William Balfour's Regiment and that for Commissary General Hans Behre's own troop, are missing from this muster. Nevertheless other elements of their regiments were present and all participated later in the campaign so it appears these warrants have been lost. As a consequence the troop strengths based on the muster details at Tiverton on 11 July, which were captured by the Royalists at Lostwithiel (see below), have been used to generate an estimate of the size of these troops in May.

Following the taking of Reading, Essex was joined by additional forces from the City of London. In early April, in response to Parliament's support for a general rendezvous of forces in southern England to mount operations against Oxford, the City authorities agreed to send three auxiliary militia foot regiments – the Green, Orange and Yellow[8] – to join Essex's army with an additional three to follow as a reserve. The first three regiments left London in mid May, each having an establishment of 1,400 men plus officers. But the units are unlikely to have been greater than 600 strong each, particularly as the reserve auxiliary regiments, which were never sent to Essex, numbered less than 1,000 men in total in early July 1644.[9]

7 British Library Add. Ms 34,315, f.44r; Hamilton, *CSPD 1644*, p.308; Shakespeare Birthplace Trust, DR98/1704 ff.74r-75v ; Ede-Borrett, p. 40; Walker p. 79; Richard Bulstrode, *Memoirs and Reflections Upon the Reign and Government of King Charles I and King Charles II* (London, 1721), p. 110; Richard Symonds (C.E. Long, ed.), *Diary of the Marches of the Royal Army* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 66.

8 The Yellow Auxiliaries were commanded by Colonel John Owen (*CSPD 1644*, p.514).

9 Lawson Chase Nagel, *The Militia of London 1641–1649*, unpublished PhD thesis, University of London 1982, pp. 182–183, 193; Keith Roberts, *London and Liberty* (Partizan Press: Southend-on-Sea, 1987), p.17.

Separately, a regiment of horse raised by the City under Colonel Edward Harvey was eventually despatched to Essex on 25 May, reaching him on 3 June. That regiment had been ordered to join Sir William Waller in early April, but Harvey steadfastly refused to obey, saying that 'he would rather carry a musket under His Excellency [Essex] than have a charge under Waller'. This argument dragged on until the end of May when the Committee of Both Kingdoms decided instead that Harvey should join Essex. Essex apparently despatched three of Urry, Stevens, Bruce and Ramsay's troops to Waller, with whom he was supposedly co-operating at this point in the campaign, as compensation for the loss of Harvey's Regiment. It is unlikely that this was done willingly and Essex may only have agreed to make this resubordination under duress. Indicative of this was Essex's correspondence with the Committee of Both Kingdoms from Lambourn on 10 June where he said he was unable to spare 'any from my army' until he knew what forces were likely to face him in the West. By then Essex had made his decision to relieve Lyme and departed company from Waller, taking the forces he had at Reading and the City regiments into the West.[10]

Additional equipment for the train of artillery had been sent from London before the campaign started in May. Spades, shovels and pickaxes, along with 960 ells of canvas for cartridges, 4,000 Swedish feathers and carts, wagons and tumbrels valued at almost £350 were provided.[11] Some military supplies, including 600 muskets and bandoleers, 500 pikes, over 160 sets of armour for cavalry, several hundred pairs of pistols, 200 saddles and bitts and over a half a tonne of oats, were separately despatched from London for Essex's army in late May. The wagoners that carried these supplies were out for 22–24 days, departing 24 May and 31 May respectively and it seems likely they caught up with the army as it was leaving the vicinity of Oxford (for the earlier date) or at Lambourn (the later date). No other supplies were provided by wagon from London until the army returned to Portsmouth in September, but 100 barrels of powder do seem to have been supplied by sea to Lyme and Plymouth for the army's use in late July 1644. It is also possible other provisions were shipped for army use from south coast ports holding military supplies, such as Portsmouth or Plymouth.[12]

Essex marched quickly and achieved his primary objective of raising the siege of Lyme on 15 June. From there he advanced to take Weymouth, which surrendered on 17 June, and garrisoned the town with the Yellow Auxiliary Regiment of Foot. The capture of Lyme and Weymouth enabled Essex to link up with the fleet under the Earl of Warwick and receive supplies. From Weymouth the army moved toward Exeter, but the Queen, who had given birth there on 16 June, had already escaped into Cornwall and left Falmouth for France on 18 July. Possibly because he lacked sufficient heavy artillery and due to a failure to find suitable field carriages for cannon

10 *CSPD 1644*, pp. 153, 155, 168, 199–200, 220, 363; Nagel pp. 179–180.

11 This probably equates to nine or ten wagons etc. as the price of wagons in 1642 was £30–40 each.

12 TNA, SP28/145 ff.45r-46r; SP28/140 part 4, ff.31v-32v; WO55/460, f.47r; BL Ms Add. 34,315 f.56v; WO47/1 f.74.

which could have been taken from the Earl of Warwick's ships, Essex declined to invest Exeter and moved the majority of the army instead to Tiverton with units deployed at Barnstaple, Weymouth and Taunton. Essex remained at Tiverton 3–18 July and it was here that a further muster was taken of the army on 10 and 11 July.[13]

At Tiverton the infantry in Essex's army are estimated to have numbered around 4,800 men, excluding the trained band regiments as these were not included within the Exchequer warrants. Despite ongoing efforts to recruit soldiers – £20,000 was received to pay the soldiers at Tiverton and over 60 recruits were recorded joining the army in July alone, notwithstanding a reluctance to serve under any but their own countrymen – the hardships of campaign as soldiers fell sick or deserted meant that its overall strength was lower than when it started the campaign. One hundred and eighty-seven soldiers were recorded as being sent away from the army in July because they were sick – 49 from Colonel Fortescue's Regiment, 32 from the Earl of Essex's and 30 from Major General Skippon's alone. Death and desertion would account for the remainder.[14]

By the time he reached Tiverton, Essex had also begun to add local units to his army. Colonel John Weare, the garrison commander at Lyme and Colonel Alexander Popham, a Deputy Lieutenant of Somerset, raised regiments which were attached to Essex's army. The former is likely to have included soldiers from Lyme garrison whilst the latter seems to have recruited at least some of its men from the Taunton area. But process was slow and Essex lamented on 15 July that both regiments were 'not above 200 [men] in all'. Weare's Regiment would eventually be 12 companies strong, although it is unlikely to have numbered more than 500 men during the campaign.[15]

The strength of the cavalry at Tiverton was recorded by Sir Edward Dodsworth, the Commissary General of Musters of Horse. His record fell into Royalist hands at Lostwithiel and was reproduced by Richard Symonds in his diary. This identified 38 troops with 411 officers and 2,720 troopers at the Devon town; a single troop of dragoons consisting of 65 men and nine officers was also present. These figures almost match the estimated troop sizes based on the available pay warrants. These suggest about 2,722 troopers were present at Tiverton, indicating that, overall, the cavalry estimates in this article based on the muster warrants are likely to be more accurate for the campaign than those generated for the infantry.[16]

After leaving Tiverton the army marched to relieve Plymouth, which was besieged by Cornish Royalist troops under Sir Richard Grenville, before storming Fitzford House in Tavistock on 23 July. A Council of War at Tavistock subsequently debated the next move. What Essex called 'the western men' – probably an allusion to Lord

13 *CSPD 1644*, pp. 244–245, 301, 335, 355; S.F Jones (ed.), *Mercurius Civicus*, Vol II, 1644, Milton Keynes, 2013, p.228.

14 *CSPD 1644*, pp. 335, 351; TNA SP28/17 ff.53, 58, 97, 128, 132, 137, 300.

15 *CSPD 1644*, p. 351; P. Young and W. Emberton, *Sieges of the Civil War* (London: Bell & Hyman, 1978), p. 67; John Wroughton, 'Popham, Alexander (1604/5–1669)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004, online edn., Jan 2008; TNA, SP28/18 f.64.

16 Symonds, p. 73.



Figure 1.1 Lostwithiel area of operations.

Robert, whose family seat was at Lanhydrock – assured the Council that the only way to reduce the West was to take Cornwall, that the people of the county were well affected to Parliament's cause and would provide victuals for the army. On this advice Essex ordered his men to march to Bodmin, from where, finding the Cornish largely opposed to its arrival, the army moved south to Lostwithiel to position itself near the coast with the prospect of resupply from the fleet under the Earl of Warwick.[17]

Disaster at Lostwithiel

Elements of the Plymouth garrison regiments under Colonels Carre and Rouse joined Essex's army after the city's relief. However, neither Rouse nor Carre appears to have served with the army. Carre was governor of Plymouth and Rouse's name is not recorded in the 'Attestation of the Officers of the Army concerning their Disaster

17 *CSPD 1644*, pp. 358, 398–99.

in Cornwall' but both their lieutenant colonels' names – Robert Martyn and Robert Moore – are. The surviving pay warrant made to these officers in September 1644 covers their soldiers jointly, supporting Stephen Ede-Borrett's suggestion that soldiers from these regiments formed a single unit at Lostwithiel. Lord Roberts claimed in early October 1644 that 1,000 foot had marched from Plymouth with Essex and this appears to be a reference to the garrison regiments under Carre and Rouse.[18]

At some point in August before it was forced to fight, a final army muster was taken, probably at Lostwithiel. The warrants from this muster, which were not honoured until September, therefore provide the best indication of the strength of the army before its defeat. These suggest it had a little over 4,900 infantry excluding an estimated 1,200 London militia soldiers and 1,500 men from regiments raised locally en route. Some local recruitment had obviously been successful following the army's departure from Tiverton, but not to the extent predicted by the 'western men'. The cavalry were little changed from the muster at Tiverton and had around 2,730 troopers.

However, the army warrants do not provide the complete picture of the Parliamentarian order of battle at Lostwithiel. The surviving commissary accounts from 26 July to 1 September 1644 belonging to Robert Woolsey, one of the deputies to the army's Commissary General, Nicholas Bond, detail the distribution of foodstuffs, including bread, 'biskett', cheese, butter, bacon, 'pease' and salt, and drink, including beer and 'syder', to the army. These indicate that there were additional formations supplied with victuals in the Lostwithiel pocket between these dates and, perhaps, that other units were not present. Colonel Popham's Regiment, a company of dragoons under Colonel Weare, a company of Northampton foot and a 'party of foot' under Lieutenant Colonel Innis were all in receipt of victuals as late as 28 August–1 September. Popham's Regiment received slightly fewer victuals than Davies' and Aldrich's Regiments over the period, perhaps suggesting its strength was about 300 men. The Northampton foot company and Lieutenant Colonel Innis' party might have added a further 100 men to the total number of foot and Weare's dragoons are likely to have been 50–70 men strong. In total the Parliamentarians perhaps had around 8,000 infantry at Lostwithiel when they were mustered there in August.[19]

Missing from the victualling lists were Rouse and Carre's 'joint' regiment, but as their lieutenant colonels attested, as noted above, it seems likely they (and therefore their formations) were present at Lostwithiel. James Sheffield's Regiment of Horse is also absent from the victualling accounts, though he was paid in early September with the other regiments of horse which broke out of the Royalist encirclement. This raises the possibility that his regiment had been sent away from the army earlier than 30 August, perhaps as a result of the Royalist encirclement reducing grazing options for the cavalry on 26 August; Behre's and Pye's Regiments of Horse received no victuals

18 Ede-Borrett pp. 74, 106; TNA SP28/18 f.66; *CSPD 1644–45*, p. 12.
19 SP28/128 part 28, ff.12v-28v.

Figure 1.2 The open beaches of Polkeris (left) and Menabilly (right). (Author's photo)

until 28 August, suggesting, for at least some of the regiments, local supplies and grazing could be obtained further afield until the encirclement was complete.[20]

The Royalists slowly surrounded Essex's army at Lostwithiel and the Fowey peninsular from mid August onwards. On 21 August they mounted an assault which cleared the Parliamentarians from the high ground around the town. Essex hoped for supplies from the navy, but the Royalist capture of Polruan Fort in mid August, which guarded the approaches to the harbour at Fowey, made obtaining such support difficult. Nonetheless supplies were delivered to the army on five occasions between 18–29 August by five different ships to the open beach anchorages at Menabilly and Polkeris (see Figure 1.2). The last delivery of bread and butter by the *Guift of Plymouth* on 29 August appears to have been into Menabilly as 1,680 loaves were left on 30 August in a carriage between the bay there and Lostwithiel, where the commissary supplies were stored. The volumes landed at these small ports were greater than had been supplied through Fowey earlier in the month.[21] The anchorages themselves therefore appear to have been able to accommodate the offloading of tonnes of victuals by small boat. Contrary winds, the availability of provisions in Plymouth or the lack of shipping appear therefore to have been the main cause of supply difficulties. The amounts of victuals delivered were not sufficient to sustain the army. Between 26 July and 1 September 1644, Essex's infantry regiments were supplied with around

20 SP28/18 f.20.

21 Around 5,350 lbs and 12,820 lbs of supplies were landed at Fowey on 8 and 10 August, around 29,000 lbs were brought in to either Menabilly or Polkeris on 21 and 24 August and between 9,000–10,000 lbs on each of 26 and 29 August. About 5,000 lbs had been landed at one of these beaches on 18 August, but the need for supplies, as Fowey was then also being used, was less pressing.

292 hundredweight of biskett, 5,890 loaves, 49 and a quarter firkins of cheese, 56 and a half firkins of butter around 3,300 pounds of bacon and 173 bushels of peas. Whilst these volumes appear large they were used to support just over 4,900 soldiers excluding officers for a period of 38 days. Based on the foodstuffs issued, and assuming a loaf of bread weighed one pound, then this equated to about one fifth of a pound of bread/biskett per man per day and around one ounce of cheese/butter/bacon per man per day. This equated, by modern standards, to perhaps 350 calories in total per man per day. Sir James Turner in his military treatise *Pallas Armata* recommended two pounds of bread and one pound of meat or cheese (around 4,200 calories) per man per day. Accepting this was an ideal, Turner acknowledged that a soldier might only receive two pounds of bread per week and, in calorie terms, this appears to have been what Essex's men were receiving on average from the end of July onwards.[22]

On 30 August, following the Royalist capture of St Blazey a few days earlier, which denied the Parliamentarians opportunities to graze their horses on the west bank of the River Par and find victuals further afield, Essex ordered a breakout of the cavalry. This was achieved overnight 30/31 August and the following morning the Parliamentarian infantry and train of artillery began to retreat to the coast. Harried across the hilly enclosed land that runs from Lostwithiel to the harbours at Fowey, Menabilly and Polkeris, Essex's remaining units withdrew in relatively good order until late in the day when a collapse of the right wing and pressure on the left from a Royalist assault across the Par at Tywardreath made their position untenable. Essex escaped by rowing boat leaving his infantry commander, Major General Philip Skippon, to sue for terms. These were agreed on 1 September with 6,000 infantry, and between 36–50 pieces of artillery surrendering to the Royalists. If the 6,000 figure reported by the Royalists is accurate it would suggest Parliamentarian infantry losses (killed, wounded and fled) of about 2,000 men between the August muster and 1 September 1644, excluding officers.

Return and Reconstitution

The surrender articles allowed the Parliamentarian soldiers to march east under Royalist escort. From Poole they went on to Southampton and Portsmouth, where they again took up arms. They were supposed to be protected from plundering by their escort, but were attacked by local people and Royalist soldiers in spite of these promises. According to The King's Secretary the 6,000 that set out from Lostwithiel were reduced to 1,000 men through death, sickness and desertion by the time they reached Poole. But these losses appear exaggerated.[23]

Essex seemed to expect at least 6,000 men to return from the West as he wrote from Plymouth on 3 September to the authorities in London setting out what was required to re-equip his army. This included 6,000 complete suits of clothes (coats, breeches, shirts, stockings and shoes), 6,000 muskets, 6,000 swords and 1,000 pikes,

22 SP28/128 ff.1v-19v; Sir James Turner, *Pallas Armata* (London, 1683), p. 201.
23 Walker, pp. 79–80.

80 partizans, 180 halberds and 180 drums. For a new artillery train he requested 20 pieces of ordnance: four demi-culverins, 16 small sakers of which six were to be of 12 lb shot and 10 of 6 lb shot or otherwise small minions of 5 lb or 6 lb shot with the rest drakes – probably 3-pounders.[24]

Why Essex asked for 7,000 muskets and pikes but only 6,000 sets of clothes is unclear, though he might have judged local supplies of clothing would be available wherever he reconstituted his army. Expecting 7,000 men to return from Cornwall was perhaps optimistic but not unreasonable if his muster in August had indicated the army's infantry strength at 8,000 men. Nevertheless the proportions of pikes and muskets requested by Essex was odd as it would suggest a 6:1 ratio in favour of muskets, much higher than in any army during the Civil War. The arms would presumably have been used to re-equip the London auxiliaries and those western regiments that made it back to Portsmouth in addition to Essex's men. Resupply of the Plymouth garrison forces may have been entirely with muskets and for the auxiliaries the City authorities in London had been seeking to increase their proportion of muskets to pikes from 1644. Even allowing for these factors the high musket to pike ratio implied by his proposals seems odd and it may be Essex was simply establishing a reserve of equipment as he knew from past experience that supply was never guaranteed. Nevertheless the nature of battle in enclosed ground at First Newbury and Lostwithiel, where the musket reigned supreme, and the defensive nature of all the battles he fought might have encouraged Essex to increase the army's firepower.[25]

In response to Essex's requests, the Committee of Both Kingdoms were preparing to send 6,000 sets of clothes and arms to Portsmouth in readiness for the defeated infantry by 8 September 1644. By 18 September 2,000 sets of clothes and 3,000 arms were in the process of being sent and the Committee of Both Kingdoms was pressing Essex to give an account of the numbers of horse and foot he had available. On 26 September the Committee again indicated that 6,000 sets of clothes and the same number of muskets and swords' had been 'voted' for the army along with 1,000 pikes.[26]

Soldiers from Lostwithiel started to reach Southampton by 13 September when Essex informed the Committee of Both Kingdoms that 800–900 had arrived. This report was from the colonel of Essex's own regiment, John Boteler, and the context of the report suggests this simply refers to the Lord General's Regiment which had been over 1,200 strong at Lostwithiel. Essex nonetheless did not muster his army until October. Pay for seven days was issued to the foot on 14 October and these warrants suggest the strength of Essex's infantry was at least 1,980[27] and possibly as high as

24 Bodleian Library, MS Tanner 61, f.149, quoted in Chris Scott and Alan Turton, *Hey for Old Robin* (Solihull: Helion & Company, 2017), p. 155.

25 LMA COL/CC/01/01/041 f.92v; I am grateful for the discussion on the pike to musket ratio by participants of the Century of the Soldier Conference.

26 *CSPD 1644*, pp.482, 514, 536.

27 This assumes all companies of all regiments were fully officered.

2,900.[28] Payments, some of which were rounded 'on account' amounts, were made on 16 September to the London auxiliary regiments and the locally raised regiments belonging to Colonels Weare, Rouse and Carre. Weare's Regiment was by then 150 men strong excluding officers and 36 transferred to the Earl of Essex's Regiment by early October. Whether soldiers under Colonel Rouse and Carre similarly joined Essex's army is unclear, though Lord Roberts indicated on 4 October that only 200 of the 1,000 that had left Plymouth had returned from Portsmouth. The number of auxiliaries is unclear, but Essex had asked on 3 September for a month's pay to be sent down to the army, so if the payment of £1,000 made on 16 September was for this duration, it probably represented 700–800 soldiers in total. Taken together these suggest that in addition to the 1,980–2,900 infantry that returned from Essex's army, perhaps around 1,100 from other regiments also made it back to Portsmouth. If so, 2,000–3,000 of the 6,000 captured by the Royalists failed to return from Lostwithiel. Whilst very high, these losses are not as dramatic as Walker made out.[29]

Further local recruitment, no doubt augmented by some late arriving stragglers, raised the numbers in Essex's infantry regiments to an estimated 3,000–3,600 men[30] when the next muster payments were made on 21 October. Essex's cavalry fared better than the infantry. Payments made to them on 21 October suggest that just under 2,000 troopers were serving at that time compared to the 2,730 at Lostwithiel. The 21 October figures exclude Colonel Harvey's Regiment which by then was no longer part of the army, and once the figures are adjusted for this, the overall reduction in Essex's cavalry was about 15 percent. These foot and horse would make up Essex's contingent at the Second Battle of Newbury at the end of October 1644.

Whilst many of the soldiers had returned, they still needed to be re-equipped and a new train of artillery established. By 11 September the Committee of Both Kingdoms had resolved to re-equip Essex's army with artillery, including two drakes for each regiment. Fourteen brass drakes were founded and carriages supplied for these along with two demi-culverin and four sakers. A further three culverin 'battering pieces' were due to supplied around the same time. Nevertheless, by the time of the Second Battle of Newbury on 27 October only eight pieces of ordnance (two 3-pounder drakes, probably four sakers and two demi-culverins) had been sent from London to the army via Reading prompting the General of the Ordnance, Sir John Merrick, to tender his resignation. This does not seem to have been accepted or Merrick was persuaded to take up his commission again as the Ordnance Office was being ordered to provide him in his role as General of the Ordnance with supplies in December 1644. The change of heart may have come about because a further six pieces of drake

28 This assumes that the number of common soldiers declined by the proportion that the value of the warrant reduced between the August and 14 October musters.

29 *CSPD 1644*, pp. 502, 517; SP28/18, ff.64, 66–67; SP28/19 f.89; *CSPD 1644–45,* pp. 12,45; MS Tanner 61 f.149.

30 See footnotes 27 and 28 explaining the assumptions in these figures.

artillery and the three culverins were delivered to Reading for the army in the first half of November and Essex's infantry recaptured some of the guns they had lost in Cornwall at the second battle of Newbury.[31]

The Ordnance Office procured for Essex's army 120 drums from the drum-makers Thomas Smith, Edward Tench and Giles Smart, 200 long pikes from John Edwards, 100 barrels of gunpowder from John Berisford's Temple Mill works in the Lea Valley and almost 11 tonnes of match from Thomas Stephanton and John Freeman. New ensigns for the infantry regiments made from Florentine sarsenet were also ordered from Alexander Venner; seven with an orange field with distinctions of white mullets, eight with crimson fields and yellow mullets, eight with green fields and yellow 'bullets', eight with crimson field and white balls, eight with green fields and yellow half moons and eight with green fields with white diamonds. The gunpowder and match were ordered to be shipped, probably by sea, to Portsmouth on 11 September and the drums with 60 ensigns, 120 halberds and 60 partizans were to be sent with the conductors and commissaries of train of artillery on 16 October. The pikes purchased from John Edwards were brought into the Ordnance Office stores, but there is no corresponding surviving warrant for their issue, indicating that the picture we have of the resupply of Essex's army is incomplete.[32]

This picture of the resupply effort can be augmented by the accounts of Thomas Richardson, who was Essex's wagonmaster general. Table 1 shows the volume of equipment and supplies transported to either Portsmouth or Reading in September and October for the army. This was achieved largely through convoys of wagons despatched from London to Portsmouth, though some of the artillery supplies were carted to Reading in October and barges were used to transport other items for the train at the end of the month. Three wagon convoys were despatched to Portsmouth from London on 20, 27 September and 2 October containing 32, 10 and 20 carts respectively. They appear to have travelled along what is now the A3 road via Kingston, Guildford, Godalming and Petersfield and what was then the main road from the Capital to the port. The round trip lasted eight or nine days and at least two of the carts returning from Portsmouth on the 27 September convoy carried sick soldiers back to London for treatment.[33]

The quantities of equipment supplied in bundles, hampers and packs are not clear, but an estimate of the number of muskets sent in bundles can be made. The Committee of Both Kingdoms' report to Essex on 18 September that 3,000 arms were being sent appears to refer to those shipped in the convoy of 20 September. As 500 pikes made up this shipment and the only other arms in the consignment were muskets, the 180 bundles of muskets identified must represent the balance of the arms

31 TNA, SP28/19 ff.208, 214; SP28/20 f.17; *CSPD 1644*, p. 493; H.G. Tibbutt, *The Letter Books of Sir Samuel Luke 1644–45* (London: HMSO, 1963), p. 365; TNA, SP28/140 part 4, ff.37v-38r, 42v, 44v; WO47/1 f.152.

32 SP28/19 ff.152, 174, 188, 198, 200, 202, 204, 206; WO55/460 f.53v.

33 TNA, SP28/140 part 4, ff.34r-39v; John Ogilby, *Britannia* (London, 1675), plate 30.

Equipment	20 Sep 1644	27 Sep 1644	2 Oct 1644
To Portsmouth			
Muskets	180 bundles		68 bundles
Bandoleers	4 hampers	9 hampers	5 hampers
Pikes	500		
Pistols			8 hampers
Swords		3,300+	
Belts		3,300+	
Clothes	24 packs	-	28 packs
Shoes	1 fatt	2 fatts	1 fatt
To Reading			**12 Oct 1644**
Match			6 fatts
Unidentified Ammunition			9 carts
Spades, Shovels, Picks			3 carts
Carts and Tumbrels for the Train or Artillery			11

Table 1: Thomas Richardson's account of military supplies sent to London and Reading for re-equipping the Earl of Essex's army.

Note: Based on reported quantities transported, the table assumes one cart load of muskets equates to ten bundles; 3,300 swords and belts are identified in Richardson's accounts as being supplied along with an additional cart load. A fatt is a measure of nine gallons equivalent, a fatt of match is around ten hundredweight.

supplied. If 2,500 muskets equates to 180 bundles, a bundle must have contained 13–14 muskets. On this basis the 68 bundles sent on 2 October probably contained around 950 muskets. Similarly if the 2,000 sets of clothes mentioned in the 18 September despatch represented the 24 packs loaded on the convoy by Thomas Richardson's men then the 52 packs of clothes supplied overall in September and October would equate to around 4,340 sets.

Five hundred pairs of pistols for cavalry had also been despatched to Essex by 2 October and preparations were being made to send saddles and other horse furniture, the latter indicating that not all supplies were necessarily handled or conveyed by Richardson as these do not appear in his accounts. Only 249 pairs of pistols were delivered by 15 October, presumably in the eight hampers despatched on 2 October,

but Essex told the Committee of Both Kingdoms that he needed more due to the losses experienced in skirmishing following the cavalry breakout on 30 August.[34]

Essex therefore probably received at least 500 pikes, almost 3,500 muskets, perhaps 3,600 swords and around 250 pairs of pistols at Portsmouth to re-equip his army. This was more than sufficient for the 3,000–3,600 infantry of Essex's own regiments that had returned from the West as well as many, but not all, of the other soldiers from the auxiliary militia and western regiments. Having only 500 pikes available to issue to his troops would have resulted in the unusually high musket to pike ratio identified earlier. Nevertheless if the 1,000 pikes 'voted' for supply reached Essex or local supply had augmented the totals, the issue of musket and pikes would have been more in line with expected ratios.

An additional 66 bundles of muskets and 17 hampers of pistols were sent with clothing and knapsacks by barge to Windsor, with seven of the hampers of pistols due to be forwarded to Reading on Essex's orders. Whilst the pistols seem likely to have been despatched to address the deficit in such cavalry arms identified by Essex, their departure from London appears to have been on 25 or 26 October and they are unlikely to have been available for use at the second battle of Newbury.[35]

Re-arming and re-clothing of the foot was due to be completed by 14 October, when the soldiers were mustered and paid, but this was not finished until 16 October. Essex's army therefore departed Portsmouth on 18 October and rendezvoused with the Earl of Manchester's force at Basingstoke on 21 October, the same day the Committee of Both Kingdoms ordered that six tonnes of bullet and six of match be issued from Farnham Castle for the use of the armies.[36]

Whilst the cavalry had managed to get away from Lostwithiel relatively unscathed, the disarmed infantry had suffered badly and the whole artillery train had been lost. Essex's officers had managed the march from Lostwithiel as well as could be expected and by bringing back a good proportion of the army they had ensured that it could be reconstituted and augmented with local recruitment. Parliament's effective administrative arrangements had enabled the procurement of new arms, artillery, equipment and clothes and their delivery to the army to allow it to become a fighting force once again. All this had been achieved impressively in a period of around five weeks. Nevertheless there was no immediate solution to the extensive loss of manpower and once again Parliament turned to its London militia reserves.

The requirement for Trained Band units to support efforts to stop the King's advance westward appears to have been identified by Parliament in mid September 1644. On the 13th a committee of the Lords and Commons met the City's governing body, the Common Council, to discuss '… if there be occasion, what Forces they can raise or

34 *CSPD 1644–45*, pp. 6, 44.
35 TNA, SP28/140 part 4, ff.40v, 45v.
36 *CSPD 1644–45*, pp. 30, 52, 62.

send forth'.[37] By 21 September, the Committee of Both Kingdoms reported that the City had offered five regiments of foot consisting, it estimated, of around 5,000 men. On 26 September the Committee was reporting that these regiments were due to march to join the forces earmarked to advance to meet the King, though at the end of the month they remained in London.[38]

A new date of 7 October was set for the City brigade to depart following a debate about who should command the force in the field. The officers in the brigade petitioned that Sergeant Major General Philip Skippon should be the brigade commander, but Parliament rejected this on the grounds that it was 'inconvenient' and Sir James Harrington was appointed instead. However some of the brigade remained in London until 12 October, apparently awaiting an ordinance relating to the maintenance of the City forces to be agreed by Parliament. By 16 October, the brigade had dribbled out of London, but had only reached Colnbrook, around 18 miles west of the City.[39]

The brigade's sluggish advance cannot be blamed entirely on officer discontent or procrastination because of concern over pay and victuals, though the experiences of City soldiers serving with Sir William Waller and the Earl of Essex over the summer of 1644 might well have coloured opinion on the latter. One explanation was that the brigade needed to await escorts of cavalry to protect its march westward and this was eventually solved by using troops from the Earl of Manchester's army and those under Herriot Washbourne, from Essex's army, riding to meet its advance. On 16 October the Committee of Both Kingdoms ordered Harrington to advance with his brigade to Reading and on 19 October he wrote from the town explaining that the brigade's regiments, numbering around 3,000 men, had first come together at Maidenhead on 17 October from where they marched to Reading the same night. Harrington noted that his companies were 'thin' and hoped his numbers would increase to 4,000 men in a day or two provide the Committee in London 'force out our defaulters'[40].

The regiments making up the City brigade were the Blue and Red Regiments of the City trained bands along with the Westminster (Red), the Southwark (Yellow) and Tower Hamlets (Yellow) trained band regiments. The Southwark Regiment was left to garrison Reading with the others eventually advancing toward Newbury. Each of the City regiments was supposed to have an establishment of seven companies of 200 men – 1,400 men in total excluding officers. The Tower Hamlets Regiment appears to have followed the City regiments' company organisation. The Westminster Regiment, which contained eight companies at second Newbury, should have had companies 300 men strong excluding officers and its theoretical strength was 2,400 men. If all the regiments had been up to strength, Harrington would have had 6,600 men at his disposal. But full strength regiments were never achieved; at a muster in September

37 *Journal of the House of Commons* [*CJ*]: *volume 3: 1643–1644* (1802), p.626.
38 *CSPD 1644*, pp. 523, 535, 545.
39 *CSPD 1644–45*, pp. 7, 30, 32, 49; *CJ 1643–44*, pp. 626, 655, 660.
40 *CSPD 1644–45*, pp. 16, 23–24, 39, 49, 56.

1643, the City Blue and Red Regiments were estimated to each be around 930 strong, all excluding officers, whilst the Tower Hamlets Regiment numbered 1,234 men and Westminster Regiment 1,938 men in seven companies.[41]

That Harrington only had 3,000 men indicates that all were below establishment. According to *Mercurius Civicus* the Westminster Regiment should have had a 'full appearance' of 1,900 men when it marched out to Newbury, but accounts for payments by defaulters who refused to go on the Newbury expedition in October 1644 show that the regiment was missing around 325 of its men – around 17 percent of its strength – as they had refused to march. On 14 October defaulters were ordered to join their units 'upon paine of death', but on 28 October the Committee of Both Kingdoms reported 'that numbers of soldiers of the brigade lately sent forth remain yet here [in London]'. Such absenteeism appears therefore to have been experienced by all the regiments in the brigade and if the 17 percent defaulting rate is applied to other militia regiments' September 1643 muster figures, the Blue and the Red Regiments might have each been missing around 160 men each and the Tower Hamlets 210. But the brigade strength quoted by Harrington relates to five regiments, implying, if the Westminster Regiment was 1,575 men strong, the remaining regiments would only have consisted of around 600 men if the brigade managed to reach 4,000 men as anticipated[42].

Whatever their size, on 26 October 1644 these militia regiments were eventually combined with the Earl of Essex's infantry to be part of the force that marched from the east side of Newbury to the west to assault the village of Speen the next day.

Conclusion

The Lostwithiel and Second Newbury campaigns demonstrate Parliament's ability and that of its senior military officers to sustain an army in the field under trying circumstances and reconstitute a defeated force for action in a relatively short period of time. Essex's army started the campaign in late May 1644 with around 5,500 infantry and almost 5,000 (excluding additions during the campaign) fought at Lostwithiel during August. Losses were suffered due to desertion and sickness, but local recruitment on the march occurred across all regiments. Most managed to increase their strengths in Devon and possibly Cornwall, contrary to the view that no support for Parliament was forthcoming in the latter county, suggesting that Lord Roberts has perhaps been judged a little unfavourably in this respect. The cavalry also increased in number until the battle at Lostwithiel, in large part due to the addition of an extra cavalry regiment – Colonel Harvey's in late May 1644 – although recruitment of troopers during the campaign also generally outstripped losses.

Lostwithiel was a terrible blow to Essex's army. Fifty to 60 percent of his infantry were lost because of entrapment, battle and the subsequent march east with perhaps 30–50 percent of all the 6,000 infantry which surrendered failing to make it back.

41 Nagel, p. 208; *CSPD 1644–45*, p. 57; Keith Roberts, p. 17; BL Harleian MS 986 ff.34r, 72v.

42 Nagel, pp. 211–213; *CSPD 1644–45*, p. 57; TNA, E179/253/12 ff.21r-28v.

Whilst very high these losses are significantly lower than those claimed by the King's Secretary, Sir Edward Walker, who implied over 80 percent were lost on the march from Lostwithiel. The cavalry fared much better with losses of around 15 percent during their stay at Lostwithiel and as a result of skirmishing during their breakout from the town, vindicating Essex's decision to get the cavalry away to fight again.

The soldiers that returned to the east formed the core of the army that would fight at Speen in late October 1644 during the Second Battle of Newbury. The infantry lacked weapons, clothing and equipment as well as a supporting train of artillery. Re-equipment could only begin when the soldiers had returned from the West, starting in mid September. From then to the 17 October, when the army marched from Portsmouth, was a period of just over five weeks. That Parliament was able to resupply the soldiers and recreate a small train of artillery in this period was testament to its ability to mobilise its military production and the effectiveness of its supply organisation.

But turning this defeated force into a military effective one again in such a short period of time required more than just new equipment. The experience, capabilities and discipline of officers at all levels in the army and the veteran qualities of Essex's men must also have played an important part. These merits stand in contrast to the vacillation displayed by some the citizen soldiers of the brigade sent from London to augment Parliament's forces at Newbury and perhaps are best epitomised by Essex's infantry taking 'much contentment' in recapturing at Speen some of the artillery they had lost at Lostwithiel; with professionalism, commitment and a sense of unfinished business being expressed in this statement.[43]

ANNEX A

A Note on Methodology

The Exchequer papers in SP28 in The National Archives provide a record of Essex's army from its formation in 1642 to its integration into the New Model Army in 1645. The papers are far from comprehensive with warrants missing and, by 1644, those relating to individual regiments and cavalry troops having largely ceased detailing the numbers of soldiers present at a given muster. They instead give an overall cost of paying the soldiers for 7, 14 or 28 days based on the most recent muster. Officers of Essex's army[44] seem to have been in receipt of only half pay at this point in the war reflecting the difficulties faced by Parliament in financing its armies. For foot

43 *CSPD 1644–45*, p. 75.

44 London militia foot officers of captain and above had been put on half pay from July 1643, though it is unclear whether this was ever enacted. Militia soldiers were paid 6d per day and per night when in service – 12d each twenty-four hours (see Simon Marsh, 'The Arming of the London Auxiliary Regiments to the Trained Bands', *Arquebusier Vol XXXIV, VI*, 2016, pp. 2–17).

regiments the estimates above were therefore based on subtracting the half pay costs of the officers and, to use a modern term, non-commissioned officers (both hereafter referred to in seventeenth century terminology as 'officers'), from the pay warrant to calculate the number of common soldiers within a regiment based on daily pay of eight pence. Excluded from this were sergeants, corporals and drummers (including drum majors) as these continued to receive full pay. Estimating this way requires an understanding of the number of companies in each regiment and an assumption that the regiments were at full officer strength. Warrants listing the number of sergeants, corporals and common soldiers in Colonels Thomas Tyrell, Adam Cunningham (by then under the command of Edward Fortescue), Harry Barclay's, Edward Aldrich's, the Earl of Essex Regiments are available for 24 June 1644. These identify 524, 630, 475, 300, 1,292 and soldiers in each respectively[45] and for Tyrell, Cunningham and Barclay that the regiments were eight companies strong. Aldrich's Regiment had similar numbers of NCOs as the others suggesting it also had eight companies and this is reinforced by the replacement of standards for Essex's regiments in late October 1644. Essex's Regiment, commanded by John Boteler, is more problematic as its total of NCOs suggests a 13-company regiment and this assumption was used in the estimations. These warrants also indicate that the regiments were not at full officer strength and, based on those available where the numbers of officers are known, the estimates may, as a result, understate the total regimental common soldier strengths by between three and six percent.

Where the methodology for calculating infantry numbers becomes more problematic is following their surrender at Lostwithiel as losses occurred to both officers and other ranks on the retreat to Poole and Southampton. To deal with this two sets of figures have been produced. One based on the previous methodology provides a minimum number of common soldiers returning from Lostwithiel. An upper limit figure has been calculated by reducing the numbers in each regiment by the same proportion as the drop in the value of the warrant between the musters before Lostwithiel and those that occurred subsequently. The reality is likely to be somewhere in between; officers will have fared better than common soldiers on the march back to Southampton and are likely to have reduced in number proportionately less, however they will not all have survived or remained with the colours. Similarly the assumption that all regiments were fully officered by the time they reached Southampton, on which the lower estimates are based, is not credible.

Within cavalry troops the overall cost of the officers is less variable than within a foot regiment as there are fewer of them; this and the better pay offered to cavalry generally meant they were more likely to achieve full officer establishment. In order to estimate the size of cavalry troops the nominal cost of a full officer compliment at half pay was deducted from each warrant total and the remaining figure divided by the daily wage of a trooper (2 shillings 6 pence for harquebusiers and 3 shillings 6 pence

45 TNA, SP28/16 ff.98, 101, 105, 106, 226.

for cuirassiers) times the number of days for which pay had been received. For troop sizes of more than 50 men this is likely to produce fairly accurate estimates. However, for those estimates which suggest less than 50 men in a troop there is likely to be a distorting effect due to an assumed officer compliment which is larger than it may necessarily have been. Depending on which officers are missing from a troop the unit may have been 10–12 percent larger.

To what extent is this methodology likely to produce accurate figures of regiment and troop sizes? For both the infantry and cavalry there is limited independent data that provides some corroboration for the approach. Pay warrants which detail the number of soldiers in five foot regiments are available for 24 June 1644. These were issued in between two main musters on 20 May and 10/11 July and cannot be expected to tally exactly with either. The number of common soldiers in each of the

	Number of Common Soldiers		
Regiment	**20 May**	**24 June**	**10/11 July**
Aldrich	347	300	324
Fortescue	778	630	542
Barclay	543	475	521
Tyrell	775	524	550
Lord General	1,352	1,292	1,223

Table 2: Comparison of pay warrant estimates with stated numbers of soldiers in selected regiments May–June 1644

five regiments is shown in Table 2. with the May and July figures being estimates based on the value of the pay warrant and the June figure reflecting the number of soldiers reported in the warrant.

These figures are broadly consistent with what would be expected of an army on campaign. Larger numbers of soldiers at the outset with a decline in numbers due to sickness and desertion as the campaign proceeded. Perhaps surprisingly there were increases in the number of soldiers in some regiments between the June and July warrants. For Aldrich and Tyrell's Regiments these are relatively modest, but for Barclay's the increase is more substantial. This is probably explained by the fact that the July musters coincided with the army halting for two weeks at Tiverton which would have given an opportunity for recruitment.

For the cavalry, the confidence in the figures is much higher. A direct comparison with the muster list for Tiverton which was captured by the Royalists and the estimates calculated from the warrant payments show only a slight discrepancy.

ANNEX B

Table 3: The army of the Earl of Essex – infantry regiment estimated strengths during the 1644 campaign

Note: These estimates are generated from an analysis of pay warrants contained in TNA SP28/16, SP28/17, SP28/18 and SP28/19 unless otherwise stated.

Regiment	20 May 1644 Muster	10/11 Jul 1644 Muster	Aug 1644 Muster	14 Oct 1644 Muster	21 Oct 1644 Muster
Col. Davies	347	312	336	39–178	171–248
Col. Aldrich	347	324	336	100–210	232–281
Col. Skippon	578	542	546	258–360	391–446
Col. Tyrell	775	550	549	161–297	305–390
Col. Cunningham/ Fortescue	778	544	571	199–326	332–413
Col. Lord Roberts	755	799	827	213–375	357–480
Col. Barclay	543	521	521	209–322	342–407
Earl of Essex	1,352	1,223	1,232	800[46]	800-872
Green Aux	N/A	600[47]	600[47]	N/A	N/A
Orange Aux	N/A	600[47]	600[47]	N/A	N/A
Yellow Aux	N/A	600[48]	N/A[48]	N/A	N/A
Col. Weare	N/A	100?	50048[49]	N/A	N/A
Cols. Carre/Rouse	N/A	N/A	1,000[50]	N/A	N/A
Col. Popham	N/A	100?	300[47]	N/A	N/A
Northampton/ Lt. Col. Innis' foot	100?	100?	100	?	?
Total	**5,475 +100?**	**4,815 +2,100?**	**4,918 +3,100[51]**	**1,979 -2,868**	**2,930 -3,538**

46 Pay warrant missing and therefore based on the lower figure of Boteler's own estimate.
47 Estimated unit size not based on pay warrant data.
48 The Yellow Regiment was, by this stage in the campaign, garrisoning Weymouth.
49 By 15 September 1644, Weare's Regiment was 150 men strong.
50 *CSPD 1644–45*, p. 12.
51 The 3,100 figure Includes 1,200 City Auxiliary soldiers and Colonels Weare, Popham, Rouse and Carre's Regiments plus 100 men from the Northampton foot company and Lieutenant Colonel Innis' 'party'.

Table 4: The army of the Earl of Essex – cavalry regiment estimated strengths during the 1644 campaign

Note: Estimates are based on pay warrants contained in TNA SP28/16, SP28/17, SP28/18 and SP28/19. Totals are of common troopers serving in each regiment.

Regiment/Troop	20 May 1644 Muster	10/11 July 1644 Muster	August 1644 Muster	21 October 1644 Muster
Earl of Essex				
Col. Stapleton	124	122	122	120
Lt. Col. Greaves	71	98	97	74
Maj. Hamilton	60	69	69	66
Capt. Skippon	65	70	70	57
Capt. Draper	94	100	98	77
Capt. Copley	68	67	67	51
Capt. Chute	74	77	77	77
Capt. Abercromy	55	51	51	45
Total	**611**	**654**	**651**	**567**
Sir W. Balfour	99	98	97	106
Maj. Balfour	77	77	72	40
Capt. Luke	66	72	72	60
Capt. Rainsborough	47	55	55	44
Capt. Semple	61	62	62	65
Capt. Boswell	62	65	66	62
Total	**412**	**429**	**424**	**377**
Col. Behre	74	74	74	45
Maj. Bosa	65	70	70	56
Capt. Buller	71	80	80	63
Capt. Fleming	42	68	68	54
Capt. Carmighael	70	74	74	62
Total	**322**	**366**	**366**	**280**
Col. Dalbier	50	72	72	69
Capt. Salkeld	63	74	74	67
Capt. Pym	63	82	82	59
Capt. Lukeman	43	48	48	41

Regiment/Troop	20 May 1644 Muster	10/11 July 1644 Muster	August 1644 Muster	21 October 1644 Muster
Total	**219**	**276**	**276**	**236**
Col. Sheffield	91	86	86	98
Capt. Sheffield	61	64	64	59
Capt. Hale	56	63	66	63
Capt. Fiennes	50	73	73	49
Capt. Robotham	47	63	63	59
Capt. Wogan	40	53	61	61
Total	**345**	**402**	**413**	**389**
Sir Robert Pye	82	82	82	51
Capt. Scrope	74	80	80	63
Capt. Pyle	23	47	60	31
Total	**179**	**209**	**222**	**145**
Col. Harvey	N/A	94	100	N/A
Maj. Mainwaring	N/A	72	72	N/A
Capt. Hacket	N/A	58	58	N/A
Capt. Blackwell	N/A	45	45	N/A
Capt. Norwood	N/A	65	65	N/A
Capt. Washburne	N/A	52	52	N/A
Total		**386**	**392**	
GRAND TOTAL	**2,088**	**2,722**	**2,744**	**1,994**

2

Warfare in the Wilderness: The Indian War of 1688

Rachael Abbiss

Introduction

In 1686 two companies of foot were sent from the British Isles to serve in New England and organise colonial government and security on behalf of the Crown. The Dominion of New England (1686–1689) stretched from the St Croix River in the north-east to Delaware Bay on the south-east coast, encompassing a coastline of 650 miles, so defending the region was a huge undertaking for all the commissioned officers and soldiers. From the Crown's perspective, the Dominion provided protection for the colonists, allied Indians, territory and trade and was deemed essential for preventing French encroachment from neighbouring New France (Canada). Consequently the military played an important role in organising and maintaining security throughout the New England colonies: Massachusetts, Maine, Connecticut, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Plymouth, New York and East and West Jersey (New Jersey).[1]

The Dominion was the first substantial attempt to combine the colonies, militia and military resources under Crown control and permanently station regular troops in New England. Between 1686 and 1689 the new royal administration improved intercolonial military support, constructed and restored fortifications and garrisons and organised a regular–provincial army. Regular officers from the British Isles were responsible for leading and organising the colonial militia and allied Indians against hostilities throughout New England. This chapter will explore the actions and experiences of soldiers during the Indian War of 1688, which took place between

1 The Dominion of New England and the imperial security policy of James VII & II is examined and discussed at length in: R.M. Abbiss, 'James VII & II, the Army and Imperial Security Policy between 1685 and 1689' (unpublished PhD, University of Chester, 2015). The research contained in this chapter stems from work carried out for Chapter Two: Conflict, pp. 119–184. The relationship between regular and provincial officers and soldiers is also examined in R. Abbiss, 'Conflict within Conflict: Indian War 1688', *Context,* 1 (2014), pp. 4–12.

July 1688 and April 1689.[2] Examination of the personal experiences of war will shed light on the demands, challenges and consequences of combat in the wilderness and provide an understanding of the military strategy adopted by the Redcoats in order to defend and secure the New England borders. The success of operations in Maine during 1688 and 1689 were dependent upon strong leadership, intercolonial cooperation, American Indian assistance and an understanding of the topography and the weapons and fighting tactics of the enemy. The geography and conditions presented to regular troops were largely unfamiliar and resulted in a different experience of war in a new landscape. Drawing upon personal accounts, military orders and political correspondence, this chapter will highlight the experience of regular troops during conflict in New England in the late seventeenth century and shed light on the strategy and tactics adopted by a newly formed regular-provincial army.

The Indian War of 1688 is considered the start of a series of clashes between European rivals – the British Isles and France – throughout the late seventeenth and

2 Abbiss, 'James VII & II', pp. 1–36, 98–115, 119–181. Different names have been used for the Indian War of 1688 including Second Anglo-Abenaki War, Second Indian War, Castine's War and King William's War, 1688–97 and the First French and Indian War, 1688–99. Each name implies a different interpretation of the conflict concerning why it started, the parties involved and its connection to European politics and war. It is more appropriate for this study to refer to the conflict in New England between July 1688 and April 1689 as the Indian War of 1688. The other names imply that the conflict did not involve the French or it was an extension of the war in Europe (Nine Years' War, 1688–97). The first clashes in New England, that are considered as the start of the Indian War, took place in July 1688 and it was not until 1689 that the colonists acknowledged the international fight against France. War and conflict in North America were different during James VII & II's reign from those occurring during William III's reign and thus this is another reason why it is important to avoid eliding the war's timescale. Whilst this study acknowledges the historiographical debate over why war started in 1688 and who participated in it, it will not directly engage with it, as it is not the purpose of the chapter. For use of the different names in existing secondary literature, please see: First French and Indian War, 1688–99 is used in N.J. Santoro, *Atlas of the Indian Tribes of North America and the Clash of Cultures* (Bloomington, IN, USA: iUniverse, 2009), p. 38; King William's War, 1688–99: J.H. Pulsipher, *Subjects unto the Same King: Indians, English and the Contest for Authority in Colonial New England* (Philadelphia, PA, USA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), p. 253; King William's War, 1688–97: G. Chet, *Conquering the American Wilderness: The Triumph of European Warfare in the Colonial Northeast* (Amherst & Boston MA, USA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003), pp. 70, 78–79; Second Anglo-Abenaki War is used in E. Haefeli and K. Sweeney, *Captors and Captives: The 1704 French and Indian Raid on Deerfield* (Amherst & Boston, MA, USA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003), pp. 81–82; Castine's War, 1688: H.M. Sylvester, *Indian Wars of New England,* Vol. II (Boston, MA, USA: W.B. Clarke Company, 1910), pp. 381–396; Stephen Saunders Webb refers to the war in the index as Abenaki War: S.S. Webb, *Lord Churchill's Coup: The Anglo-American Empire and the Glorious Revolution Reconsidered* (Syracuse, NY, USA: Syracuse University Press, 1998), pp. 182–186, 283. Richard R. Johnson and Mary Lou Lustig do not include a name for the conflict during 1688/89: R.R. Johnson, *Adjustment to Empire: The New England Colonies, 1675–1715* (New Brunswick, NJ, USA: Rutgers University Press, 1981), pp. 85–86, 122; M.L. Lustig, *The Imperial Executive in America: Sir Edmund Andros, 1637–1714* (Madison/Teaneck, NJ, USA: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2002), pp. 170–182.

eighteenth centuries.[3] Despite relative peace in Europe during 1688, Anglo-French relations were strained in North America and between 1685 and 1689 the English and French were engaged in conflict over territory, trade and alliances.[4] The Covenant Chain of 1677 secured an alliance between the English and the Five Nations of the Iroquois, which included the Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga and Seneca tribes.[5] The French had established a similar partnership with the Wabanaki Confederacy, which consisted of the Abenaki, Mi'kmaq, Penobscot, Passamaquoddy and Maliseet tribes.[6] Both European powers developed a trade relationship with their respective Indian allies and conducted joint military operations throughout the 1680s. This chapter will discuss American Indians in relation to their interactions with officers and soldiers from the British Isles; however, the role and struggles of the Indians cannot be adequately covered in this space and a longer piece would be needed to provide a comprehensive overview of native history and to do justice to the contribution made by the Indian warriors in New England warfare.

In 1688 tensions erupted into conflict as peace between the English and Wabanaki tribes dissolved and the French, using this to their advantage, encouraged attacks against the New England colonists.[7] In an attempt to secure the borders of the Dominion, the Governor, Sir Edmund Andros, led a combined force of 709 Redcoats and militia to Maine in November 1688 to increase military presence and strengthen defences.[8] Mary Lou Lustig considers the campaign as necessary for the protection of New England and argues that Andros executed a strong and robust strategy

3 R.M. Utley & W.E. Washburn, *Indian Wars* (New York, NY, USA: American Heritage Press, Inc., 2002), p. 59.

4 M.L. Lustig, *The Imperial Executive in America: Sir Edmund Andros, 1637–1714* (Madison/Teaneck, NJ, USA: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2002), pp. 170–182; G.H. Guttridge, *The Colonial Policy of William III in America and the West Indies* (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1966), pp. 12, 42–43; Abbiss, 'James VII & II', pp. 119–135.

5 N.J. Santoro, *Atlas of the Indian Tribes of North America and the Clash of Cultures* (Bloomington, IN, USA: iUniverse, 2009), p. 166.

6 S. Belmessous, 'Wabanaki versus French and English claims in Northeastern North America, c.1715' in *Native Claims: Indigenous Law Against Empire 1500–1920*, ed. S. Belmessous (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 107.

7 *Documents and Records Relating to the Province of New Hampshire, from the Earliest Period of its Settlement, Vol. I: 1623–1686,* ed. N. Bouton (Concord, MA, USA: George E. Jenks, 1867), pp. 588–589: Articles of Peace with the Indians inhabiting New Hampshire and Maine, 19 Oct. 1685; E. Haefeli & K. Sweeney, *Captors and Captives: The 1704 French and Indian Raid on Deerfield* (Amherst & Boston, MA, USA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003), pp. 81–82; K.M. Morrison, *The Embattled Northeast: The Elusive Ideal of Alliance in Abenaki-Euramerican Relations* (Berkeley, CA, USA & London: University of California Press, 1984), pp. 113–115; J.T. Hull, *The Siege and Capture of Fort Loyall, Destruction of Falmouth, May 20, 1690* (Portland, ME, USA: Owen, Strout & Co., 1885), pp. 31–32; For more detail on the development of Anglo-French conflict please see: Abbiss, 'James VII & II', pp. 119–135.

8 S.S. Webb, *Lord Churchill's Coup: The Anglo-American Empire and the Glorious Revolution Reconsidered* (Syracuse, NY, USA: Syracuse University Press, 1998), p. 183; Lustig, *Imperial Executive*, p. 179.

against the French and their allied Indians.[9] Bruce Lenman and Douglas E. Leach on the other hand regard the campaign in Maine as futile and that it demonstrated the weaknesses of Andros and his army.[10] Leach argued that the conflict achieved little beyond displaying the brutality of English officers alongside the disintegration of command and fractured relationship between regular officers and the militia.[11] With such contrasting views over the importance of the campaign and the conduct of regular officers, it seems necessary to examine their role in the conflict and consider their actions and experiences to identify how the soldiers adapted to warfare in the wilderness and whether their previous military experience weakened strategy and relations with the colonial militia.

Fighting in New England

This section will explain the political and military landscape of New England during the mid to late seventeenth century and the development of Anglo-French conflict and interaction between soldiers, colonists and Indians leading up to 1688. Throughout the seventeenth century the colonists in North America experienced a series of confrontations relating to imperial control, socio-economic problems, religious differences, property and land disputes.[12] The New England colonists considered their homes, land and livestock under threat from hostile Indian tribes and as suspicions, greed and tensions grew, conflict proved inevitable. Throughout the 1660s and 1670s violent clashes occurred between colonists and Indians in Virginia relating to the expansion of colonial settlements, theft and the destruction of crops.[13] Hostilities increased elsewhere and in New England conflict between the Wampanoag tribe and Plymouth colony resulted in the outbreak of King Philip's War (1675–1678).[14] War quickly spread throughout the neighbouring colonies and involved more colonists and different Indian tribes. Fighting caused extensive damage to homesteads, exhausted food and ammunition stores, destroyed crops, devastated the New England economy and thousands of colonists and Indians lost their lives.[15]

9 Lustig, *Imperial Executive,* pp. 179–182; V.F. Barnes, *The Dominion of New England: A Study in British Colonial Policy* (New York, NY, USA: Frederick Ungar Publishing, 1960), pp. 227–229; Abbiss, 'Conflict within Conflict', p. 7.

10 D.E. Leach, *Roots of Conflict: British Armed Forces and Colonial Americans, 1677–1763* (New York, NY, USA: The Macmillan Company, 1973), pp. 14–16, 17–19; B. Lenman, *Britain's Colonial Wars, 1688–1783* (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2001), p. 15; Abbiss, 'Conflict within Conflict', p. 6.

11 Leach, *Roots of Conflict,* pp. 14–16, 17–19; Abbiss, 'Conflict within Conflict', p. 6.

12 B. McConville, *The King's Three Faces: The Rise and Fall of Royal America, 1688–1776* (Chapel Hill, NC, USA: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), pp. 15–16; A. Taylor, *American Colonies: The Settling of North America* (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 2002), pp. 158–203.

13 R. Middleton, *Colonial America: A History, 1607–1760* (Oxford & Cambridge, MA, USA: Blackwell Publishers, 1992), pp. 117–119.

14 I.K. Steele, *Warpaths: Invasions of North America* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 98–99.

15 Middleton, *Colonial America*, pp. 126–128; C. Jones, *The History and Future of Narragansett Bay* (Boca Raton, FL, USA: Universal-Publishers, 2006), pp. 128–129; D.R. Mandell, *King Philip's War: Colonial*

The fighting across New England instilled fear in the hearts of many colonists. Cotton Mather, a Puritan minister and historian, summarised the effect of war on the colonies: 'The flame of war then raged thro' a great part of the country, whereby many whole towns were laid in ashes, and many lives were sacrificed'.[16] The fighting strategy adopted by the colonists was not enough to avoid the high casualty rates and destruction to homes. In 1643 the colonies of Massachusetts, Connecticut, Plymouth and New Haven joined together to form the United Colonies of New England or the New England Confederation. The alliance supported joint military action, which was demonstrated during King Philip's War, but revealed inefficiencies and problems with intercolonial cooperation.[17] The United Colonies raised a sufficient force of militia troops, but navigating the swamps, wetlands and forests in pursuit of the Indians proved very difficult. The war had questioned the effectiveness of the military strategy in New England and persuaded the Crown that a different approach would be needed in the future.[18]

A strong military and secure borders were particularly important in light of the mobilisation of French forces in New France throughout the 1680s. During the late seventeenth century animosity and conflict increased in North America between the English and French and their respective Indian allies. Problems were associated with territorial disputes, trespassing, trade and alliances and each European power made significant preparations to build military strength to defend against and oppose hostile forces.[19] During 1684 Joseph Antoine le Fèbvre de La Barre, Governor of New France from 1682 to 1685, stationed men at Cadarachqui near Lake Ontario to launch an attack upon Seneca Indians inhabiting the area. In 1685 La Barre was replaced by Jacques-René de Brisay, Marquis de Denonville, but this did not halt military preparations made by France. Denonville continued to station 400–500

Expansion, Native Resistance and the End of Indian Sovereignty (Baltimore, MD, USA: The John Hopkins University Press, 2010), pp. 134–135, 137; Abbiss, 'James VII & II', pp. 10–11.

16 A.S. Miller, 'Cotton Mather' in *The Oxford Encyclopedia of American Literature, Volume 1,* ed. J. Parini (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 32–35; C. Mather, *Magnalia Christi Americana: The Ecclesiastical History of New England from its first planting in 1620 unto the year of our Lord, 1698,* Vol. II, Book VII (Hartford, CT, USA: Silas Andrus, 1820), p. 505.

17 Steele, *Warpaths,* pp. 95–103; W.F. Craven, *The Colonies in Transition, 1660–1713* (New York, NY, USA: Harper & Row, 1968), pp. 121–122; A. Starkey, *European and Native American Warfare, 1675–1815* (London: UCL Press Limited, 1998), pp. 68–69; Abbiss, 'James VII & II', pp. 10–11.

18 Steele, *Warpaths,* pp. 101–109; Mandell, *King Philip's War,* pp. 100–105, 130–134, 138; Starkey, *European and Native American Warfare,* pp. 71–73; G. Chet, *Conquering the American Wilderness: The Triumph of European Warfare in the Colonial Northeast* (Amherst & Boston MA, USA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003), pp. 70–80; Abbiss, 'James VII & II', pp. 10–11.

19 F. Parkman, *France and England in North America: Count Frontenac and New France under Louis XIV, A Half-Century of Conflict,* Vol. II (New York, NY, USA: Library of America, 1983), pp. 91–137; Lustig, *Imperial Executive,* pp. 170–182; W.J. Eccles, *The French in North America, 1500–1783* (East Lansing, MI, USA: Michigan State University Press, 1998), pp. 100–105; G.A. Rawlyk, *Nova Scotia's Massachusetts: A Study of Massachusetts–Nova Scotia Relations, 1630–1784* (Montreal, Québec, Canada: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1973), pp. 51–58.

troops at Cadarachqui and detachments of regular soldiers and colonial militia were dispatched to capture and occupy enemy forts along the border of New England and New France.[20] The French also fortified Montreal and stationed 500–600 regular soldiers in the town.[21]

Further military arrangements were made in 1686 when Monsieur Jean Bochart de Champigny, Intendant of New France, arrived in Quebec with *Troupes de la Marine* to support operations against the Iroquois who were allied to the English. In 1687 five or six second-rate ships of the line were sent from France to Quebec alongside '10 or 12 Companies of Marines'.[22] In 1687 the French put these men and resources to use in an operation against the Iroquois. The army contained 800 regulars and an equivalent number of militia, 100 colonists to manage the supply train and 300 allied Indians including the Algonquins, Abenaki and Hurons. The army arrived at Irondequoit on the south side of Lake Ontario and met with 180 French colonists and 300–400 more Indians to construct a fort. The site was intended to shelter the army's boats and canoes and operated as a base to launch attacks inside Iroquois territory.[23] Between 1685 and 1689 the French intended to prevent the Iroquois from attacking French settlements and protect their relationships with Indian trading partners. They also wanted to disrupt the commercial, economic and territorial growth of their rivals in North America: the English. Consequently, the Crown and the Lords of Trade and Plantations, a committee of the Privy Council responsible for the administration of the colonies, were faced with organising a response to this threat in a new and challenging environment.[24]

Protecting New England required careful planning and a different approach compared with the strategy and tactics deployed in conflicts in Europe. Cotton Mather highlighted that conflict in New England was different to war in Europe in terms of scale and service, but no less severe and destructive: 'Tis true, the European campaigns for the numbers of men appearing in them, compared with the little numbers that appear in these American actions, may tempt the reader to make a very diminutive business of our whole Indian war'.[25] The size and scale of conflict in North America was different to war in Europe whereby vast armies containing thousands

20 The National Archives (TNA), CO 1/61, ff. 282–283: Report by Thomas Dongan, Mar. 1687.

21 American Antiquarian Society (AAS), Indians, I, unfol.: Marquis de Denonville succeeds Joseph-Antoine Le Febvre de La Barre, 1685.

22 AAS, Indians, I, unfol.: Monsieur Jean Bochart de Champigny arrives at Quebec, Jul. 1686; Monsieur d'Amblemont arrives at Quebec, May. 1687; French attacks on the Five Nations, 8 Jun. 1687.

23 *The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents: Travels and Explorations of the Jesuit Missionaries in New France 1610–1791, Vol. LXIII: Lower Canada, Iroquois: 1667–1687,* ed. R.G. Thwaites (Cleveland, OH, USA: The Burrows Brothers Company, 1900), pp. 269, 271: Two Letters of Reverend Father Beschefer to Monsieur Cabart de Villermont, 19 Sept. 1687.

24 The Committee of the Privy Council for Trade and Plantations, also known as the Lords of Trade and Plantations, was established in 1675, please see: M.G. Hall, *The Last American Puritan: The Life of Increase Mather, 1639–1723* (Middletown, CT, USA: Wesleyan University Press, 1988), p. 184.

25 Mather, *Magnalia Christi Americana,* p. 491.

of soldiers engaged in pitched battles in wide-open landscapes or sieges of fortresses and fortified towns and cities. Towards the end of the seventeenth century wars were becoming more frequent and required additional soldiers to man fortifications and compete with larger armies. After the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648), military powers in Europe reduced reliance upon militias and hired mercenaries and began to focus on raising permanent armed forces financed through greater taxation.[26] The size of armies grew considerably, for example, in 1675 Electoral Saxony had an army consisting of 8,260 soldiers, but by 1700 that figure had grown to 20,000 and the Great Elector of Brandenburg, Frederick William, strengthened his army from 12,000 in the 1670s to 30,000 soldiers by 1688.[27] Similarly, the army of James VII & II grew from 8,865 in 1685 to 34,320 in 1688.[28] Substantial armies often faced off against each other in large, open and hilly terrain, such as at the Battle of Mont Cassel in 1677 where 30,000 French soldiers fought a Dutch-allied army containing a similar number of infantry and cavalry.[29]

The previous experience of many officers in King James's army was not in Continental warfare but in domestic guard and garrison duties or naval campaigns.[30] The numbers of regulars from the British Isles' standing army sent to New England during James's reign were few in comparison to the figures based in Europe; however, some of the officers and soldiers had experience of fighting in European battles. Thomas Dongan was a regular officer and served the Crown as Governor of New York from 1683 and 1688. Prior to his service in North America, Dongan was involved in conflict in Europe during the 1670s. In 1671 he was appointed lieutenant colonel of an Irish regiment and led soldiers into war during the Battle of Enzheim (Entzheim) in 1674.[31]

26 J. Childs, *Warfare in the Seventeenth Century,* ed. J. Keegan (London: Cassell, 2003), pp. 88–89, 138–159; O. van Nimwegen, 'The Dutch-Spanish War in the Low Countries 1621–1648' in *The Ashgate Research Companion to the Thirty Years' War,* eds. O. Asbach and P. Schröder (London: Routledge, 2016), p. 163; M. Pollak, *Cities at War in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 109.

27 Childs, *Warfare,* p. 90.

28 TNA, WO 24/7, Part 1, Guards, Garrisons and Land Forces, 1 Jan 1684; The British Library (BL), Add. MS 28082, ff. 117–118: List of James's Army, Oct. 1688; Historic Manuscript Commission (HMC), *The Manuscripts of the Earl of Dartmouth,* Vol. I (London: HMSO, 1887), p. 171: Abstract of the numbers of all his Majesty's forces in England, 26 Oct. 1688; Figures included in J. Childs, *The Army, James II, and the Glorious Revolution* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1980), pp. 1–4.

29 The British Museum, 1978,1111.7: *L'armée du prince d'Orange défaite devant Mont Cassel par l'armée du roi commandee par Monsieur duc d'Orléans en 1677,* 1685. [Online]. Available: <http://www.britishmuseum.org/research/collection_online/collection_object_details.aspx?objectId=1399065&partId=1&people=131728&peoA=131728-2-60&page=2> [accessed 15 January 2018]; C.J. Nolan, *War of the Age of Louis XIV, 1650–1715: An Encyclopedia of Global Warfare and Civilisation* (Westport, CT, USA: Greenwood Press, 2008), p. 72.

30 J. Hussey, *Marlborough: Hero of Blenheim* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2004), pp. 22–23.

31 P. Wauchope, 'Thomas Dongan, Second Earl of Limerick, 1634–1715', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography,* eds. H.C.G. Matthew & B. Harrison, Vol. 16 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 523–524; C. T. Atkinson, 'Feversham's account of the battle of Enzheim, 1674', *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, 1 (1921), pp. 38–39.

The landscape in and around Enzheim, in lower Alsace, France, featured wooded areas close to the battlefield, a vineyard, hedges, ditches, open fields and a ravine. A significant amount of combat took place in woodland and muddied fields and soldiers also had to manoeuvre around different field fortifications. Not only was the battle fought on varied terrain, it was also long, exhausting and involved heavy cannon fire and resulted in the death of over 6,000 soldiers.[32]

The casualty numbers, army size and landscape in Europe differed to New England and fighting against American Indians presented a different set of challenges for European soldiers. Rather than large pitched battles, conflict in New England involved defending against Indian war parties containing warriors skilled in hunting and ambush tactics. Fighting was on a smaller scale with less reliance on heavy artillery and often took place in forests and woodland as opposed to open fields.[33] The European theatre was familiar fighting territory for some of the English regulars serving in New England, but this was not necessarily an advantage for combat in North America. The regulars had to adjust to the different levels of manpower and military support and adapt to the unfamiliar fighting landscape. Consequently, security of the colonies was reliant upon the coordination and cooperation of royal troops and colonial militia with support from their Indian allies. The Dominion of New England sought to bring these different groups together under Crown control and establish a colonial government and army capable of protecting the colonies.

Dominion of New England, 1686–1689

The Dominion of New England was originally intended to be part of a larger imperial design to unite the majority of English colonies in North America under Crown authority. In 1688 William Blathwayt, Secretary at War from 1683 to 1704 and Secretary of Lords for Trade and Plantations from 1679 to 1696, wrote to Edward Randolph, Secretary and Registrar from 1685 to 1689, in New England and highlighted the intentions of King James VII & II: 'If the union of all New England under one governor be acceptable on your side the water, what will the joining and annexing to the same government be of all the English territories in America, from Delaware Bay to Nova Scotia?'[34] James pursued this plan shortly after he ascended the throne in 1685 and intended to 'reduce

32 *Stand und eigentliche Abbildung dess scharffen Gefechts Zwischen denen Kaÿserlichen Aliirten und Frantzösischen Armeen underm Feld Marschallen von Turrenne vorgangen bey Holtz- und Enstsheim in vndern Elsass vonerst den XXIV. September IV. Oktober Anno 1674* (Germany, 1674) [Online]. Available: The Library of Congress, <https://www.loc.gov/item/2016645798/>; D.G. Chandler, *Atlas of Military Strategy: The Art, Theory and Practice of War, 1618-1878* (London: Arms and Armour, 1998), p. 40; Atkinson, 'Feversham's account of the battle of Enzheim, 1674', pp. 33–43; J.A. Lynn, *The Wars of Louis XIV, 1667–1714* (Oxon: Routledge, 2013), pp. 131–132; Childs, *Warfare*, p. 174.

33 T.D. Mays, *American Guerrillas: From the French and Indian Wars to Iraq and Afghanistan – How Americans fight Unconventional Wars* (Guilford, CT, USA: Lyons Press, 2017), pp. 1–7.

34 T. Hutchinson, *Hutchinson Papers*, Vol. II (New York, NY, USA: Burt Franklin, 1967), pp. 301–302: William Blathwayt to Edward Randolph, 10 Mar. 1688.


A New Map of
NEW ENGLAND
and
NEW YORK
By Robt. Morden
Boston
Charles Town
Cambridg
Newton
Watertown
Dedham
Medfield
Roxbury
Dorchester
Milton
Braintree
Waymouth
Hingham
Lin
Beverley
Manchester
Bradford
Topsfield
Newport
Portsmouth
Taunton
Bridgwater
Seacunk
Woodcok
Prudence I.
Patience I.
Swansey
Rehoboth
Bristol
Warwick
Providence
Martins Vineyard
Nantucket
Block I.
Long Island
South Sand Beach
New Albanie
New Yorke
East Reach
Johnsons Kil
Conecticut
Hartford
Weathersfield
Middletown
Norwich
Pequid Country
Naragansets
Boston Harbor
Marble head
Salem
Ipswich
Newbery
Salsbury
Hampton
Amesbury
Andover
Billerica
Chelmsford
Woburn
Lancaster
Groton
Concord
Medfield
Dedham
Roxbury
Dorchester
Milton
Braintree
Weymouth
Hingham
Hull
Kingam
Scituate
Marshfield
Duxburrow
Plymouth
Plymouth Colony
Barnstable
Yarmouth
Eastham
Cape Cod
Mommoy
Nantucket
Martins Vineyard
Rode Island
Elizabeths
Fishers I.
Gardners I.
Montaugh Pt
Southampton
Southold
Easthampton
Huntington
Oyster Bay
Flushing
Newtown
Jamaica
Hempstead
Oyster Bay
Westchester
Rye
Stamford
Greenwich
Fairfield
Norwalk
Stratford
Milford
Guilford
Branford
Hartford
Windsor
Springfield
Northampton
Hadley
Hatfield
Deerfield
Squakheag
Swanfield
Colonie
Malachusets
Connecticut R.
Merrimack R.
Piscataway R.
Saco R.
Kennebeck R.
Penobscot R.
Penicook
Dover
Exeter
Portsmouth
Kittery
Wells
Champernam I.
Pasons I.
Shoales I.
Lafferies Ledge
C. Porpus
Gloucester

Following the establishment of the Dominion in May 1686, the Crown employed and dispatched Sir Edmund Andros to manage colonial government and organise security. King James considered Andros to be a highly competent military commander with an understanding of colonial politics having served as Governor of New York between 1674 and 1683. Andros had varied military experience on different fronts: in 1667 he fought against the French in the Leeward Islands, he organised security for New York during King Philip's War and participated in the Battle of Sedgemoor in 1685.[37] In 1667 Andros was commissioned as Major of the Barbados Regiment of Foot. During 1667 and 1668, he fought on land and at sea in the Caribbean and led his soldiers against the French through beaches, ravines and riverbeds. Andros was responsible for a combined force containing regulars and militia and learned the value of working with local Indian tribes.[38] In 1677, during King Philip's War, Andros, then Governor of New York, sent Lieutenant Anthony Brockholes, another regular officer, to Maine to support colonists who were unable to manage conflict along the eastern frontier. Andros ordered sloops and soldiers to fortify Pemaquid and provide 'protection and incouragement to any his Majesties subjects, planters or fisheries'.[39] Although Andros remained in New York during the war, he continued to issue orders and requested the dispatch of sloops from Maine to give him regular updates on military and diplomatic progress.[40] Andros's military background armed him with the necessary knowledge and experience to organise security in North America and navigate through the varied landscape and lead a combined army containing regulars and militia.

In 1686 the Crown commissioned two companies of foot from the British Isles to support Governor Edmund Andros in New England. Officers appointed to the new companies were Captain Francis Nicholson, Lieutenant James Weems, Lieutenant Thomas Treffry (Treffrey), Ensign Joshua Pipon and Ensign Ames Andros.[41] In 1688, following the annexation of New York and New Jersey to the Dominion of New England, a further two companies were raised consisting of regular officers from the British Isles and regulars already stationed in North America. The following individuals were appointed to two independent companies of foot in New England: Captain Anthony Brockholes, Lieutenant John Jordan, Ensign Bartholomew Russell, Captain Jarvis (or Gervase) Baxter, Lieutenant Thomas Sharpe and Ensign

37 R.R. Johnson, 'Sir Edmund Andros, 1637–1714', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography,* eds. H.C.G. Matthew & B. Harrison, Vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 138–139.

38 S.S. Webb, *1676: The End of American Independence* (New York, NY, USA: Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 1984), pp. 314–321; Lustig, *Imperial Executive*, pp. 32–33.

39 *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York, 1614–1692,* Vol. III (*DRNY*), ed. J. Romeyn Brodhead (Albany, NY, USA: Weed, Parsons and Company, 1853), pp. 248–249: Instructions for Anthony Brockholes, Caesar Knapton and Richard Nicolls, 13 Jun. 1677; B. Bourque, *Twelve Thousand Years: American Indians in Maine* (Lincoln, NE, USA: University of Nebraska Press, 2001), p. 156.

40 *DRNY, 1614–1692*, Vol. III, pp. 248–249: Instructions for Brockholes, Knapton and Nicolls, 13 Jun. 1677; Bourque, *American Indians in Maine,* p. 156.

41 TNA, SP 44/164, ff. 347-348, 356, 361: Commissions for the companies of foot in New England, Jul. & Aug. 1686; Abbiss, 'James VII & II', pp. 74–75.

Figure 2.2 *Sir Edmund Andros* (1657). (Public domain. From The New York Public Library)

Willoughby Bradford.[42] Brockholes, Baxter and Russell had previous experience of serving in the colonies. During Andros's absence, Brockholes was Acting Governor of New York during 1677 and 1678 and again during 1681 and from 1685 Baxter served as commanding officer at Fort Albany and Russell was a senior commander at Fort James in New York.[43] By the end of 1688 Governor Edmund Andros commanded around 240 regulars, 17,000 militia troops, two Royal Navy ships, three large and several

42 TNA, CO 5/904, ff. 203–204: Commissions for the companies of foot in New England, 20 & 21 Apr. 1688; Payment of two foot companies in New York, Apr. 1688; TNA, CO 389/9, f. 234, Earl of Sunderland to Edmund Andros, 20 Apr. 1688; *English Army Lists and Commission Registers, 1661–1714, Vol. II:* 1685–1689, ed. C. Dalton (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1894), p. 159; Abbiss, 'James VII & II', pp. 75, 113–115.

43 *The Encyclopedia of New York State,* eds. P. Eisenstadt and L-E. Moss (Syracuse, NY, USA: Syracuse University Press, 2005), p. 364; D.W. Voorhees, '"All Authority turned upside downe": The Ideological Origins of Leislerian Political Thought' in *Jacob Leisler's Atlantic World in the Later Seventeenth Century:*

smaller provincial vessels, and approximately 44 forts, garrisons and blockhouses throughout New England.[44]

Regular officers were responsible for supporting Andros with government duties, taking command of militia units and organising security. Captain Anthony Brockholes, Commander in Chief of New York, and Captain Jarvis Baxter were both members of the Council of New York and undertook administrative tasks and helped organise defences to prevent French-Indian attack.[45] Between 1686 and 1688, Lieutenant Thomas Sharpe captained a vessel to Pentagöet in Maine to seize wine and merchandise that had been illegally smuggled into English territory and conducted military surveys, inventory lists and managed stores of war at forts and garrisons throughout the province.[46] In 1687 Ensign Ames Andros was appointed 'Commander of the Garrison and Souldiers att Pemyquid [Pemaquid]' in Maine and was ordered to take charge of militia in the County of Cornwall. Ensign Andros was responsible for 'Exercising the said Militia in Armes both Officers and Souldiers Keeping them in good Order & Disciplyne'.[47]

Other regular officers, such as Captain Francis Nicholson (also Lieutenant-Governor of the Dominion) and Ensign Joshua Pipon, were responsible for organising garrisons and assessing the capability of New England's defences. In 1688, following attacks on English colonists by French-allied Indians near Springfield and Northfield in Massachusetts, Nicholson reported that he had been 'informed that some places were afraid of the Indians in their neighbourhood, and that others were very much alarmed att the news from Northfield, (for they have nott yett forgott the Cruelties of the Indians

Essays on Religion, Militia, Trade and Networks, ed. H. Wellenreuther (Berlin, Germany: Lit Verlag, 2009), p. 108.

44 Lustig, *Imperial Executive,* pp. 174–179; Craven, *Colonies in Transition,* p. 217; D.S. Lovejoy, *The Glorious Revolution in America* (New York, NY, USA: Harper & Row, 1972), pp. 208–209; Barnes, *Dominion,* pp. 212–216; E.B. Greene & V.D. Harrington, *American Population before the Federal Census of 1790* (Columbia, NY, USA: Columbia University Press, 1981), p. 3; G. Bancroft, *History of the United States of America from the Discovery of the Continent,* Vol. I (New York, NY, USA: D. Appleton and Company, 1898), p. 9; *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and West Indies, 1689–1692,* Vol. 13 [CSPC], ed. J.W. Fortescue (London: HMSO, 1901), p. 261: Abstract of the militia of New England, 13 May. 1690; Massachusetts State Archives MSA, SC1-45x, Massachusetts Archives Collection – 'Felt Collection' – 1629–1799, CCXLII, ff. 352–352a: Account of the Forces Raised in New England, Apr. 1689. Please see Abbiss, 'James VII & II', p. 45, for an explanation of militia figures.

45 *CSPC, 1685–1688,* Vol. 12, ed. J.W. Fortescue (London: HMSO, 1899), p. 242: Minutes of the Council of New York, 14 Sept. 1686; *DRNY, 1614-1692,* Vol. III, pp. 475–477: Instructions from Dongan to Palmer, 8 Sept. 1687 . TNA, CO 1/63, f. 101: Letters received from Blathwayt, 18 Aug. 1687; TNA, CO 5/904, f. 202, Commission to Nicholson to be Lieutenant Governor of New England, 7 Apr. 1688 ; *Second Annual Report of the State Historian of the State of New York,* No. 68, ed. H. Hastings (Albany and New York, NY, USA, 1897), p. 391.

46 MSA, SC1-38x, Transcripts and Documents collected in France 1492–1815: Vol. III, ff. 187–188: John Palmer to Thomas Sharpe, 23 Jul. 1686; Palmer to Baron Jean-Vincent d'Abbadie de Saint Castine, 31 Jul. 1686; TNA, CO 1/63, f. 111: Stores of War at Pemaquid and Casco Bay, 28 Mar. 1687.

47 MSA, SC1-45x, CXXVII, f. 55: Edmund Andros to Ames Andros, 27 Aug. 1687.

in the war they had with them about 12 or 13 years agoe)'.[48] The colonists in New England were clearly concerned about recurring violence, so Nicholson reassured them by stressing that 'they had the happiness of being subjects of a victorious King, who could protect them from all their enemies'.[49] During July and August 1688, Nicholson travelled over 230 miles in 24 days to inspect defences, offer support and coordinate men and military resources at towns and settlements across New England.[50] During September 1688, Ensign Pipon wrote to Edmund Andros and outlined his intentions and preparations for defending colonists and settlements in Maine. To prevent further attacks and subdue any hostile Indians, Pipon argued that 'there is a great need of sending from Boston – a sufficient quantity of men well armed, who shall be imployed as is necessary'.[51] Pipon intended for the soldiers to march to different locations throughout Maine, including Kennebec River, Merrymeeting Bay and Tacohok Fort, and 'fall upon' groups of enemy Indians.[52] Both Nicholson and Pipon stressed the threat faced from New France and Indians allied to the French and highlighted the growing tensions along the New England borders.[53] In correspondence discussing security around New York, Albany and Esopus, Nicholson claimed the French were encouraging attacks on the English by using the Indians to spread rumours and stories amongst the English settlements. He considered the reports as 'a tricke of the French, Endeavouring to afright our country people, and soe make them Garrison themselves, and then they may insinuate to the Indians, that the English either designes to fall upon them, or are afraide of them, either of which will be prejudiciall to us'.[54]

Regular officers were committed to the Crown and their service against enemy forces, as emphasised by Ensign Pipon when he requested leave to lead a detachment of troops against suspected hostile Indians in Maine.[55] Despite regulars trying to improve and organise defences, violence continued and eventually resulted in war in 1688. The Indian War of 1688 was the first serious test of the Dominion's security forces. It required Andros and his officer corps to use their experience and initiative to secure the New England borders and advance against hostile Indians. The campaign

48 *DRNY, 1614–1692*, Vol. III, pp. 551, 557: Francis Nicholson to John Povey, 31 Aug. 1688; Andros to Denonville, 19 Sept. 1688; TNA, CO 1/65, f. 147: Report by Nicholson, 31 Aug. 1688.

49 *DRNY, 1614–1692*, Vol. III, p. 551: Nicholson to Povey, 31 Aug. 1688; TNA, CO 1/65, f. 148: Report by Nicholson, 31 Aug. 1688.

50 *DRNY, 1614–1692*, Vol. III, pp. 550–554: Nicholson to Povey, 31 Aug. 1688; TNA, CO 1/65, ff. 147–150: Report by Nicholson, 31 Aug. 1688; Abbiss, 'James VII & II', pp. 149–151, 175.

51 MSA, SC1-45x, CXXIX, f. 173: Joshua Pipon to Andros, 10 Sept. 1688.

52 MSA, SC1-45x, CXXIX, f. 173: Pipon to Andros, 10 Sept. 1688.

53 *DRNY, 1614–1692*, Vol. III, pp. 550–554: Nicholson to Povey, 31 Aug. 1688; TNA, CO 1/65, f. 150: Report by Nicholson, 31 Aug. 1688; MSA, SC1-45x, CXXIX, ff. 172–174: Pipon to Andros, 10 Sept. 1688; MSA, SC1-45x, CXXIX, f. 200: Pipon to Andros, 22 Sept. 1688; MSA, SC1-45x, CCXLII ff. 351–351b: Pipon to Andros, 3 Sept. 1688.

54 Connecticut State Library (CSL), RG 001:010, Colonial Wars (CW), 1st Series: 1675–1786, Vol. 2: 1688–1694, f. 4: Nicholson to Boston, 1 Dec. 1688.

55 MSA, SC1-45x, CXXIX, f. 174: Pipon to Andros, 10 Sept. 1688; Abbiss, 'James VII & II', p. 81.

presented new challenges to the regular officers and soldiers serving there. These obstacles included different topography, weapons, the nature of Indian warfare and cooperation with colonial militia.

The Indian War of 1688

The Indian War of 1688 was the result of a build up of hostilities between the English and French and their Indian allies during the 1680s. Following a series of violent skirmishes involving English colonists and the Wabanaki and heated written exchanges between Edmund Andros, Thomas Dongan and the Governor of New France, further conflict seemed inevitable.[56] The colonists had mostly ignored previous peace settlements with the Wabanaki by encroaching on their lands and showing little respect to the Indians and this encouraged closer ties with the French. In November 1688 Edward Randolph argued that 'the Indians, were never civilly treated by the late government, who made it their business to encroach upon their lands, and by degrees to drive them out of all'.[57] Between July and October 1688 attacks on English colonists and their allied Indians took place near Springfield and Northfield in Massachusetts, New Haven in Connecticut and North Yarmouth, Merrymeeting Bay, Sheepscot, Kennebunk, New Dartmouth and Cape Porpoise in Maine.[58] Some of the Indians responsible for carrying out the attacks were allied to the French who continued to make military preparations throughout 1688 by sending ammunition and supplies to Cadarachqui and intending to build a fort at Penobscot in Maine.[59] There were also reports that between 700 and 2,000 armed French men and

56 Parkman, *France and England*, pp. 91–106; Lustig, *Imperial Executive*, pp. 170–182; Rawlyk, *Nova Scotia's Massachusetts*, pp. 51–58; Guttridge, *The Colonial Policy of William III*, pp. 12, 42; *The Dongan Papers, 1683–1688, Part 2: Files of the Provincial Secretary of New York During the Administration of Governor Thomas Dongan* (*DP*), ed. P.R. Christoph (Syracuse, NY, USA: Syracuse University Press, 1993), pp. 179–180, 187–190, 203–209: Dongan to Arnout Cornelise Viele, 25 May. 1688; The Five Nations to Dongan, 26 Jun. 1688; The Five Nations to Andros; *DRNY, 1614–1692*, Vol. III, pp. 466–468, 469–472, 472–475, 569–571: Denonville to Dongan's, 21 Aug. 1687; Denonville's remarks on Dongan's letter, Aug. 1687; Dongan to Denonville, 9 Sept. 1687; Denonville to Andros, 23 Oct. 1688; TNA, CO 1/65, ff. 233, 241: Andros to Denonville, 19 Sept. 1688; Andros to Denonville, 1 Oct. 1688.

57 J.H. Pulsipher, '"Dark Cloud Rising from the East": Indian Sovereignty and the Coming of King William's War in New England', *The New England Quarterly*, 80 (2007), pp. 588–613; T. Hutchinson, *The History of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay* (2nd Edn., London, 1765), p. 364.

58 *DRNY, 1614–1692,* Vol. III, p. 557: Andros to Denonville, 19 Sept. 1688; *Colonial Justice in Western Massachusetts, 1639–1702: The Pynchon Court Record*, ed. J.H. Smith (Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press, 1961), pp. 50–51; TNA, CO 1/65, ff. 151–152: John Pynchon to Nicholson, 21 Aug. 1688; Boston Public Library (BPL), Prince Papers, Ms.AM 1502, Mather Papers 1632–1689: Volume VII, f. 45: Samuel Sewall to Increase Mather, 8 Oct. 1688 ; Mather, *Magnalia Christi Americana*, p. 509; MSA, SC1-45x, CXXIX, ff. 261–267: Examination of Henry Smith by Randolph, 31 Oct. 1688; CWF, Ms. 1946.2, Vol. III, No. 4: New England, New York, Oct. 1688–Jun. 1689, unfol.: Andros to Blathwayt, 19 Oct. 1688; Andros to Blathwayt, 10 Nov. 1688; Abbiss, 'James VII & II', pp. 142–182.

59 *DRNY, 1614–1692*, Vol. III, pp. 550–551; 557, 561–562: Nicholson to John Povey, 31 Aug. 1688; Andros to Denonville, 19 Sept. 1688; Examination of Magsigpen, an Indian, 15 Sept. 1688; AAS, Indians, I,

their Indian allies had gathered at Penacook in New Hampshire and had constructed a fort in preparation for 'Warr with the English'.[60]

In an attempt to avoid the military problems and vulnerabilities exposed during King Philip's War, during October 1688 Andros organised an expeditionary force composed of regular officers and soldiers and militia companies. Andros declared that there was 'a Pannick fear upon all' in New England and following failed attempts by colonists to resolve the violence and inadequate defence measures being used, the Governor outlined his intentions: 'to send three or four Vessells & forces suitable to Secure and Settle the Eastern parts with particular Regard to our fishery and shall Endeavour to apprehend & Secure the Murderers if doe not Surrender themselves'.[61] Andros's previous military experience in Maine gave him the confidence to carry out an effective military operation. He was familiar with the landscape of the province after previously ordering the construction of a 'framed Block house or Ridout [redoubt]' surrounded by nine-foot stockades and two bastions and posting a sufficient number of sentinels and guns at Pemaquid in Maine.[62] Andros understood the geography and recognised Pemaquid as a suitable location for access by boat and a strong defensive point that had a supply of fresh water. He also suggested other locations ideal for constructing a fortification such as Cape Anawagon near Sagadahoc and the islands of Monhegan and Damariscove. Andros realised the importance of keeping a large quantity of arms, ammunition and other provisions at the garrison and in 1677 he requested that all soldiers remain together and not to 'stragle or range the woods' alone or in small numbers.[63] During King Philip's War Andros used the army to build, maintain and improve defences at Pemaquid and a similar approach was taken in 1688 but developed further by constructing new forts and garrisons along the coastline and also further inland. He also used the soldiers to pursue and confront all hostile parties in the province.

Preparations started in October when small contingents of soldiers were distributed throughout Maine, Massachusetts and Connecticut to guard settlements, apprehend hostile Indians and protect allied Indians.[64] A significant move from Andros was the establishment of a combined regular-provincial army containing 709 officers and soldiers,

unfol.: War in Maine, Sept. 1688; MSA, SC1-45x, XXX, ff. 310–311: The examination of an Indian called Magsigpen by Stephen Van Cortlandt , 15 Sept. 1688; *DP*, *Part 2*, p. 202: Dongan to Iroquois Sachems, 1688; TNA, CO 1/65, f. 147: Report by Nicholson, 31 Aug. 1688; Abbiss, 'James VII & II', pp. 142–182.

60 TNA, CO 1/65, f. 108: An Abstract of letters from Boston, 20 Aug. 1688.

61 *ERLP, 1678–1700,* Vol. VI, pp. 278-280: Randolph to Blathwayt, 8 Nov. 1688; MSA, SC1-45x, CXXIX, ff. 178–179, 194–195: Thomas Treffry, Joseph Dudley, John Usher and Samuel Shrimpton to Andros, 11 Sept. 1688; Andros to Edward Tyng, 20 Oct. 1688; CWF, Ms. 1946.2, III, 4, unfol.: Andros to Blathwayt, 19 Oct. 1688.

62 *DRNY, 1614–1692*, Vol. III, p. 248: Instructions for Brockholes, Knapton and Nicolls, 13 Jun. 1677.

63 *DRNY, 1614–1692*, Vol. III, pp. 248-249: Instructions for Brockholes, Knapton and Nicolls, 13 Jun. 1677.

64 MSA, SC1-45x, CXXIX, f. 195: Andros to Edward Tyng, 20 Oct. 1688; S. Sewall, *The Diary of Samuel Sewall, 1674–1729: Volume I, 1674–1708,* ed. M. Halsey Thomas (New York, NY, USA: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1973), pp. 181–182; CSL, RG 001:010, CW, 1, 2: 1688–1694, ff. 2, 3a–3b: Andros to John Allen, 1 Nov. 1688; Andros to John Allen, 1 Nov. 1688; *Edward Randolph: Including his Letters and Official Papers from the New England, Middle and Southern Colonies in America and the West Indies, 1678–1700,* Vol.

which was an unfamiliar partnership in New England. The force contained about 100 regulars from the New York and Boston garrisons and nine militia companies raised from different colonies in the Dominion. Regular officers, including Captain Anthony Brockholes and Lieutenant John Jordan from New York and Lieutenant James Weems, Lieutenant Thomas Treffry, Ensign Joshua Pipon and Ensign Ames Andros from Boston, commanded regular soldiers and militia units.[65] Regular and provincial soldiers were expected to work together to build and restore forts and garrisons and monitor the Maine coastline and towns, villages and rivers on the interior. Regular officers – Captain Brockholes, Lieutenant Treffry and Lieutenant Weems – were stationed at Pemaquid and accompanied by two militia companies commanded by militia officers; Captain Edward Tyng (or Ting) and Captain George Minot and Lieutenant Jordan managed standing forces at New Dartmouth alongside Captain John Withington's company of militia. Weems was also ordered to 'Garrison a fort att Casco Bay' with a detachment of regular and militia troops. Ensign Andros was dispatched to Sagadahoc, at the mouth of Kennebec River, and helped organise colonial troops in the surrounding smaller forts alongside militia officers: Lieutenant-Colonel Magregory (or Macgregor), Major Thomas Savage and Captain John Manning.[66] It is interesting to note that the majority of regular officers mustered and sent to Maine in 1688 were the commissioned officers from the British Isles dispatched to New England in 1686 and 1688 as opposed to the regular officers already serving in North America.

Regular officers were expected to travel between different forts and garrisons, so the choice of regulars that were not familiar with the landscape could have presented a problem. According to correspondence from the time this does not seem to have significantly hindered progress particularly as regulars worked more closely with colonial troops. Andros reported at the beginning of the expedition to Maine, Lieutenant Jordan travelled from Boston to New Dartmouth in the sloop *Mary* with a detachment of regular and colonial soldiers: 'I immediately ordered all necessarys on board the sayd Sloope who was very well manned and sent a Detachment from the Garrison here under the Command of Lieutenant Jordan who sayled the next morning for the Relief of that place'.[67] Colonial officer, Captain John Alden, was the commander of the sloop *Mary* and throughout 1688 assisted the army. Alden was familiar with transporting soldiers and supplies to different forts throughout Maine, including Pemaquid, Sagadahoc and

VI (*ERLP*), ed. A.T. Scrope Goodrick (Boston, MA, USA: The Prince Society, 1909), p. 280: Randolph to Blathwayt, 8 Nov. 1688.

65 MSA, SC1-45x, CCXLII, ff. 352–352a: Account of the Forces Raised in New England, Apr. 1689; MSA, SC1-45x, CXXIX, f. 304: Stephen Van Cortlandt to Randolph, 1688; J. Romeyn Brodhead, *The Government of Sir Edmund Andros over New England in 1688 and 1689* (New York, NY, USA, 1867), pp. 15–16; Abbiss, 'James VII & II', pp. 158–161.

66 MSA, SC1-45x, CCXLII, ff. 352–352a: Account of the Forces Raised in New England, Apr. 1689; *ERLP, 1678–1700,* Vol. VI, p. 280: Randolph to Blathwayt, 8 Nov. 1688; CWF, Ms. 1946.2, III, 4, unfol.: Andros to Blathwayt, 10 Nov. 1688.

67 CWF, Ms. 1946.2, III, 4, unfol.: Andros to Blathwayt, 10 Nov. 1688.

Penobscot and apprehending potential hostile individuals in north-east New England.[68] Using the geographical knowledge of local commanders and the military skill and intuition of regular officers was a preferred approach by Edmund Andros. While Andros was preparing to march into Maine during November 1688, he instructed Colonel Robert Treat and a company of soldiers 'to Quarter at the head of Connecticut River … for the Security and Defence of that River and parts'.[69] Andros described Treat as 'the late Governor of Connecticut and a good Experienced Indian Officer', which would have been good for negotiations and useful in predicting Indian movements and preventing further assaults on New England.[70] In September 1688 Ensign Pipon requested 'a sufficient quantity of men well armed' from Boston to help prevent further attacks and subdue hostile Indians in Maine.[71] His intention was to take leave from Fort Pemaquid and lead the provincial soldiers himself:

> If your Excellency was pleased to grant me the favour to send an officer to take charge of ye fort & lett me go with the men sent from Boston, I would do my best endeavour both with prudence & courage to acquitt my life of my duty & render myself worthy of the favour you would honour me withall, in granting ye request.[72]

Pipon wanted to march the soldiers to Kennebec River, travelling as far as Merrymeeting Bay, or Tacohok Fort and launch a surprise attack upon the Indians. Here, Pipon was coordinating military movements in Maine and using the colonial militia in order to bolster defences and confront hostile Indians or French soldiers. He seemed confident with that approach and was unconcerned about travelling deeper into the Maine wilderness.[73]

Some regulars sent from the British Isles embraced the challenges in New England but others found it more difficult to adapt. In September 1688, whilst Andros was in New York, Lieutenant Thomas Treffry and councillors, based in Boston, managed the government and military. They responded to the attacks in Maine by dispatching a sloop and 40 militia troops, and shortly after another 50 men, to settle the area. The 40 soldiers were under the command of militia officer: Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Tyng but rather than quelling the violence in Maine, retaliatory attacks occurred, colonists and Indians were taken as prisoners and panic increased in Maine.[74] Andros

68 MSA, SC1-45x, CXXIX, ff. 352–353: Order to John Alden, 26 Mar. 1689; CWF, Ms. 1946.2, III, 4, unfol.: Andros to Blathwayt, 10 Nov. 1688.

69 CWF, Ms. 1946.2, III, 4, unfol.: Andros to Blathwayt, 10 Nov. 1688.

70 CWF, Ms. 1946.2, III, 4, unfol.: Andros to Blathwayt, 10 Nov. 1688.

71 MSA, SC1-45x, CXXIX, f. 173: Pipon to Andros, 10 Sept. 1688.

72 MSA, SC1-45x, CXXIX, ff. 173–174: Pipon to Andros, 10 Sept. 1688

73 MSA, SC1-45x, CCXLII f. 351a: Pipon to Andros, 3 Sept. 1688; MSA, SC1-45x, CXXIX, ff. 173–174: Pipon to Andros, 10 Sept. 1688.

74 *ERLP, 1678–1700,* Vol. VI, pp. 278–280: Randolph to Blathwayt, 8 Nov. 1688; MSA, SC1-45x, CXXIX, ff. 178–179, 194–195: Treffry, Dudley, Usher and Shrimpton to Andros, 11 Sept. 1688; Andros to Edward

criticised the decision to send out the troops and seize Indians without his authority and Treffry responded with: 'I find your Exll[ll] [Excellency] displeased with me for which I am very sorry my sineing with the Counsell was as I thought for the preservation of the Country and people, had your Exll[ll] [Excellency] given me any perticular Orders, I should have been very Carefull to observe them'.[75] During Andros's absence from Boston, Treffry assumed the position of 'Cheife in Command' but it appears that his previous experience as Ensign in the Earl of Bath's Regiment of Foot in the British Isles, did not adequately prepare him for service in New England.[76] In a joint letter addressed to Andros, Treffry and the Council acknowledged their uncertainty over handling conflict with the Indians in Maine: 'Wee know not what more to doe in the unhappy business to the Eastward without your Excell[s] [Excellency's] Express Direction and are sorry that so rash and Early a Seizure of Indian Women and Children should produce such a Hurry and Expence'.[77] During 1685 Bath's regiment was used for guard and garrison duty after being stationed at Plymouth for the majority of the year. As a junior officer, serving in a regiment responsible for security in the British Isles, Treffry faced a very different environment in New England with new threats, communication delays and an unfamiliar landscape.[78] Treffry's mistake, however, did not discourage Andros from deploying him during the Indian War and in October 1688 he was sent with a detachment of troops to help command Fort Pemaquid in Maine.[79] The majority of regulars serving in New England adapted quickly to the challenges they were presented with and were supported by other regulars and the colonial militia.

The success of the combined actions of the regulars and colonial officers and soldiers was dependent upon a strong working relationship. Douglas E. Leach argued that relations were strained during the Indian War and the Redcoats treated the colonial militia with contempt and unnecessarily berated the troops.[80] Despite the development of a useful military partnership between regular and provincial troops, there is some evidence to suggest friction in a few forts and garrisons in Maine. Ensign Pipon wrote to Governor Andros and described the officers stationed near Kennebec River as

Tyng, 20 Oct. 1688; CWF, Ms. 1946.2, III, 4, unfol.: Andros to Blathwayt, 19 Oct. 1688.

75 *Documentary History of the State of Maine containing The Baxter Manuscripts* [*DHSM*], Vol. VI, ed. J. Phinney Baxter (Portland, ME, USA: The Thurston Print, 1900), pp. 438–439: Treffry to Andros, 9 Oct. 1688; MSA, SC1-45x, CXXIX, ff. 194–195: Andros to Tyng, 20 Oct. 1688; CWF, Ms. 1946.2, III, 4, unfol.: Andros to Blathwayt, 19 Oct. 1688; Andros to the Lords of Trade and Plantations, 10 Nov. 1688.

76 *ERLP, 1678–1700*, Vol. VI, p. 257: Randolph to Blathwayt, 28 Jul. 1688; *CSPC, 1689–1692*, Vol. 13, p. 100: Petition of John Treffry, 22 Jul. 1689; *Narratives of the Insurrections, 1675–1690*, ed. C.M. Andrews (New York, NY, USA: Barnes & Noble, 1967), p. 174: Byfield's Account of the Late Revolution, 1689.

77 MSA, SC1-45x, CXXIX, ff. 178-179: Treffry, Dudley, Usher and Shrimpton to Andros, 11 Sept. 1688.

78 R. Cannon, *Historical Record of the Tenth, or the North Lincolnshire, Regiment of Foot* (London: Parker, Furnivall & Parker, 1847), pp. 1–3; V. Henshaw, *Scotland and the British Army, 1700–1750: Defending the Union* (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), pp. 120–121.

79 *ERLP, 1678–1700*, Vol. VI, p. 280: Randolph to Blathwayt, 8 Nov. 1688; CWF, Ms. 1946.2, III, 4, unfol.: Andros to Blathwayt, 10 Nov. 1688.

80 Leach, *Roots of Conflict*, pp. 15, 17–19.

Figure 2.3 *Province of Maine* by Amos Doolittle (Philadelphia, PA, USA: M. Carey, 1806). (Public domain. Map reproduction courtesy of the Norman B. Leventhal Map & Education Center at the Boston Public Library)

ineffective and weak: 'the officers there are such fools, that it is easy for the Indians to take advantage of them'.[81] In that instance Pipon may simply have wanted to draw Andros's attention to a potential weakness and reporting such details would have been expected of him as a junior officer. In separate correspondence sent to Andros, Pipon described the soldiers at Fort Pemaquid as 'hott & fiery, & long to show their valor against anybody & make as many holes in the Indians bodies, as they have in their coats'.[82] At some garrisons the problems between regulars and provincial troops went beyond written criticism.

During the Indian War, at Fort Sheepscot and Fort Pemaquid, Lieutenant John Jordan and Lieutenant James Weems carried out aggressive disciplinary action against some provincial troops. Weems was accused of verbally abusing some officers by telling soldiers who wanted to return home that 'alas poore men you will never goe home while you live' and describing military service in Maine as: 'Hell is like to be your winter quarters and the Devill your Lanlord'.[83] In 1689 Henry Teuxbury described the actions of Lieutenant John Jordan at Fort Sheepscot at New Dartmouth in Maine. Jordan was accused of:

> … hanging up a man by the hand with a cod line clear from the ground only bearing one foote upon a Sharpe Stake a long time, and afterwards tied neck & heels, and after that tyed up by the other hand as before, with his other hand & foot tyed cross behinde him, and after that bound down with his back upon a sharp rayle or stake saying that he would so punish him that he should not be able to earn his living if he lived but begg from Dore to Dore.[84]

This story was reiterated in complaints delivered to Simon Bradstreet, Governor of Massachusetts, in June 1689 and related to a soldier serving at New Dartmouth called Richard Hodges. Hodges stated that he was 'falsely accused of breaking into the stores' and was subjected to 'devilish torments'.[85] Lieutenant Jordan's response to the accusations of brutality was that the disciplinary methods he used were necessary in the garrison and were appropriate for the misdemeanours that were carried out. In reaction to Hodges' complaint, Jordan argued that the storehouse had been broken into three times and after threatening the soldiers several men came forward to confirm Hodges' guilt. Jordan discovered that Hodges was a repeat offender and had been 'whipped' for theft in the past and pardoned for drawing his musket and aiming

81 MSA, SC1-45x, CXXIX, f. 174: Pipon to Andros, 10 Sept. 1688.

82 MSA, SC1-45x, CCXLII, f. 351b: Pipon to Andros, 3 Sept. 1688.

83 *DHSM*, Vol. VI, p. 469: The Deposition of Henry Tuxberry [Teuxbury], 1689; MSA, SC1-45x, XXXV, f. 276: Lieutenant James Wemms [Weems], 1689.

84 MSA, SC1-45x, XXXV, f. 275: Henry Teuxbury, 1689; *DHSM*, Vol. VI, p. 469: The Deposition of Henry Tuxberry [Teuxbury], 1689.

85 *CSPC, 1689–1692*, Vol. 13, p. 71: Charges against Lieutenant John Jordan, 23 Jun. 1689.

it at his senior officer.[86] The regular officers deemed their actions as necessary and this reflected the disciplinary methods used in European armies, which the Redcoats implemented during service in North America.

In Europe military discipline was considered a necessary tool for cohesion, control and efficiency. Discipline was also a method of transforming inexperienced and untrained men into loyal soldiers.[87] In the British Isles, James VII & II intended to maintain a strong, disciplined and professional army. In line with this objective, a set of military regulations was sent to Governor Andros to support training and command of the army in New England.[88] Inferior officers and soldiers were expected to obey senior commanders and those that resisted could be punished or dismissed and acts of theft were punishable by death unless the case was referred to a court martial.[89] Consequently in 1687, Lieutenant James Weems was ordered to 'Observe & follow Such Orders & Direccons as you shall from time to time receive from me [Andros] according to the Rules & Discipline of War'.[90] Weems was told to 'Carefully & Dilligently' take command of Fort Pemaquid and the militia stationed there and in return the officers and soldiers were expected to 'obey' his command.[91] Jordan's Commission in 1688 ordered him to 'discharge the Duty of Lieutenant by Executing and well Disciplining the Inferior Officers and Soldiers of that Company'.[92] This instruction was exercised by Lieutenant Jordan towards his company but also to the garrison troops in Maine. This order was reiterated to Jordan by Andros prior to his embarkation to Maine in 1688: 'To embark his detachment from Dartmouth and take command of the port, ship the women and children away, arm the men, do his best to secure their property for them, and maintain strict discipline'.[93] Colonial troops had limited experience of serving under regular officers and were largely unfamiliar with professional command and discipline. Previously, the militia were commanded by individuals living and working in the same town or colony. The Dominion of New England introduced a new military system in 1686 that required the joint coordination of regulars and militia units. The new army not only contained men from different countries but also men from different colonies, all of which had different approaches

86 *CSPC, 1689–1692*, Vol. 13, pp. 71–72: Answer of Jordan to the charges against him, 23 Jun. 1689.

87 J. Childs, *Armies and Warfare in Europe, 1648–1789* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1982), pp. 174–175; A. Starkey, 'European-Native American warfare in North America, 1513–1815' in ed. J. Black, *War in the Early Modern World, 1450–1815* (London: UCL Press, 1999), p. 243; Starkey, *European and Native American Warfare*, p. 19.

88 TNA, CO 1/60, f. 201: Letters received by Andros, 12 Oct. 1686; TNA, CO 5/904, f. 158: Articles of War for New England, 12 Oct. 1686; W. Winthrop, *Military Law and Precedents*, Vol. II (2nd ed., Boston, MA, USA: Little, Brown & Company, 1896), pp. 1434–1445; Abbiss, 'Conflict within Conflict', pp. 5–6.

89 C. Walton, *History of the British Standing Army, A.D. 1600 to 1700* (London: Harrison and Sons, 1894), p. 811; Winthrop, *Military Law*, pp. 1436–1437.

90 MSA, SC1-45x, CXXVII, f. 267: Appointment of James Weems as Commander of Pemaquid, 30 Nov. 1687.

91 MSA, SC1-45x, CXXVII, f. 267: Appointment of Weems as Commander of Pemaquid, 30 Nov. 1687.

92 TNA, SP 44/69, f. 219: Commission to Jordan to be Lieutenant in New England, 28 May. 1688.

93 *CSPC, 1689–1692*, Vol. 13, p. 72: Orders of Andros to Jordan, 31 Oct. 1688.

to military training, command and discipline.[94] In some of the forts and garrisons emotions were clearly running high and combined with constant fears of a joint French-Indian attack, the atmosphere was tense.

The most significant military preparations during the Indian War of 1688 took place between October 1688 and April 1689 and even though the French did not dispatch a large number of soldiers into Maine during that time, preparations were made to do so and the French organised smaller expeditions and continued to encourage Indian attacks.[95] During October 1688 Edmund Andros wrote to Denonville, the Governor of New France, concerned that a party of Indians responsible for the murder of English colonists at Casco Bay boasted about receiving 'Encouragement and assistance from Canada'.[96] During the same month Edward Randolph received information that French priests were helping supply and arm French-allied Indians in Maine and 'would send them more armes and ammunition as soone as the frost Came & an army of men from Canada'.[97] Randolph also reported that Baron Jean-Vincent d'Abbadie de Saint Castine, a former French officer and Abenaki chief, was supplying French-allied Indians and encouraging attacks on English colonists: 'Monsieur Castine did give to every Indian that Engaged against the English one pound of Powder two pound of Load and a small Quantity of Tobaco'.[98] Louis-Alexandre des Friches de Meneval, Governor of Acadia, described the Canibas, who inhabited the Pentagöet region, and the Abenakis, who in large numbers lived near Kennebec River, as 'devoted to the French' and hateful of the English.[99] Consequently, Andros wrote to Meneval at Port

94 Lustig, *Imperial Executive*, p. 181; Leach, *Roots of Conflict,* pp. 18–19; Pulsipher, *Subjects unto the Same King*, pp. 254–255; J.B. Whisker, *The American Colonial Militia: Introduction to the American Colonial Militia, Volume I* (Lewiston, NY, USA: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1997, pp. 7, 9–17; J. Cooper, 'Militia and National Guard' in *The Oxford Companion to American Military History*, ed. J. Whiteclay Chambers II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 440–441; 'The Boston Regiment in Colonial Days', *Colonial Wars: A Quarterly Magazine*, Vol. I (Boston, MA, USA: Society of Colonial Wars, 1913), pp. 30–38; Starkey, *European and Native American Warfare*, pp. 68–69; For more information on the clash between regulars and provincial troops in Maine, please see: Abbiss, 'Conflict within Conflict', pp. 4–12.

95 MSA, SC1-45x, CXXIX, ff. 261–267: Examination of Henry Smith by Randolph, 31 Oct. 1688; D.F. Marley, *Wars of the Americas: A Chronology of Armed Conflict in the New World, 1492 to the Present* (Santa Barbara, CA, USA: ABC-CLIO Inc., 1998), p. 200; *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York, 1631–1744*, Vol. IX, eds. J. Romeyn Brodhead, & E.B. O'Callaghan (Albany, NY, USA: Weed, Parsons and Company, 1855), pp. 402–408, 411–416; Louis Hector de Callières to Marquis de Seignelay, Jan. 1689; Callières to Seignelay, Feb. 1689; Supplies required for the Invasion of New York, Feb. 1689; Observations on the Project of Attack on New York, 24 Apr. 1689; AAS, Indians, I, unfol.: The Maquas speak to the Magistrates of Albany, 21 Feb. 1689; The Eastern Indians renew hostilities, Apr. 1689; Relations between the French and Iroquois, Jun. 1689.

96 TNA, CO 1/65, f. 241: Andros to Denonville, 1 Oct. 1688.

97 MSA, SC1-45x, CXXIX, f. 266: Examination of Smith by Randolph, 31 Oct. 1688.

98 MSA, SC1-45x, CXXIX, f. 266: Examination of Smith by Randolph, 31 Oct. 1688.

99 MSA, SC1-38x, III, f. 317: Report by M. de Meneval, 10 Sept. 1688 translated in G. Wheeler, *History of Castine, Penobscot and Brooksville, Maine: Including the Ancient Settlement of Pentagöet* (Bangor, ME, USA: Burr & Robinson, 1875), p. 273.

Royal: 'Adviseing him of these troubles, and desyreing that noe such Indians may be received or supplyed from those parts'.[100]

To secure the eastern frontier and prevent French-Indian encroachment into English territory, the regular-provincial army was charged with constructing new forts, including Pemaquid, Pejepscot, Sheepscot and Popham, and made improvements to run-down garrisons.[101] Soldiers were distributed throughout Maine and stationed at different strongholds across the province to secure the region from roaming war parties. In December 1688 Captain Wait Winthrop, a member of the Council of New England, highlighted the difficulties in locating Indians in Maine and reported that 'the Indians are nobody knows where'.[102] This did not dampen efforts to locate Indian hideouts and, while scouting parties were dispatched from forts to find and confront French-allied Indians, Andros ordered 200 more men from adjoining colonies to travel to Maine.[103] The Albany Commissioners for Indian Affairs reported that Andros and his army prevented 'the Indians from doing mischief all this Winter'.[104] Andros was determined to stay and secure the region and reiterated this point to Edward Randolph, based in Boston, in January 1689: 'where I shall not delay returning as soon as the state of these parts will allow it'.[105]

The Maine expeditionary force contained 709 regulars and militia and although this was a small number in comparison to European armies, it was sufficient for carrying out the military objectives of Governor Edmund Andros. Not only was there a difference in troop numbers participating in war but the challenges involved in colonial conflict were very different in North America. During the mid to late seventeenth century European soldiers and colonists experienced fighting against some American Indians but also formed necessary military alliances with others. Indian warriors were physically fit and could survive long marches on limited provisions and living off the land. They also understood methods of warfare adopted by different tribes, including raiding and ambush tactics, and created items ideal for frontier warfare such as lightweight canoes and snowshoes.[106] These skills were crucial in navigating unfamiliar and isolated areas of New England and were particularly useful during the winter campaign in Maine. Andros reduced reliance upon using Indian warriors during combat and instead wanted to develop and use the skills of the newly formed regular-provincial army; however, the

100 CWF, Ms. 1946.2, III, 4, unfol.: Andros to Blathwayt, 10 Nov. 1688.

101 MSA, SC1-45x, CCXLII, ff. 352–352a: Account of the Forces Raised in New England, Apr. 1689; AAS, Indians, I, unfol.: Andros's expedition to Maine, 5 Nov. 1688; Massachusetts Historical Society (MHS), PN-350, 'Winthrop Family Papers, 1537–1990', Reel 13, Box 23, unfol.: Wait Winthrop to Fitz-John Winthrop, 25 Dec. 1688.

102 MHS, PN-350, Reel 13, 23, unfol.: Wait Winthrop to Fitz-John Winthrop, 25 Dec. 1688.

103 MHS, PN-350, Reel 13, 23, unfol.: Wait Winthrop to Fitz-John Winthrop, 28 Jan. 1689; Abbiss, 'James VII & II', pp. 166–168.

104 AAS, Indians, I, unfol.: Andros's expedition to Maine, 5 Nov. 1688.

105 MSA, SC1-45x, CXXIX, f. 316: Andros to Randolph, 26 Jan. 1689.

106 Starkey, *European and Native American Warfare*, pp. 18–19.

Indians were still considered valuable in guiding the troops around Maine.[107] Captain Silvanus Davis, one of the commanding militia officers at Falmouth, described using an Indian's knowledge to guide the soldiers through unknown territory. The intention was to locate the hideouts and 'lurking places of the Indians'.[108]

Indian tribes that were negotiating and trading with the colonists had become more familiar with European politics and military operations, including using similar weapons such as flintlock muskets. Consequently, many Indians started to use a combination of native and European weapons whilst conducting raids and scouting patrols against colonial settlements and fortifications.[109] More and more Indian tribes were obtaining muskets and gunpowder from Europeans, so rival groups were keen to acquire and use the weapons against neighbouring powers and the colonists.[110] In 1687 Onondaga warriors thanked Governor Andros 'for his product of Powder & Ball' and described their preparations against the French: 'as soon as he Begins War with us, our Ax is ready'.[111] While the Five Nations were using a combination of weaponry in combat, other tribes were making similar preparations to attain firearms. The Outagarni, Kickapoo and Mascouten Indians joined together to raid a 'French Fort for Armes to go against the Sioux'.[112] In August 1688, following attacks on colonists and Indians in New England, Natick and Ponkapoag (Punckapaug) Indians in Massachusetts were afraid and requested some 'powder and ball' from Captain Francis Nicholson, which he provided them.[113] The Indians did not replace traditional weaponry for guns but instead wanted to arm themselves with the necessary equipment to oppose European forces and enemy tribes that were using similar firearms.[114] Learning from their training and experience using bow and arrow in forest warfare, the Indians could operate the flintlocks with a good degree of accuracy and were also capable of manufacturing their

107 *DRNY, 1614–1692*, Vol. III, p. 552: Nicholson to Povey, 31 Aug. 1688; TNA, CO 1/65, f. 148, Report by Nicholson, 31 Aug. 1688; *The Andros Tracts: Being a Collection of Pamphlets and Official Papers*, Vol. III, ed. W.H. Whitmore (Boston, MA, USA: The Prince Society, 1874), pp. 21–22; Abbiss, 'James VII & II', pp. 146–147.

108 MSA, SC1-45x, CXXIX, f. 217: Silvanus Davis – Arrival of Soldiers, 28 Sept. 1688.

109 A.A. Cave, *The French and Indian War* (Westport, CT, USA: Greenwood Press, 2004), pp. 29–30; J. Black, *Cambridge Illustrated Atlas: Warfare: Renaissance to Revolution, 1492–1792* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 44; Starkey, *European and Native American Warfare*, pp. 71–72.

110 K. Duval, 'Living in a Reordered World, 1680–1763' in *The Oxford Handbook of American Indian History,* ed. F.E. Hoxie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 59–62; P.M. Malone, *The Skulking Way of War: Technology and Tactics among the New England Indians* (Baltimore, MD, USA: John Hopkins University Press, 1993), p. 52

111 AAS, Indians, I, unfol.: The soldiers or young people of Onondaga, 28 Jun. 1687.

112 AAS, Indians, I, unfol.: Outagarni, Kickapoo and Mascouten Indians, Jun. 1687.

113 *DRNY*, 1614–1692, Vol. III, p. 551: Nicholson to Povey, 31 Aug. 1688; TNA, CO 1/65, f. 147, Report by Nicholson, 31 Aug. 1688.

114 Starkey, *European and Native American Warfare*, pp. 20–21; Malone, *The Skulking Way of War*, pp. 37–45, 52.

own ammunition and repairing disused colonial firearms.[115] These skills made them a threat to any army marching through the Maine wilderness and would have been an additional concern for Andros and his troops. Andros acknowledged the uncertainties and unpredictable nature of warfare against the Indians: 'Not knowing how the Indians may Straggle or Disperse themselves when pursued Eastward have Ordered a Company of men in Pay to Quarter att the head of Connecticutt River'.[116]

During the Indian War the army targeted Indian 'forts and strongholds' and removed or destroyed 'their Stores, many bushels of Indian Corn, their powder, some pistols and Musquet barrels and about thirty of their Canons'.[117] By destroying enemy firearms the Indians 'were reduced to very great poverty and forct to the use of their bows and arrows again'.[118] If the user was competent, the bow and arrow could be very accurate and a better option to the musket, which could be troublesome. They frequently misfired, were difficult to repair and could cause injury.[119] The Indians were by no means helpless without arms and ammunition but many had become adept at using flintlock muskets whilst hunting in forested areas in New England.[120] It was hoped by removing Indian firepower and preventing the resupply of Indians by the French, the army could better protect the colonists and homesteads in Maine. This was viewed as a significant achievement as Edward Randolph reiterated to the Lords of Trade and Plantations: the army had 'destroyed and brought away twenty-eight Indian canoes, and reduced them to the use of their bows and arrows that they could not much longer hold out'.[121]

The challenges of securing Maine were made more difficult due to the harsh weather conditions, limited supplies and sickness experienced by the army. Edward Randolph highlighted that the expedition to the eastern frontier was carried out in 'the depth of winter' but noted that, at least initially, the 'unusuall mildness' of the season meant that Andros could pursue the Indians with greater ease: 'the rivers and lakes were not frozen, so as his men could march after the Indians when and where he intended'.[122] Harsh winter conditions were nothing unusual to the English regulars, but the landscape that had to be navigated and crossed in Maine was different to the experiences of places in

115 J.D. Drake, *King Philip's War: Civil War in New England, 1675–1676* (Amherst, MA, USA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1999), p. 127; Starkey, *European and Native American Warfare*, pp. 21–23; Malone, *The Skulking Way of War*, pp. 37–45, 93–95.

116 CWF, Ms. 1946.2, III, 4, unfol.: Andros to Blathwayt, 10 Nov. 1688.

117 *Narratives of the Insurrections*, p. 198: *A Particular Account of the Late Revolution, 1689*.

118 *Narratives of the Insurrections,* p. 198: *A Particular Account of the Late Revolution, 1689*.

119 B.J. Given, *A Most Pernicious Thing: Gun Trading and Native Warfare in the Early Contact Period* (Ottawa, Canada: Carleton University Press, 1994), pp. 106–109.

120 Malone, *The Skulking Way of War,* pp. 44–45.

121 *Narratives of the Insurrections,* p. 198: *A Particular Account of the Late Revolution, 1689*; *Edward Randolph: Including his Letters and Official Papers from the New England, Middle and Southern Colonies in America with Other Documents Relating Chiefly to the Vacating of the Royal Charter of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay, 1676–1703,* Vol. IV (*ERLP*), ed. R. Noxon Toppan (Boston, MA, USA: The Prince Society, 1899), p. 277: Randolph to the Lords of Trade, 29 May. 1689.

122 *ERLP, 1678–1700,* Vol. IV, p. 277: Randolph to the Lords of Trade, 29 May. 1689.

the British Isles and Europe. According to Patrick M. Malone, 'In Europe, soldiers fought opponents who were willing to accept battle under mutually advantageous situations and to forego actions in bad weather, darkness, or forested terrain'.[123] In New England, however, surprise attacks and forest battles were familiar features of Anglo-Indian warfare and inhospitable conditions did not prevent combat from taking place.[124] Reverend John Pike recorded that from 9 November 1688 until 12 March 1689 it snowed on 13 different days. That was almost double the recorded snowfall from the previous year where Pike noted only eight days of snow between December 1686 and February 1687.[125] Even Cotton Mather, a staunch opponent of Edmund Andros, recognised the difficulties faced by the army travelling to Maine: 'He [Andros], and his Army underwent no little Hardship, thus in the Depth of Winter to Expose themselves unto the Circumstances of a Campaign, in all the Bleak Winds and Thick Snows of that Northern Country'.[126] The army was expected to navigate 'thro' dismall and almost impassable swamps' and in one instance 'marched above one hundred and twenty miles right up into the countrey, in deep snow'.[127] Andros described the winter in New England as 'Extreme Cold & Hard' but considered going to Maine as necessary to prevent further attacks from hostile Indians and a potential invasion by the French.[128] He described Maine as remote and filled with 'Rivers, Ponds, and Lakes' and soldiers marching through the province would have to trek through 'Great Snows'.[129]

The bad weather conditions did not prevent Andros and the army carrying out their duties but the experience in some garrisons and forts was very unpleasant. Ensign Joshua Pipon wrote to Andros in September 1688 and described the limited stock and broken weapons at Fort Pemaquid. The fort was in need of 'Cap paper to make Cartridges' and tools such as nails, hammers and a hand vice to fix the guns. The soldiers also needed food, including molasses and beef, and some candles, soap and boots.[130] The condition of the soldiers was best described when Pipon declared that the men wanted to 'make as many holes in the Indians bodies, as they have in their coats'.[131] The difficulties endured by the soldiers would have added to the emotional and physical hardships of campaigning and inflamed the tensions experienced between some officers and soldiers. Ensign Pipon had already declared his loyalty to Andros and his determination to carry

123 Malone, *The Skulking Way of War,* p. 40.

124 Malone, *The Skulking Way of War,* pp. 40–41.

125 MHS, P-363, 'Diary of Reverend John Pike, 1673–1716', Reel 7.8, unfol.: 'Observable Seasons', 1686–1689.

126 *Narratives of the Indian Wars, 1675–1699,* ed. C.H. Lincoln (New York, NY, USA: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1913), p. 193: *Decennium Luctuosum: or, the Remarkables of a Long War with Indian Savages* (1699).

127 *ERLP, 1678–1700,* Vol. IV, p. 277: Randolph to the Lords of Trade, 29 May. 1689.

128 CWF, Ms. 1946.2, III, 4, unfol.: Andros to the Lords of Trade and Plantations, 10 Nov. 1688; Andros to Blathwayt, 10 Nov. 1688; BL, Lansdowne Ms. 1152, Papers of William Bridgman: Vol. II, 1678–1695, ff. 257–258: Instructions to Andros, 16 Apr. 1688; *CSPC, 1689–1692*, Vol. 13, p. 548: Petition of Andros to the Lords of Trade and Plantations, 28 Sept. 1691.

129 CWF, Ms. 1946.2, III, 4, unfol.: Andros to Blathwayt, 10 Nov. 1688.

130 MSA, SC1-45x, CCXLII, f. 351b: Pipon to Andros, 3 Sept. 1688.

131 MSA, SC1-45x, CCXLII, f. 351b: Pipon to Andros, 3 Sept. 1688.

out his duties with courage and diligence but he too wanted to remove himself from the isolated Fort Pemaquid: 'I long for the occasion that I might not be in this obscure place … & I hope not to dye before it is knowne that I have been in this world'.[132]

Supply shortages were not unusual in the garrisons in Maine due to the distance from stores at Boston. The walking distance between Boston and Fort Pemaquid alone was about 170 miles (118 nautical miles by sea) and this journey would have been made transporting weighted loads. In August 1688 Ensign Pipon wrote to Andros to describe the limited supplies at Pemaquid. There were no candles, a small amount of match, no molasses and only enough bread for one week.[133] Despite needing more provisions, the garrison and soldiers continued preparing for military action. Pipon described the arrangements: 'as for the people, they are submissive enough to comand & wee keep every where, such strict watches that no Enemy can offend us'.[134] Pipon drew attention to the poor conditions and the requirements at Pemaquid but did not consider or suggest abandoning his post and remained committed to his duty: 'I am now pretty well in health & Remaine'.[135] Edmund Andros intended to remedy the shortage of supplies and before embarking to Maine in November 1688 he informed William Blathwayt: 'I find amongst the Inhabitants very many bad and Unusable Armes, and none here to be bought'.[136] Before leaving Boston, Andros requested 'Magazines and stores of Warr' from the British Isles and then marched into Maine to fortify existing garrisons and construct new forts.[137] Lieutenant John Jordan described how the forts had to be extended to make room for regular troops and new storehouses were constructed for additional ammunition.[138] Edward Randolph claimed that Andros restricted the movements of the Indians and prevented them from attacking English settlements in Maine by building 'several forts … upon the rivers and passes'.[139] The royal sloops *Mary* and *Speedwell* were furnished with food and equipment for transportation to forts and garrisons in Maine and by April 1689 Andros reported that the main garrisons had enough supplies and weapons to sustain the army for over three months.[140] The new forts and structural improvements would have required tools and equipment transported from Massachusetts to different locations in Maine. The difficult and laborious journey with the building supplies showcased the discipline and determination of Andros and his troops for improving defences.

132 MSA, SC1-45x, CCXLII, f. 351b: Pipon to Andros, 3 Sept. 1688.
133 MSA, SC1-45x, CXXIX, f. 200: Pipon to Andros, 22 Sept. 1688.
134 MSA, SC1-45x, CXXIX, f. 200: Pipon to Andros, 22 Sept. 1688.
135 MSA, SC1-45x, CXXIX, f. 200: Pipon to Andros, 22 Sept. 1688.
136 CWF, Ms. 1946.2, III, 4, unfol.: Andros to Blathwayt, 10 Nov. 1688.
137 CWF, Ms. 1946.2, III, 4, unfol.: Andros to Blathwayt, 10 Nov. 1688.
138 *CSPC, 1689–1692*, Vol. 13, p. 72: Answer of Jordan to the charges against him, 23 Jun. 1689.
139 *ERLP, 1676–1703,* Vol. IV, p. 277: Randolph to the Lords of Trade, 29 May. 1689.
140 MSA, SC1-45x, CCXLII, f. 352a: Account of the Forces Raised in New England, Apr. 1689; MSA, SC1-45x, CXXIX, ff. 352–353: Order to John Alden, 26 Mar. 1689.

Conclusions

It is clear that the regular officers and soldiers stationed in Maine between 1688 and 1689 experienced hardships due to the bad weather conditions, limited supplies and strained relationships in some forts and garrisons. The Indian War of 1688 highlighted the difficulties in protecting a large forested area and tested the military skill of regular commanders who were largely unfamiliar with the territory. However, the difficult personal experiences did not prevent the regulars from carrying out their duties and securing the region from further attacks. Using the forts and garrisons positioned throughout Maine, the combined regular–provincial army was able to monitor and protect the remote settlements and towns and deployed scouting parties to restrict enemy movements by destroying food and supplies.[141]

Just when Edmund Andros and the army had significantly reduced attacks and casualty rates in Maine, an uprising in Boston on 18 April 1689 resulted in the overthrow of Andros and the dissolution of the Dominion of New England. The interruption to defence arrangements impacted on security in Maine and this only worsened when the new government recalled the majority forces back to Boston on 20 April 1689.[142] Problems with security were evident from letters and petitions addressed to the Council of Massachusetts between May and July 1689, from towns and garrisons previously supported by Andros and the army, requesting support and assistance at the isolated locations. Some of the places that needed more military support were Kittery, Wells, Scarborough, Newtown, Falmouth, Pemaquid, North Yarmouth and Casco in Maine, Cochecho in New Hampshire and Groton, Dunstable and Chelmsford in Massachusetts.[143]

Notwithstanding the difficulties in protecting the New England borders against attack and invasion, the regular officers that had served under Edmund Andros viewed his military strategy as effective. Captain John Palmer, a regular officer who had served in Barbados and New York during the 1670s and 1680s, described the military expedition to Maine as a success in a public pamphlet: 'The Governours Conduct in that Affair has been so prudent and discreet'.[144] Palmer continued:

> Was not the whole Country secured, that not the least Damage, or Spoil was done to the Plantations and Fishery, during the Forces being abroad? And were not the Indian

141 Abbiss, 'James VII & II', pp. 170–172.

142 *DHSM,* Vol. VI, pp. 476–477: Order from the Council of Safety, 20 Apr. 1689.

143 MSA, SC1-45x, CVII, ff. 59, 97, 98b, 104, 139a, 198, 205–207: Hooke to the Council of Safety, 25 May. 1689; Inhabitants of Newtown to the Council of Massachusetts, 10 Jun. 1689; Petition of Joshua Scottow to the Council of Safety, Jun. 1689; Inhabitants of Falmouth to the Council of Massachusetts, 12 Jun. 1689; Weems to the Council of Massachusetts, 23 Jun. 1689; Captain Thomas Hinchman to the Council of Massachusetts, 12 Jul. 1689; Major Samuel Appleton to the Council of Massachusetts, 14 Jul. 1689; Silvanus Davis to the Council of Massachusetts, 15 Jul. 1689; Abbiss, 'James VII & II', pp. 215–217.

144 *The Andros Tracts: Being a Collection of Pamphlets and Official Papers,* Vol. I, ed. W.H. Whitmore (Boston, MA, USA: The Prince Society, 1868), p. 54: J. Palmer, *An Impartial Account of the State of New England.*

> Enemies by the said Forces, hard Marches, and Pursuits, sometimes above One Hundred Miles into the Desart, beyond any Christian Settlement, reduced to the Extreamest Wants and Necessities?[145]

This opinion was shared by Lieutenant James Weems who was stationed at Fort Pemaquid from November 1688. On 1 June 1689, Weems wrote to the new government: the Council of Massachusetts and described how the garrison and stores at Pemaquid required food as he was forced to 'Live upon Sault provisions and Drinking of Bad water'.[146] He stressed that the garrison was 'in great want of Severall nesesaries which would not have bin wanting had the Gover^{r} [Andros] Conti^{d} in his power'.[147]

Warfare in New England was different to conflict in Europe during the seventeenth century. The size of armies, fighting tactics, weapons and the landscape presented different challenges in North America. Drawing upon the personal experiences of regular troops, the Indian War of 1688 demonstrated the difficulties in adjusting to warfare in an unfamiliar landscape and climate and fighting against Indians who adopted guerrilla tactics and were supported by the French. A reoccurring issue in correspondence was the challenges in supplying remote forts and garrisons and managing the growing tensions between regular officers and provincial soldiers. The regulars showed a willingness to adapt to their surroundings and used the local knowledge of colonial militia to navigate through unknown territory. They also demonstrated their loyalty to the role as a royal officer by observing orders and strict discipline in the garrisons. Consequently, some of the regulars who served under the Dominion government were redeployed to North America during William III's reign. Thomas Treffry was commissioned as captain in a regiment of foot in the West Indies during 1692, James Weems was made captain of a company at New York in 1694, Francis Nicholson was sent to Virginia in 1690 to serve as lieutenant-governor and from 1692 until 1698 Edmund Andros served as Governor of Virginia.[148]

The establishment of a regular–provincial army brought together men from different cultures with varied military experience, but each side shared a similar ambition: to defend and protect the colonies albeit for slightly different reasons. For the majority of the militia it was paramount to safeguard individual homesteads and the regulars intended to carry out their duty on behalf of the Crown and secure royal territory. Between 1686 and 1689, Governor Edmund Andros and the army managed to provide a strong response to threats from New France and the French-allied Indians. This was demonstrated in Maine between November 1688 and April 1689 whereby, despite the challenges involved in wilderness warfare, the regular-combined army

145 *Andros Tracts,* Vol. I, p. 54: J. Palmer, *An Impartial Account of the State of New England.*

146 *DHSM,* Vol. VI, p. 485: Letter from Weems, 1 Jun. 1689.

147 *DHSM,* Vol. VI, p. 485: Letter from Weems, 1 Jun. 1689.

148 *English Army Lists and Commission Registers,* pp. 82–83; W.L. Shea, *The Virginia Militia in the Seventeenth Century* (Baton Rouge, LA, USA & London: Louisiana State University Press, 1983), pp. 131–135.

organised a network of well-placed forts and garrisons to monitor, defend and pursue any potential threat. The fall of the Dominion government in April 1689 removed military protection along the borders of New England and exposed the colonies to further attacks. In January 1690 inhabitants from Maine and the county of Cornwall sent a petition to King William III that described the protection received under the Dominion government and the effectiveness of the army under Andros:

> … he immediately raised and dispatched such forces to Our assistance as gave Protection to the Inhabitants there & security to their Estates, & put a stop to the further Rage & fury of the heathen and in the following Winter's service against them, where he was in person, reduced them to that want & necessity both for provision & ammunition that in all appearance they would in a very short time have submitted at mercy or been wholly subdued & overcome. And during that time Wee suffered not the least Losse in our persons or Estates by them.[149]

Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Professor Keith McLay and Professor Peter Gaunt for their comments on this chapter.

149 MSA, SC1-45x, XXXV, ff. 184–185: Petition of the Inhabitants of Maine and Cornwall, 25 Jan. 1690.

3

The Rank and File of the British Army 1685 to 1688

From the Deserters' Notices in the *London Gazette*

Stephen Ede-Borrett

The Duke of Wellington's comment of 4 November 1813 (often paraphrased) is fairly well known and is extensively quoted as a description of his Army:

> Our friends [the Army's rank and file], I can say in this room, are the very scum of the Earth. … Some of them enlist from having got bastard children, some for minor offences, many more from drink…

Equally widely quoted is the comment attributed to Wellington supposedly after seeing a draft of recruits sent to him in Spain in 1809:

> I don't know what effect these men will have upon the enemy but, by God, they frighten me.

Whether he did say this is disputed but this is not actually relevant in this circumstance – it is enough that it was and is believed that this reflected his opinion of the Army.

Probably taking his cue from Wellington's comments, David Chandler wrote of the English Army at Sedgemoor in 1685:

> The rank and file – as in every army of this period – consisted mainly of the dregs of society, the wastrels, misfits and unfortunates, fleeing poverty, the law or unemployment, but with a number of dedicated professionals and genuine volunteers who made the formations viable.[1]

1 David Chandler, *Sedgemoor 1685: An Account and an Anthology* (London: Antony Mott, 1985), p. 183.

These statements confirm a prejudice that still permeates most people's view of the rank and file of the Army before the democratisation created by the mass conscription of the First World War. This prejudice is shared and expounded by many historians as much as by the general public: an Army of rogues and vagabonds recruited from the ne'er do wells of society.[2] It is also often usually considered that the rank and file were generally quite young; with the majority being perhaps 18 to 20 year olds topped off with 11 or 12-year-old drummer boys. This latter is, of course, a total fiction all of its own, highlighted in popular culture by Eleanor Butler's famous painting of Isandlwana, even though the youngest soldier on the field at that battle was actually seventeen! The myth of the 'drummer boy' however is another subject; suffice to say that he never existed in the British Army.

All this raises a series of interconnected questions:

- Is this general view of the Army's soldiery accurate?
- Is it supported by what information we have on the make-up of the ranks?
- And if it is not (as I believe) what evidence is there either way?

Carole Divall's superb study of the 30th Foot during the Napoleonic Wars[3] has demonstrated that Wellington's statement merely reflects his own bigoted views, perhaps not a surprise given his other statements over the years – he was very much a man of his class and time. However it is still a surprise that this statement is so often taken at face value and not questioned despite the evidence of Divall and others before.

For her work however Divall had the advantage of the survival of the bureaucratic papers of the Napoleonic Army: the monthly returns, the inspection returns, records of recruits, the muster rolls (which were much fuller than earlier periods), etc. Similar papers certainly survive going back to the first half of the eighteenth century, but so far as I know, there are no similar surviving papers from the early Army of the second half of the seventeenth century. I say 'survive' since I believe that similar books must have originally existed; my evidence for this belief is presented below.

However there is one vital piece of contemporary evidence about the late seventeenth rank and file: the "Deserters' Notices" that appeared irregularly in the contemporary issues of *The London Gazette*.

The London Gazette first appeared as *The Oxford Gazette* (the Court then being at Oxford, whence it had fled to avoid the plague) with a date of *Nov. 7 to Thursday November 16 1665*. Thereafter it appeared twice weekly, usually on Monday and Thursday, and from issue 24, *From Thursday, February 1. to Monday, February 5. 1665*, it became the *London Gazette*. *The London Gazette* is still published today although it is

2 This attitude is parodied, and very effectively rebuked in Rudyard Kipling's well-known 1890 poem 'Tommy'.

3 Carole Divall, *Inside the Regiment* (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2011).



Numb. 2278

The London Gazette.

Published by Authority.

From Thursday August 18. to Monday August 22. 1687.

THE following Addresses have been Presented to the King, which His Majesty received very Graciously.

The humble Address of the Mayor, Recorder, Aldermen, and Assistants of Your Majesties Loyal Corporation of Tavistocke in Your County of *Devon*.

Great SIR,

IT having pleased Your Sacred Majesty, by Your late Royal Declaration, most Graciously to signifie Your Resolution of Protecting, Supporting, and Maintaining Your Archbishops, Bishops, and Clergy, and all Your other Subjects of the Church of England, in the free Exercise of their Religion as by Law Established.

We being by Duty and Gratitude obliged, do most humbly present Your Majesty our unfeigned Thanks for these and all other Your Royal Favours and former Assistances, shewn and made to the Church of England: And we do hereby unanimously and sincerely profess and declare, that we shall, to the Period of our Lives, endeavour to demean our selves as becomes the True Sons of the Church of England,

And Your Majesties most Loyal, and Obedient Subject and Servants.

To the King's most Excellent Majesty,

The Humble Address of Your Majesties Loyal and Obedient Subjects, the Dissenters of the Borough of *Cockermouth*, and places adjacent in the County of *Cumberland*, and in the name of divers others in the Western parts of the said County.

May it please Your Majesty,

WHereas in your Majesties late Declaration for an intire Liberty of Conscience unto all Your loving Subjects, You have been Graciously pleased to Declare, as Your constant Principle and Judgment; That Conscience ought not to be constrained, nor People forc'd in matters of meer Religion; and that such Force shall not be attempted during Your Majesties Reign; Adding Your Gracious purpose to concur with Your Two Houses of Parliament, in a Work so transcendently Good and Glorious: To which let English Mankind say Amen.

Wherefore having solemnly given Thanks to God, who hath set over these Nations, so Wise and Gracious a Prince, making Justice and Equity the Standard of His Throne; than which nothing can contribute more, to the Strength, the Wealth, and Glory of the English Nation; We Your Majesties most Dutiful Subjects, as in Duty bound, and by Your most indulgent Grace and Favour obliged, do hereby offer up unto Your Majesty, our most hearty Thanks and Acknowledgments; praying for Your Majesties long and prosperous Reign over these Your Kingdoms; and ever ready to approve our selves;

Your Majesties most Peaceable, Loyal, and Obedient Subjects.

To the King's most Excellent Majesty,

The humble Address of divers of Your Majesties most Dutiful and Loyal Subjects, Dissenters in and about *London*, being Merchants, Tradesmen, and others; on occasion of Your Majesties late Declaration.

Most Gracious Soveraign,

WHen we reflect on the various difficulties through which the special Providence of God accompanied You to the Throne of Your Royal Ancestors; and of Your Wise and Gracious Conduct since: We cannot but conclude, the Almighty hath raised You up (like Moses) to be the Deliverer of his People from the Yoak and Bondage of Penal Laws, a Slavery and Darkness worse than that which punished Egypt: In sense therefore of our Duty to Almighty God, and in Duty and Gratitude to Your Self, by whose Hand we receive so great a Blessing: We presume to offer both to him and You our solemn Thanks and Praises for the same.

By this Expedient Your Majesty will make Your Government easie and delightful to Your Self and People, augment their Trade, encourage Strangers, encrease Your Subjects, and gain the Empire of all their Hearts; banishing from thence all Fears and Jealousies.

By this Your Majesty hath distinguished and set the Bounds of Your own Dominion from that of Heaven it self; You have given to God and Man their due, and yet preserved Your own Right; and hereby Your Majesty will obtain this Glory to be admired and imitated by Your neighbouring Princes; or envied for Your own, and Subjects Felicity.

May the Almighty God who hath given You the Wisdom and Courage to attempt so great a Work, assist Your Majesty and Your next Great Council to compleat the same. And may Your Majesty long Live and enjoy the Reward thereof here; and in the World to come, an everlasting Crown of Glory. So prayes,

Your Majesties most Loyal and Obedient Subjects.

To the King's most Excellent Majesty,

The Humble Address of Your Majesties most Dutiful and Loyal Subjects, the Dissenters in *Leath-Ward* in the County of *Cumberland*.

IT having pleased Almighty God, (and for which we bless his Name for ever) to put it into the Heart of Your Majesty to issue forth Your late Gracious Declaration for Indulgence and Liberty of Conscience to all Your loving Subjects, for the free exercise of their Religion: And Your Majesty having therein publickly declared to the World, upon the most just and true Reasons and Principles of Nature and Christianity. That it hath been Your Majesties constant Sence and Opinion, (and as contrary to Your Royal Inclination, as to the Interest of Government) That Conscience ought not to be constrained, nor People forced in matters of meer Religion, in regard this success in all former ages, has not answered the Design, so as to reduce those Kingdoms to an exact Conformity: But that the difficulty is invincible. And being assured of your firm Resolution of adding this Liberty to the perfect enjoyment of our Property (the two things Men most value) which Your Majesty has Graciously

Figure 3.1 *The London Gazette*.

now simply *The Gazette* but it still carries the official Court Information, Government and Legal Announcements, etc.

Gazette Number 214, Monday to Thursday 2–5 Dec 1667, is the first to contain a notice in the form of an advertisement, for a missing servant. The following year *The London Gazette Number 1312, From Thursday June 13 to Monday June 17 1678*, contains an advert for a deserter from Francis Villiers' Company of Colonel Edward Villiers' Regiment of Foot[4] 'called the Duchess of York's Regiment':

> One John Williams, a Welchman, of about 30 years of age, of a middle stature, his head being usually shaved, a scar on his forehead, small hollow grey eyes, one of his teeth on the upper side of his head being broke, or out before, Run away from his Colours, the 8th instant, with Fifty pounds of Capt. Francis Villers's. Whoever gives notice of him to my Lord Grandisons in Petty-France, Westminster, or to Colonel Villers in Dukes-street near St. James's, shall have 40s Reward.

Thereafter similar notices appear relatively regularly, although they are more common in the Spring and Summer months than in the Winter for fairly obvious reasons.

The interesting point about such notices and their description of the deserter himself is the actual amount of information that they contain. Some, like the above, have a description that could easily have come simply from interrogating the soldier's comrades but often the information goes beyond that to where the man was from, what his occupation was, as well as physical features – which in themselves could be such that must almost certainly have been recorded by the company, probably when the man was first recruited. A good example of this is the advertisement in *The London Gazette Numb 2159, From Monday July 26 to Thursday July 29 1686*:

> Run away out of Lieutenant Colonel Halting's Company in the Earl of Huntingdon's Regiment, William Reyner, a Welshman, having upon his Left Foot 6 Toes, and on his Left Hand two Fingers growing together, and the Little Toe on his Left Foot always sticks out of his Shoe; He is pretty tall, black hair, lean-visag'd, about 30 years old. Whoever gives Notice of the said William Reyner at Lieutenant Colonel Halting's House in Downing-street, Westminster, shall have a Guinea Reward.

It seems likely that these physical abnormalities, and there are many more examples from other notices, must have been recorded somewhere in the company's or the regiment's records but, of course, most of these would have been lost with the mass Army disbandments of 1697–1698, although some may possibly survive still awaiting discovery in the family papers of the officers.

However, lacking such papers the notices themselves do give us a good snapshot of the rank and file, although it must be stressed that this snapshot is certainly not a 'scientifically

4 The regiment was disbanded in 1679.

selected sample'. These are simply the men who chose to leave their regiment, and even amongst those, only those who were not quickly apprehended, as many must have been, appear in the advertisements. Nonetheless the information contained in them casts serious doubt on the statements about the rank and file with which this paper opened.

If we look at the deserters between the beginning of the expansion of the Army in 1685 and the beginning of the campaigns abroad in 1689 we get some ideas of the make-up of the Army. After 1689, with much of the Army serving abroad successful desertion becomes a more difficult exercise and also, with a regiment serving in Ireland or Flanders it was pointless in most cases to advertise for a deserter in London. Always remember these "notices for deserters" were paid adverts, with the cost coming from the Captain's pocket, and seventeenth-century officers were no more inclined to waste their money than those of any other era.

Within the date range considered there are seventy separate notices for 159 individuals. Most deserted in ones and twos, including a couple of occasions where the deserters shared the same surname and were probably brothers or cousins. However towards the end of 1688 there are a small number of examples of larger groups of men deserting together. This may not, of course, have anything to do with hostility to William, or indeed loyalty to James, but may simply be a reluctance to serve abroad as it was obvious that the Army would soon be doing. The reluctance to serve outside the country had been the same under Charles II, as John Childs noted about deserters:

> Most of the desertions resulted from soldiers being marched off to embark for foreign service. As early as 1665 levies for overseas service quarrelled with their officers and mutinied…[5]

The information contained in the notices is highly variable in both quality and quantity but there seems little reason to assume that the deserters represented any special class within the army and I would venture to suggest that they are typical rather than atypical of their comrades and the English army overall.

It is perhaps worth reiterating that the English and Scots armies and establishments were separate until 1707 and all of the Deserters' Notices recorded in *The London Gazette* over this period refer to Regiments on the English establishment. After all, it would make no sense for an officer to advertise in *The London Gazette* for a man who had deserted in Edinburgh.

Having said all of that, what *do* the notices from *The Gazette* actually tell us? The following is a synopsis of the information that the notices actually contain but it is worth reiterating that not all notices contain the same information, or even all the information that we would like, but it may be that much of the time the missing

5 John Childs, *The Army of Charles II* (London: Routledge, 1976), p. 215. Perhaps not surprisingly Carole Divall records a similar upsurge in desertion when the 30th Foot were to be posted abroad in 1805 and again in 1809.

information suggests that the man was simply 'average' and it was not worth paying money just to draw attention to that.[6]

Age

Only 70 of the individuals recorded in the notices have an age given but the spread of these ages suggest that there is nothing exceptional and that they may be taken as an indicator of the overall make-up of the Army.

Using essentially the same divisions as Divall gives the following breakdown:

To 19	4	5.7%
20–24	20	28.6%
25–29	22	31.4%
30–39	20	28.6%
40–59	4	5.7%

It thus becomes obvious that the majority of the men fall into the 20–40 bracket with well over half in the 25–40 range, or the 20–30 range, depending how you want to bracket the information. Only 5.7 percent are below 20 and all four of these are dependent upon my interpretation of 'a young man'. If 'a young man' is someone about 20 then that becomes the largest category (just) but makes 20–30 the dominant group.

Perhaps most interesting is that the breakdown by age is so similar between 1685–8 and 1805–13, viz.:

Age	**Percentage (1685–8)**	**Percentage (1792–1815)**
Under 20	5.7%	16%
20–24	28.6%	17%
25–29	31.4%	29%
30–39	28.6%	27%
40–60	5.7%	11%

Note: Some of these categories have had to be merged from Divall's original tables, simply because the information is not available for 1685–8.

If the up-to-24 age figures are combined, becoming 34.3 percent and 33 percent, then the similarity becomes even more remarkable.

Height

This is perhaps a little more subjective, since what one officer might describe as 'middle-sized' another might say is short or tall. Nonetheless there must have been

6 The full text of the 'Deserters Notices' for this period was transcribed in Stephen Ede-Borrett, *The Army of James II: The Birth of the British Army* (Solihull: Helion & Company, 2017), pp.169–180.

some concept amongst them as to when a man was 'tall' and when he was 'short' and the number of deserters described as tall is a surprise. However, it is possible that, rather than there being an above average number of tall men in the Army it was just that it was unusual enough to be thought that it would make the man distinctive and thus it was worth mentioning in the notices. I would thus recommend caution when looking at this part of the information.

Of the 95 notices that mention height the breakdown is:

Short	9	9.4%
Middle-sized	43	45.2%
Tall	43	45.2%

Whether the 'tall' category is somehow reflective of the men and not just a notice of what made them unusual cannot be determined, but the small number of below average or 'short' men strongly suggests that there may have been some bias against their recruiting. I have found no reference to anything suggesting or recommending that short men should not be recruited but these figures suggest that it may have existed, since it would otherwise be expected that short and tall men would be mentioned somewhat more equally. The percentage of 'middle-sized' may be no more than a bias in the notices themselves as something often not worth mentioning.

Regional Origins

Very few of the notices mention a man's origins (only 38 out of the 159 men noted) and even they can be confusing. What, for example, can be made of:

> Robert Williams, a Welch-Man, Born at or near Little-Church in Derbyshire, speaks bad English.[7]

Is he Welsh? And how can he be so when he was born in Derbyshire? Although perhaps his parentage is Welsh and the fact that he 'speaks bad English' suggests he may have been brought up in a Welsh-speaking household.

Also noticeable in the below is the lack of men from London and the Home Counties, but as with all of these notices it may be merely what was thought worthwhile describing or perhaps it was not thought worth advertising for someone who could 'disappear' into a London population where he was brought up. The absence of any deserters from the West Country (Devon, Somerset, Dorset, etc.) is probably a reflection of the disastrous rebellion of 1685 that would not have made the Army a popular career choice.

The origins mentioned are:

7 *London Gazette Numb 2202, From Thursday December 23 to Monday December 27 1686.*

Bristol 1, Cheshire 2, Cumberland 1, Essex 2, Kent 2, London 3, Shropshire 3
Nottinghamshire 1, Yorkshire 2
Ireland 3, Wales 2, Scotland 12, Jersey 2
France 1, 'Flemish' 1

The highest number of any of the deserters is Scotland and it is a surprise to see Scots recruits in the English Army at all. Their desertion may be a result of their regiment being garrisoned in England and thus a long way from home. It is not an unlikely scenario that they could have been recruited when the unit was in the North of England (English Regiments were not sent into Scotland to garrison – such an action would have brought bad memories of the Cromwellian military occupation), and that the recruits became unhappy as the regiment changed its garrison to somewhere further south. I have no evidence for this suggestion and it remains no more than my own theory to explain the numbers. The Jersey men were also probably recruited whilst a regiment was in garrison there, although how a Flemish man came into the Army I cannot begin to guess. The French man, incidentally, may have been an officer's servant so having a slightly different route into the ranks – indeed he may never have actually served in the ranks and his 'master' simply added him to the strength so that he could draw his pay…

Tradesmen

Twenty two of the 159 deserters are given as holding, or having held, a trade, whether they had been apprenticed or not it is impossible to say. To our mind 'servant' may not be actually seen as a trade but in the seventeenth century it certainly was considered so.

Some of these men may have been deliberately recruited for their trade, hence the large number of 'shoemakers' who would have been of immense use to the regiment. It is interesting to note that these men are not described as 'cobblers', which suggests that they were skilled but had not been apprentices but probably journeymen before they joined up.

Similarly it is not difficult to imagine that a barber (1), blacksmith (1), butcher (1), glover (1), tailor (2), tanner (1) and even sawyer (1), scourer (1) or servant (1) would be useful to a regiment; indeed in most cases these professions would have been almost vital for the unit's smooth operation, and it is not impossible that they had indeed been deliberately recruited for their skills. It is not clear why a seaman joined the army, although it is interesting to speculate if he deserted to go back to sea…

However whilst 22 out of 159 is not a high number (14 percent) it does not preclude others also having had a profession or trade before the Army, and it is not a percentage out of line with the population as a whole. If these men had been deliberately recruited, of course, and practiced their trade within the regiment then it is distinctly possible that their incentive to desert was generally lower and that they are actually underrepresented in this list as compared to their numbers in the Army as a whole.

The full list of trades or professions mentioned is:

Barber 1, blacksmith 1, bricklayer 1, butcher 1, gardener 1, glover 1, pavier 1, Sawyer 1, Scourer[8] 1, Seaman 1, servant 1, shoemaker 8, tailor 2, tanner 1.

Summing Up

From this, albeit small, sample therefore we have a good percentage of men who we know were more than mere labourers. Very few who were what we might call 'youths', most were actually mature men – nearly 90 percent were between 20 and 40. And a goodly number of over 90 percent who were average or taller, suggesting that they were not underfed or underdeveloped and had at least a reasonable diet when they were growing up, which itself suggests against them being from a poverty stricken origin.

In addition to the deserters there were undoubtedly some true professionals within the rank and file, and whatever number these were – and it could have been a significant percentage particularly amongst the 'older' regiments whose origins were in Charles II's reign – these would serve to decrease any proportion of 'dregs'.

Whilst we will never know if the recruits did flee to the Army 'from having got bastard children' or from having committed 'some minor offences', that they were either 'the scum of the earth' (Wellington) or '…the dregs of society, the wastrels, misfits and unfortunates…' (Chandler),[9] appears to be a totally inaccurate view of the rank and file of the later Stuart English Army.

One final footnote on the subject of desertion is that since a standing army had no existence in law desertion itself was not, technically, a criminal offence and until 1689 even court martials actually had no legal basis, although as the records show it did not stop the execution of a small number of deserters.

8 A 'Scourer' was a professional cleaner (cf. a modern 'scouring pad') and may have been employed in cleaning the regiment's (or just the officers'?) weapons.

9 This would appear to be doubly inaccurate as the Army at Sedgemoor was composed entirely of 'old regiments' and included two complete battalions, as well as many in the other battalions, who were professional soldiers who had served in Tangier for a number of years, and by 1685 were almost certainly institutionalised.

4

'For God's sake come home!' – Soldiers' Wives, 1620–1660

Laurence Spring

An essential part of an army was the baggage train, which contained the army's provisions, ammunition, and even the regimental pay chests. It was also where the many civilians who followed the army were to be found, whether then drove the wagons, sold food and drink to the soldiers as sutlers and merchants purchase the goods the soldiers had plundered. Then there were the women who followed the army which according to Sir James Turner were divided into three types:

1. Wives of the general and principal commanders.
2. Those who rode on horseback.
3. Those who walked, who were usually the wives and children of inferior officers and soldiers.

It is this last group that this chapter is aimed at, although one month a woman could ride on horseback and another walked due to the feast or famine of army life. Women could also be classed in three different groups: wives, whores and prostitutes. During the sixteenth century whores would attach themselves to a soldier for a campaign or two, but by the time of the Civil War they were associated more with prostitution than being a soldier's common-law wife.

However, not all wives accompanied their husbands on campaign and preferred to keep in touch by letter. Among them was Susan Owen who wrote to her husband John in September 1643 while he was serving with Essex's Army and urged him to 'For God's sake come home'. According to the Royalist newsletter *Mercurius Aulicus* this was one of many letters captured by the Royalists and was used as an example of how many of the soldiers' wives were urging their husbands to desert the army. Unfortunately this is only one of two letters known today which were written to private soldiers during the Civil War. The other being written by Susan Rodway in November 1643, whose husband was then serving with Sir William Waller's Army.

This was also captured by the Royalists and printed in *Mercurius Aulicus* in Susan's original spelling:

> Most deare and loving husbane, my king love remember unto you hoping that you are in good helth as I ame at the writting hearof. My little Willie have been sicke this forknight. I pray you to cum whome ife you cane cum saffly. I doo marfull that I cannot heere from you ass well other naybores doo. I doo desiere to heere from youe as soon as you cane. I pray youe to send me word when youe doo thence youe shalt return. You do not consider I ame a lone woeman. I thought you would never have leave me thuse long togeder, so I rest evere praying for youre savete returine.
>
> To my very loving husbane Robbard Rodway a traine- soudare in the Red Reggiment under the command of Captaine Warrin deliver this with spide I pray youe.
>
> Your loving wife Susan Rodway, ever praying for you tell deth I depart.

It is usually believed that Robert, who served in the Westminster Liberty Regiment, was killed while serving with Waller at Basing House. However, research in the St Dunstan's in the West London parish register reveals the following entry:

> 18 November 1641, William son of Robert Rodway baptised out of Bell Yard

This is the poor Willie who was sick that Susan Rodway refers to in her letter. His burial is recorded on 19 October 1646. Bell Yard is where Captain Warren's company of the Westminster Liberty Regiment or the Red Regiment was raised.

The parish register also mentioned other members of his family:

> 20 November 1644, Hester, daughter of Robert Rodway and Susan, his wife, was baptised out of Bell Yard.
>
> 10 March 1646, Daniel, son of Robert Rodway and Susan, his wife, was baptised by Temple Barr.
>
> 21 March 1647, Daniel Son of Robert Rodway infant was buried.
>
> 12 July 1648, Robert, son of Robert Rodway tallow Chandler, and Susann his wife was baptised.
>
> 16 May 1650, Robert, son of Robert Rodway, infant buried.
>
> 18 July 1652, Alice the daughter of Robert Rodway, Tallow Chandler and Susan, his wife, was baptised.
>
> 1 June 1654, Robert son of Robert, Tallow Chandler and Susan his wife baptised.

It is clear that Robert survived Waller's autumn 1643 campaign and the war itself and it is not until 25 November 1669 that he was buried in the same parish, having outlived all his children. In fact by consulting the Guild of Tallow Chandlers and other records we know a great deal about Robert.

He was baptised on 14 February 1615 at Badgeworth, Gloucestershire, the son of William and Margaret Rodway. Unfortunately, there is a gap in the Tallow Chandlers' records so we do not know when he was sent up to London as an apprentice or who his master was, but he must have been about 15 years old. Like most apprentices the Tallow Chandlers were trained for between seven to nine years. In return for being taught a trade apprentices lived in their master's house and agreed to strict rules, such as not frequenting ale houses or ever sleeping with their master's wife.

It was probably in London after he had finished his apprenticeship that he met his future wife Susan, although no marriage was found.

After the Restoration Robert attended the Lord Mayor's banquet on several occasions and audited the Guild of Tallow Chandlers' accounts on at least one occasion. He was lucky because he had two houses in Fetter Lane, in London which survived the Great Fire of London.

Sadly we know very little about Susan, she was the executor of Robert's will and died about 10 years after him. Unfortunately, no information was found on Susan and John Owen, but what made women like Susan Owen and Susan Rodway stay at home while others accompanied their husbands to war? They believed their husbands would not be away too long, being trained band soldiers, but to others it depended on their financial situation. With the breadwinner away, a soldier's family often had little choice but to throw themselves on the mercy of the parish's poor relief or on the county's Quarter Sessions, like Janet Frodsan of Wigan in Lancashire:

> Being a poor woman and left with four small children, the eldest but twelve years of age, the second nine years of age, the third seven years of age and the youngest but one year old and having my husband taken to be in the King's service for a soldier to my undoing for ever … and having no other relief nor sucker but begging to relieve my wants and keep my children from famishing and many peoples' hearts are so hard that I cannot get them half [the] food [they need] to keep them from famishing ... [who] sits with hungry bellies which often grieves me and [I] knows no way how to relieve my wants, but pays five shillings for a poor cottage to sit in and [I] am no way able to get it.

She ends her petition 'for God's sake make and set down some order to relieve my wants.' Whether she received any money is not known, but Janet Frodsan is one of 31 wives who applied for poor relief in Lancashire between 1627 and 1660. There would have probably been many more petitioners, but their records have not survived.

Even if they did receive relief then it was not very much. At the beginning of 1626 when Ann Tilly of Chiverscoton petitioned the Warwick Quarter Sessions she was granted an allowance of just six pence per week for herself and small child, which was to be reviewed after a year.

Therefore a soldier's family would have to decide whether to accompany their husbands or try to survive without him. Others appear to have changed their minds and travelled to join him at a later date, for example Elizabeth Lobb who accompanied her husband, along with 19 other soldiers when they were being conducted to Flanders in May 1631. However, neither of the husbands of Maria Slymm and Maria Doughton, who appear to have accompanied Elizabeth Lobb, are mentioned, so they were probably already there.

Soldiers had nothing but admiration for these women. According to Sir James Turner:

> Women are great helpers to armies, to their husbands, especially those of the lower condition … They provide, buy and dress their husband's meat, when their husbands are on duty or newly come from it; they bring in fuel for fire, a soldier's wife may be helpful to others, and gain money to her husband and herself'.[1]

Robert Monro records, 'in my judgment, no woman are more faithful, more chased, move loving, more obedient nor more devout than soldiers' wives'.[2] When their husbands were killed they would have to quickly find a husband otherwise she would quickly descend the slopes of camp society, while a soldier would be eager to have their assistance. *Mercurius Scoticus* reported in December 1651 that in Edinburgh 'our English lads and Scotch lasses begin to mingle here very orderly, so that there is scarce a day but the bagpipes are not heard at a marriage'.

The number of women with a regiment is difficult to determine when Buxtehute surrendered to the Swedish General Tott in February 1632 the garrison mustered 501 soldiers, 335 women and 367 children, although garrison regiments may have had a higher ratio of women than field regiments. There were attempts to limit the number of wives accompanying the soldiers. The Committee of Stafford's Order book for 11 December 1643 records that the soldiers wives should be forced to leave the town unless they can 'give sufficient security that they shall not be chargeable to the said town' and they had to provide provisions for three months. In the dispute between Marmaduke Rawdon and the Marquess of Winchester at Basing House, Rawdon complained that the Marquess's regiment had at least three times as many women in his regiment.

Of course it was not just the soldiers' wives who followed the army, but their children also. Father Drexel who accompanied the Catholic League's Army under the command of General Johan von Tilly during the 1620 campaign records he baptised two children on 2 September and six children from Colonel Haslang's Regiment on 6 September, and later he saw:

1 Turner, Pallas Armata, p. 277

2 Monro, *His Expedition with the Worthy Scots Regiment*, part II, p. 29.

> One woman was carrying a young child on her head, but her hands were not empty of burdens. It is incredible how great a burden one such female soldier would carry, her back, head, both hands loaded and her legs strung with bundles.[3]

According to the military manuals two or three soldiers were 'hutted' together, and these huts were organised into streets to make forming the regiment easier. However, contemporary accounts suggest that a soldier and his family were hutted together.

When in garrison the women were expected to help with the town's defence, although according to the Royalist newsletter *Mercuris Aulicus* when the Scots attacked Newcastle on 22 February 1644, the camp women were issued blue caps and interspersed with the men to make their companies seem stronger. However, this is denied by the Parliamentarian newsletter *The Spie*, which says that surely the defenders would have noticed that they were wearing skirts rather than breeches and did not have beards!

This is just one incident in the war of words between the two sides' propaganda news sheets, with the Parliamentarian news sheets referring to the women following the Royalist armies as 'dunghill sluts', 'whores', 'Ammunition whores' and even 'Irish women'. At Nantwich in January 1644 it was said that there were 120 Irish Women captured, who were to rob and plunder the fallen and were armed with long knives to cut the throats of the wounded. One pamphlet even went so far as to describe them as a 'Female Regiment'. However, Thomas Malbon's records in his journal, 'There were amongst them [the Royalist prisoners] about 120 women taken also which we put forth of the town; only some poor women in the town took the best of their clothes which they had gotten by plunder'.[4] There is no mention of daggers or even that they were Irish, so these references should be viewed with caution. Furthermore it would be wrong to suggest that the thousands of news sheets published by either side during the war were full of references to women and their character and nationality.

Unfortunately, when it comes to army records there is usually no mention of women, and the 1642 Royalist Laws of War published to keep discipline in the army just mentions that any soldier committing 'adultery, fornication, and other dissolute lasciviousness shall be punished with the discretion according to the quality of the office'. This was repeated in Colonel Michael Jones's laws when serving in Ireland in 1647. Presumably the soldier was expected to keep his wife under control himself and this clause was to prevent diseases such as syphilis from spreading among the soldiers, as one London pamphlet put it, 'the camp bitches or leaguer ladies having the delights and diseases of the camp.'

One law that is often quoted was issued by Charles' Council of War in July 1643 and reads as follows:

3 Father Drexel, 'Diary of Father Drexel', in Sigmund Riezler, *Kreigstagebucher aus Den Ligitischen Hauptquarter* (Munchen: G Fransohn, 1908) pp. 156–158, 170.

4 *Memorials of the Civil War in Cheshire* (Record Society, 1889), p. 115.

> Because the confounding of habits appertaining to both sexes and the promiscuous use of them is a thing which nature and religion forbid and our soul abhors and yet the prostitute impudency of some women (if the same deceives us not) have (which we cannot think on but just indignation) thus conversed in our army; therefore let no woman presume to counterfeit her sex by wearing man's apparel and pain of the severe punishment which law and our displease shall inflict.[5]

This is usually seen as proof that there were many women in the Royalist Army serving as soldiers, but it is just an edict for women not to dress in men's clothes. True, there were 'Gallant She Soldiers', but they were almost certainly a rarity judging by the fascination they caused when one was discovered, so why Charles felt he needed to issue such an order is now lost over the space of time. Certainly there are accounts where women dressed as men to disguise their sex from unwanted advances by the soldiers, and it was probably more practical on campaign.

The women would have to undergo the same dangers as their men, being susceptible to the diseases of army such as typhus, and since the women were usually kept with the baggage train this could be a dangerous place to be during a battle: there are many examples of the baggage train being pillaged, since if you destroy the enemy's baggage train then you destroy their reserves of ammunition, provisions and the regimental money chests.

Then there was the danger that the army might be defeated in battle and the camp followers caught up in the rout of the army. The best example of this is the battle of Naseby, where the Parliamentarians are said to have killed over 100 Royalist women in a field near East Farndon.

There are two possible scenarios for this massacre. The first is that the pursuing cavalry caught up with the women near East Farndon, one eyewitness is said to have told the naturalist John Morton they were 'cut and slashed the women with this sarcasm "remember Cornwall you whores!" Sir Ralph Hopton as they said used their women in Cornwall in the like manner'. This is believed to refer to the Lostwithal campaign when the local population attacked Essex's retreating army, including the camp followers and the wounded.[6]

The second scenario is that the Parliamentarians rounded up:

> The common rabble of common vermin on foot, 500 of them at least being taken and kept with a guard, until order was taken to dispose of them and their mates, many of these were Irish women of cruel countenances, some of them were cut by our soldiers when they took them there.[7]

5 British Library, Harley MS 6804, Volume of letters for the latter part of the reign of Charles I, f.76

6 John Nicholl *The History and Antiquities of the County of Leicestershire* (John Nicholls, 1815), p. 506.

7 British Library, *A More Exact and Perfect Relation of the Great Victory, 15 June 1645*, Thomason Tracts E.288[28].

Most Parliamentarian newsletters agree that they were Irish women and their deaths were sanctioned under *An Ordinance to give no quarter to the Irish Rebels taken here*. This Ordinance had been passed on 24 October 1644 and stated "That no quarter shall be given hereafter of any Irishmen nor any Papists whatsoever born in Ireland which shall be taken in hostility against the Parliament." It was to be distributed to the commanders of the armies two days later.[8] However it is now believed that these women were Welsh rather than Irish.

With the wars over the soldiers and their wives returned home, but many widows were often left in extreme poverty. True there were various ordinances during the Civil War to pay the wives and widows of soldiers, but these payments were usually in arrears. In December 1645 the widows of the Earl of Essex's train of artillery demanded their husbands' wages. Their claim was to be dealt with by the Committee of the Military Garden, but such was the demand that Parliament ordered that only two widows per day should petition the House of Commons for their husbands' arrears and by 1659 Ely House and Savoy Hospital was responsible for over 4,000 widows and orphans.

However, this must have been a tiny fraction of the widows created by the Civil Wars. In Lancashire 37 widows applied for relief: including Alice Otiwell, a widow of a pressed soldier, who in 1629 applied for relief because her cottage had fallen down, and in 1650 Elizabeth Hoewood, whose husband had died in Scotland was facing eviction. In Essex on average the widows received 40 shillings 8 pence whereas the maimed soldiers received 36 7d. But in many counties there was a set number of petitions that could be awarded, so when a pensioner died or lost their pension for some reason then it was awarded to someone else. In the meantime they would have to rely on their friends and neighbours for help, or sell what few belongings they had.

Appendix 1: Petitions from Soldiers' Wives in Lancashire

Description	Date	Lancashire Archives Reference No.
Petition of Margaret Coppull, wife of Thomas Fisher, soldier, for relief	1647–1648	QSB/1/300/47
Petition for the relief for Mary of Blackley, wife of Henerie Peake, a soldier in Ireland under Capt. John Seddon.	c.1649	QSP/24/17
Petition for the relief for Jane of Whittingham, wife of William Simpson who was soldier under col. Rigby	c.1650	QSP/30/3
Petition for the relief for Jenet of Hardhorn, wife of John Pearson of Brockall, who was a soldier under Capt. ...	c.1650	QSP/30/8

8 *House of Lords Journal* Volume 7: 24 October 1644 (His Majesty's Stationery Office), p. 34.

Description	Date	Lancashire Archives Reference No.
Petition for the relief for Ann Gyll of Heysham, wife of a soldier under Col. West.	c.1651	QSP/49/10
Petition for the relief for Jenet Kewe, wife of a pressed soldier.	c.1651	QSP/49/11
Petition for the relief for Alice of Pilling, wife of Lawrence Clifton, pressed soldier.	c.1651	QSP/50/21
Petition for the relief for Mary of Westhoughton, wife of John Greene, a soldier	c.1651	QSP/52/3
Petition for the relief for Jenet Hodgson, of Wennington, wife of a pressed soldier.	c.1651	QSP/53/8
Petition for the relief for Ann Tompson of Tunstall, wife of soldier in Ireland.	c.1651	QSP/53/15
Petition for the relief for Anne Prockter, of Hornby, wife of soldier in Ireland.	c.1651	QSP/53/17
Petition for the relief for Dorithy Barton, of Dutton, wife of a soldier in Ireland.	c.1651	QSP/54/6
Petition for the relief for Jane of Euxton, wife of Richard Dobson, of the paper mills, now a pressed soldier.	c.1651	QSP/55/12
Petition for the relief for Jennett of Litherland, wife of John Massam, a soldier under Capt. Croft.	c.1651	QSP/55/18
Petition for the relief for Anne, of Manchester, wife of Thomas Hamson, sievemaker, a pressed soldier in Ireland.	c.1651	QSP/56/10
Petition for the habitation for Ann, of Bury, wife of William Howorth, a soldier.	c.1651	QSP/56/17
Petition for the relief for Ellin Breanon, of Ireby, wife of a soldier.	c.1652	QSP/61/7
Petition on behalf of the wife and children of Thomas Barton, a pressed soldier.	c.1652	QSP/62/6
Petition for the relief for Alice, of Cuerden, wife of Thomas Cowper, a soldier in Scotland.	c.1652	QSP/63/40
Petition for the relief for Alice, of Tottington, wife of Charles Holte, a soldier in the garrison of Liverpool.	c.1652	QSP/64/12
Petition for the relief for Anne, of Chipping, wife of John Rowlison, a soldier in Ireland.	c.1652	QSP/66/8

Description	Date	Lancashire Archives Reference No.
Petition for a habitation for An, of Bury, wife of William Haworth, a soldier.	c.1652	QSP/68/6
Petition for the relief for Mary, of Elton, wife of Thomas Nuttall, a soldier in Scotland under Lieut. Col. Worsley.	c.1653	QSP/80/3
Petition for the relief for Margrett of Manchester, wife of Robert Bowker, a soldier.	c.1653	QSP/80/26
Petition for the relief and habitation for Anne of Edgworth, wife of Richard Gryme, a soldier in Scotland.	c.1653	QSP/88/20
Petition for the relief and habitation for Emery Hutchinson, of Salford, wife of a pressed soldier.	c.1653–1654	QSP/92/8
Petition for the relief for Elline, of the town of Lancaster, wife of Anthonie Shepard, a soldier in Scotland.	c.1654	QSP/97/5
Petition for a habitation for Isabel, of Larbreck, wife of Edward Smyth, soldier.	c.1655	QSP/110/8
Petition for the restitution to Ann of Longton, wife of Lawrence Wilding, a soldier, from Richard Briggs of Hutton ...	c.1655	QSP/111/16
Petition for the relief of the wife of Lawrence of Wildinge, a soldier at sea.	c.1656	QSP/127/14
Petition for the relief for Sarah wife of Thomas of Pendleton, a soldier.	c.1656	QSP/128/19
Petition for the relief and habitation for Elizabeth of Walton, wife of Francis Primrose, a soldier.	c.1659	QSP/174/23

Appendix 2: Surviving Lancastrian Soldiers' Widows' Petitions

Description	Date	Lancashire Archives Reference no.
Petition for the relief for Jennett Caton, widow of John Clarke, a pressed soldier	1629	QSB/1/52/26
Petition for the brief for Alice Otiwell, Wigan, widow of pressed soldier, whose cottage has fallen down	1629–1630	QSB/1/66/44
Petition of Anne of the town of Lancaster, widow of Humphrey Adamson, soldier, for relief	1647	QSB/1/294/17

Description	Date	Lancashire Archives Reference no.
Petition of Anne Pope, Whittingham, widow of Thomas son of Richard Pope, soldier killed at Bolton, for maintenance	1647	QSB/1/295/37
Petition for the relief for Elizabeth Turton, widow of James Crompton, a soldier under Capt, Markland.	c.1650	QSP/32/27
Manchester – Petition for the relief of Elizabeth, of the town of Manchester, widow of Samuel Heawood, a soldier dead in Scotland, threatened with eviction from house in Millnegate	c.1650–1651	QSP/44/2
Petition for the relief for Alice, Nether Wyresdale, widow of Thomas Wylie, shoemaker, a soldier slain in Munster.	c.1652	QSP/62/1
Petition for the relief for Mary Brooks, of Whittle-le-Woods, widow of a soldier in Scotland.	c.1652	QSP/63/18
Petition for the family of Allice Rimmer, of North Meols, widow of a soldier, slain at Liverpool.	c.1652	QSP/63/74
Petition for the relief for Elizabeth Wylde, of Crompton, widow of soldier slain at Pomfret.	c.1652	QSP/64/23
Petition for the relief for Allice Earnshaw, of Rochdale widow of soldier slain at Pomfret under Capt. Sanders in regiment of Colonel Charles Fairfax.	c.1652	QSP/64/29
Petition for a habitation for Dorothy Green, of Worsley widow. (husband John, a soldier)	c.1652	QSP/68/17
Petition for the relief for Elizabeth Crompton, of Turton, widow of Parliamentarian soldier	c.1652	QSP/68/21
Petition for the relief for Jane of Aughton widow of Richard Dobson a soldier slain in Ireland.	c.1652	QSP/71/24
Petition for the maintenance of Ellin Haslome, of Bolton, widow of a soldier.	c.1652–1653	QSP/76/16
Petition for the maintenance of Ellin Haslome, of Bolton, widow of a soldier.	c.1652–1653	QSP/76/17
Petition for the relief for Jennett of Hardhorn, widow of John Pearson, a soldier at Lathom and Bolton.	c.1653	QSP/78/6
Petition for the relief for Susan Fish of Newbold, widow. (husband a soldier)	c.1653	QSP/88/24

Description	Date	Lancashire Archives Reference no.
Petition for the relief for Ales of Ashton-under-Lyne, widow of Samuell Barton, a soldier who died in Dublin.	c.1653–1654	QSP/92/2
Petition for a habitation for Elizabeth of Woodplumpton, widow of Richard Rawnson a Commonwealth Soldier	c.1654	QSP/94/15
Petition for the relief for Mary Greene of Westhoughton,, widow of a soldier in Scotland.	c.1654	QSP/100/17
Petition for the relief for Jane of Wigan, widow of Richard Dobson, a soldier.	c.1654	QSP/103/9
Petition for the relief for Susan of Fishwick, widow of James Turner, a soldier.	c.1655	QSP/110/3
Petition for the relief for Elizabeth Greenhalgh of Entwisle, widow of a soldier.	c.1655	QSP/112/18
Petition for the relief for Alice of Lancaster widow of Christopher Chamney a soldier.	c.1655	QSP/113/5
Petition for the relief for Ellin of Kirkham, widow of Richard Fenton, a soldier.	c.1655	QSP/118/3
Petition for the relief for Elizabeth of Whiston, widow of Henry Dey, a soldier.	c.1657	QSP/147/8
Petition for the relief for Amary Hutchinson of Salford, widow of a soldier.	c.1657	QSP/148/25
Petition for the relief for Elizabeth of Thurnham, widow of James Greene, soldier.	c.1657–1658	QSP/153/12
Petition for the relief for Constance Creane, widow of a soldier.	c.1657–1658	QSP/154/5
Petition for the relief for Alice of Ditton, widow of Thomas Tarbock. ex soldier	c.1657–1658	QSP/155/19
Petition for the relief for Alice of Ditton, widow of Thomas Tarbock. ex soldier	c.1657–1658	QSP/155/20
Petition on behalf of Katterin Wright of Bolton,, widow of a soldier slain at Bolton, threatened ejectment by William Seddon	c.1657–1658	QSP/156/2
Petition for the relief for Emery Hutchingson of Salford, widow. husband a soldier	c.1658	QSP/164/13
Petition for the relief for Anne of Lancaster, widow of Robert Robinson, a soldier at Glasgow.	c.1658	QSP/165/8
Petition for the relief for Agnes of Great Eccleston, widow of Henrie Futhergill, a soldier.	c.1659	QSP/178/3

5

A House Called Loyalty – The Archaeology of a Civil War Siege

Alan Turton

The siege of Basing House is among the most famous events of the English Civil War. Victorian artists such as Crofts and Landseer created large-scale oil paintings of the house's last minutes, and Cope's version forms part of the wall decoration in the House of Lords' corridor at the Palace of Westminster. However, none of these works give an accurate impression of what Basing looked like at the time of the siege, or of its defensive works that held the forces of Parliament at bay for over two years. Using over 140 years of archaeological investigation on the site combined with contemporary documentation this paper sets out to give the latest ideas on the physical evidence of the siege.

The ruins of Basing House lie approximately 1½ miles to the east of the town of Basingstoke and stand on rising ground on the southern side of the valley of the River Lodden with its surrounding marshland. Immediately to the east of the House stands the village of Basing, and to the south across an area of parkland (now Basingstoke Common), runs the modern A30 near to the line of the old London to Exeter road.

Excavations have revealed that the location has been occupied, on and off, since at least the Iron Age, with the strong possibility of a Roman villa or farm beneath or near the ruins. In the 12th century, the site was dramatically changed by the construction of a large timber and earth ringwork castle, with baileys on the north and south sides, built as a replacement for an earlier Conquest-period fortification, confusingly known as *Oliver's Battery*, which is sited at the other end of the village. The Basing House ringwork, known as the *Old House*, is some 300 feet in diameter, and is still the most dominant feature of the remains. In the 16th century, it formed the centre of Sir William Paulet, 1st Marquess of Winchester's rebuild of the property. Paulet was one of the most successful and long-lived servants of the Tudor court, dying at Basing at the age of almost 100 years, having been Lord Treasurer of England under Edward VI, and Queens Mary and Elizabeth.

The revenue from this and various other offices enabled Paulet to massively and lavishly restyle his home in the latest fashion, using local clay deposits to create red bricks by the tens of thousands. The work began after Paulet obtained, in 1531, what was to be



Figure 5.1 Location map of Basing House.

the last full licence to crenellate, i.e. to build a castle, ever issued by the Crown. Thirty years later, Paulet further developed the property by the construction of the *New House* immediately on the eastern side of the ditch of the *Old House*. Both houses had stately gatehouses and were connected to each other by bridges that crossed the old Norman ditches of the northern bailey, which was itself filled in to form a large platform and used as a bowling green. On the north and west, the property was surrounded by formal gardens which in turn were enclosed by a brick curtain wall studded with battlemented turrets. Immediately outside the northern curtain wall runs a road, known as The Street, which separates the main house from *The Grange*, a partially walled complex of farm buildings and brick-lined fish tanks that were built to serve the great house.

When Paulet had finished his grand design, Basing House was recorded as 'The greatest of any subject's house in England'.[1] The splendour of the house and its proximity to the main London road attracted many royal progresses. These in turn brought financial problems for the Paulets, forcing the 4th Marquess in the first decade of the 17th century to pull down part of the house. He then took up residence at his much smaller hunting lodge at Hackwood, some two miles south of Basing. His son and successor, John, was a recusant and when it was revealed in 1626 that there were arms for 2,000 men stored at Basing House, plus two field pieces and ammunition, the Privy Council ordered their removal for safekeeping to the Bishop's Palace at Winchester. There they remained until the summer of 1630, when a royal visit was planned to the city of Winchester, and it was realised that all the reception rooms at the Palace were still full of these arms. The Council hurriedly contacted the Bishop, who in turn ordered the Dean of Winchester to take the arms into the Cathedral for temporary storage. By October the King allowed the arms to be returned to Basing House for the Marquess, 'To make sale of the same to his best profit'.[2] The House they were returned to was by this stage in bad repair, described by diarist Peter Munday, who visited Basing in 1634–35, as '…now forsaken and desolate.'

On the eve of the Civil War, in the autumn of 1641, a Mr Sewer reported to the Commons that 'A great many arms in the Marquess of Winchester's house at Basingstoke, a recusant, and that the keepers of them told him there were arms for 1500 men.'[3]

Obviously, the Marquess had had little success or indeed the will to sell the weaponry over the previous 11 years, and so on 4 November 1641 the Commons ordered him '…to sell them to such tradesmen as will buy the same.'[4] This time most of the arms were sold, and before the outbreak of hostilities, leaving, we are told, only six muskets for the use of the Marquess to defend his house. Which house was it? At this stage, almost certainly Hackwood. The Marquess kept a low profile in the early months of the war, but it became apparent to him that as the county was coming increasingly under Parliamentarian control,

1 Dr. Thomas Fuller, *The Worthies of England*, ed. John Freeman (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1952), p. 201.
2 Acts of the Privy Council of England, June 1630–June 1631 (London: HMSO, 1964).
3 Rev. G.N. Godwin, *The Civil War in Hampshire* (London: Bumpas, 1904), p. 8.
4 *Ibid*.

he had to move to a more defensible base. By early December 1643, he had taken up residence at Basing House, from where he wrote to the King at Oxford on 2 December:



Figure 5.2 John Paulet, 5th Marquess of Winchester.

> Most gratious Souuvrayne
>
> Since by commande your majestyes forces at Basingstoke are drawing of, and ye enemy now lying wthin lesse than ten miles of this place, I conceave this Castle to be in apparent danger and cannot be long kept wthout some assistance from your matsey [majesty's] army; for from this county no reliefe is to be expected it standing for want of your presence and some authority to commande it divided in it self. If this house be anywayse considerable for your matyes [majesty's] service and advantage, be pleased to take it into your consideration and protection least I be necessitated to leave it to the will of the enemy.
>
> I refer most particularly to the relation of thy bearer in case you maty [majesty] will vouchsafe to speak to him.
>
> My duty and affecton to your matyes [majesty] service occasions this address from
>
> Your matyes [majesty's] most faithfull and Loyal Subject
> Winchester
> Basing this 2 of Decbre: 1642[5]

No reinforcements were sent at this stage. The Marquess hung on as both Royalist and Parliamentarian forces marched up and down the western road, but he was unable to take any active role. For instance, in early February, a small cavalry force under Colonel Nathaniel Fiennes, en route to Bristol, were billeted in Basingstoke, but they make no mention of any threat from Basing House. However, within a month the Marquess who must have been now more confident in his defences, became more aggressive, and it was reported to the Commons that travellers were being fired upon from windows of the House. With the limited manpower available to him at this

5 Hampshire Record Office 48M80/F1.

5.3 (above) Blocked musket loops facing the street. (Author's photo)



5.4 (left) North dovecot tower showing loops. (Author's photo)

5.5 (below) Example of intruded loophole in northern dovecot.


Internal View
(Dotted Lines Showing Original Configuration)
6"
← Outer Face of Curtain
Outer Wall Face
Plan Showing How Original Tudor Slit Window Has Been Enlarged To Increase Field Of Fire For A Musket

time, what defensive works could have been erected? Almost certainly the Tudor outer walls would have been his first line of defence and although built for show, they were still serviceable, particularly against an attacking force without artillery. Loopholes were cut through the brickwork of the walls, at approximately four feet, eight inches from the ground level on the inner face of the walls, an ideal height for a musketeer 'giving fire'. The wall turrets also had their small slit windows roughly modified for the same purpose.

The same procedure was also carried out on the walls of the Grange. Surprisingly, only one apparent loop is visible on the Great Barn (which building dates from 1535), cut at the bottom of one of the lower ventilation slots, which in themselves, because of the thickness of the walls, are not useable for this purpose.

It was these makeshift modifications which enabled the Marquess to beat off two minor attacks with his small number of defenders. On 31 July 1643, Paulet's request for reinforcements was at long last answered by the arrival of 100 musketeers of Colonel Rawdon's Regiment under Lieutenant Colonel Peake, along with an escort of four troops of horse under Colonel Bard. This force had only been inside the walls for a matter of hours when the House received a surprise attack from Colonel Richard Norton and Colonel Harvey with a party of horse and dragoons. The Parliamentarians were themselves taken by surprise by the increased size of the garrison and were quickly beaten off and forced to retreat to their garrison at Farnham. With the house secure, at least for the moment, Bard and his horse withdrew to Oxford. On 22 August, Colonel Rawdon himself arrived with rest of his regiment, some 150 men, plus a supply of ammunition and three guns (2x 6 lb and 1x 3 lb). Basing House was now a formal garrison, part of the outer ring of fortresses around Oxford, and Rawdon was made its military governor. The Marquess also received a commission as a colonel of a regiment of foot and horse, which he began to raise from his household and the numerous Catholic refugees who had now taken shelter within the walls of Basing. He also persuaded Peake, along with half of the original relief contingent, to become part of the new formation, a move which understandably angered Rawdon who had raised his regiment at his own expense. This was to lead to constant friction between Protestant Rawdon and Catholic Winchester.

Despite this serious internal problem, both men cooperated in the strengthening of Basing's defences. By 8th August 1643, Parliamentarian spies reported, 'There are 500 howseholds gotten into Basing howse where they are fortifieing themselves and gott 8 peeces of ordnance.'[6]

New earthworks were thrown up in front of the outer walls on the park side of the house. Here there already existed, directly behind the Old House, the southern bailey of the old Norman castle, consisting of a bank and ditch. This was altered by the erection, at either end, of raised mounds to take artillery pieces as was the centre of the bailey bank. This centre section is wider than the end mounds, and as it lies across

6 *Journal of Sir Samuel Luke*, ed. I.G. Philip M.A. (Oxford Record Society, 1950, volume II), p. 130.



Figure 5.6 Site plan of Basing House, based on Godson's map circa 1760 (showing outline of some now vanished earthworks).

the most level approach to the Old House from the park, may have been constructed as a *rampier* to absorb enemy artillery fire. In front of each of these elevated sections of the bank, three irregular open-backed, half-moons protrude out into the park, each with its own outer ditch. The centre half-moon is probably that referred to as the 'Park Bastion' in contemporary accounts. At the terminal ends of the southern bailey, ditches were extended to protect at one end; the south-eastern end of the New House, and at the other; the south-west face of the curtain wall surrounding the gardens. The up-cast from the ditch seems to have been dumped against New House wall as protection, as was it seems the south-west section, although this work was obliterated by landscaping in the eighteenth/nineteenth centuries. As with the south bailey, both of the sections would appear, from the mid-18th century Godson plan, to have half-moons at their corners. Excavations on the Park Bastion, carried out in the 1960s, revealed it to have been of 'simple dump construction'.[7] Core samples taken in the early 2000s failed in an attempt to locate the original ground surface, suggesting that the turf had been removed prior to the commencement of work, possibly to be used to strengthen the defences elsewhere.

The defences of the north-east face of the New House have been obliterated by the erection of later dwellings and the construction, in the 1790s, of the Basingstoke Canal, which was excavated straight through the central wing of this great two-courtyard building. The canal, now mostly filled in along this section, leaves a three-metre-high plateau along its western side which has in the past deceived writers of the history of Basing into believing that this was the limit of the New House, rather than what is actually just the raised inner courtyard. In 1999, excavations by Channel 4's *Time Team* revealed in the edge of this bank the remains of a large turreted gatehouse, which would have housed a broad staircase connecting the upper inner courtyard with the now mostly vanished lower. On the eastern edge of the canal cut, present day garden boundaries follow the line of the actual remains of the outer wall of the New House. Beyond this wall stands a brick building known today as Cannon Cottage. In the 1960s the thatch of this building was replaced, and found to be over four feet in thickness, and impregnated with numerous lead shot of various calibres. From contemporary accounts we know that on 7 November 1643 the Marquess burned down the houses about his defence perimeter to give himself field of fire and deny shelter to the enemy. It would therefore suggest that Cannon Cottage was included within this perimeter, thus pushing the outer defences out to the line of the present-day Crown Lane.

Who designed the Civil War fortifications of Basing House? The King's Surveyor General, Inigo Jones, was certainly present in the House when it was stormed in October 1645, and, *Mercurius Britannicus* comments, 'He was gotten thither for help to the house.' Closet-Catholic Jones possibly arrived at this household in early 1643 and so may well been instrumental in the layout of the defences, although he had never

7 R.C. Combley, J.W. Notman & H.H.M. Pike, *Further Excavations at Basing House* (Hampshire Field Club Paper, 1968, volume 23, part III), p. 99.

actually done any military design before. Another military engineer was present in the garrison, a Dutchman by the name of Humphrey van Debline, and it was possibly he that did the practical side of the work.

The works were complete enough to keep Sir William Waller at bay when he attempted to take Basing House in November 1643. Waller arrived on 6 November with an army of well over 5,000 men and a train of artillery which included two demi-cannon. After some slight skirmishing about the south-west corner of the House, Waller crossed the River Lodden at Basingstoke and occupied Cowdery's Down to the north side of the garrison which, he noted, 'The enemy had fortified most strongly on that side, with diverse retrenchments one under command of another.'[8]

The right Valiant and expert Comander S^r William Waller
K^t Cheife Generall of all the forces in Glocester^shr and the Counties
adjacent raised for the preservation of the King and Parliament.

Figure 5.7 Sir William Waller.

Protected by a little breastwork, which was thrown up under cover of darkness, a battery was positioned on the south side of Cowdery's Down, which fired throughout the early hours of the morning upon the Grange and the New House. In the late 1970s, extensive archaeological investigations were carried out on the Down in advance of a large-scale housing development. But the site of the battery was not located and the report simply states that, 'evidence consisting principally of scattered musket balls is the only unambiguous evidence that can be related to this period.'[9] In the same area some old chalk pits, later known as Oliver's Delve, gave some shelter to Waller's troops, as they would also to later besieging forces. These also disappeared under 1980s housing.

On the morning of 7 November, Waller launched a large-scale assault down the slope of Cowdery's Down, across the swollen waters of the River Lodden, and into the defended area of the Grange, where, according to Lieutenant Elias Archer, 'We

8 Anon, *A Description of the Siege of Basing Castle Kept by the Lord Marquis of Winchester* (Oxford, February 1645).

9 Martin Millet with Simon Jones, 'Excavations at Cowdery's Down, Basingstoke, Hampshire. 1978–81', *Royal Archaeological Institute Journal*, 1983. Volume 140, p. 263.



Figure 5.8 Oliver's Delve and Swing Swang Lane in relation to Basing House. Based on Godson's plan circa 1760.

gained all their outhouses, wherein was much provision of bread, beere, bacon, pork, milk, creame, pease, wheat, oats, hay and such-like, besides pigs and poultry…'[10]

The garrison, not wishing to lose these important supplies, put in a number of counter-attacks across The Street, but finally in desperation fired most of the Grange, driving Waller's troops back across the Lodden. Evidence of this burning was found during excavations in the Grange field in the early 2000s, when the foundations of a number of burnt-out store and cattle sheds were discovered. Only the Great Barn seems to have survived but bears the evidence of numerous musket ball strikes, plus some large impact scars from artillery shot, possibly fired at short range from the house.

Bad weather and mutinous rumblings in the ranks forced Waller to draw off to Basingstoke to allow his troops a few days rest. But on Sunday 12 November, he returned, as he wrote, '…to have another fling at Basing'. He had planned an early morning assault, but the sluggishness of the troops delayed the action until the afternoon. Alarms were raised on all sides of the House, but the main attacks were to be made on the Basing side and across the park. Waller positioned himself in the now partly burned-out village and having intelligence from deserters from the House of a weak spot in the walls, sent forward his petardier, supported by his own regiments of foot and dragoons and a section of Colonel Jones' Regiment to exploit it. This party managed to take the outer works ahead of them but instead of attaching the petard to the section of wall, it was set against a blocked doorway, which proved too strong for it.

In the meantime, the force which was supposed to assault the park side of the house came under fire from a gun loaded with case-shot and failed to push home their attack. This allowed the defenders to occupy an abandoned half-moon which flanked the failed petard attack, and their fire drove Waller's men back with heavy casualties.

Some writers have interpreted the petard assault as being upon Garrison Gate (Basing House's only surviving gateway), but although this gate arch shows evidence of strengthening, it was certainly never fully blocked, being the main communication route between the House and the Grange. I would therefore suggest that the attack point was either a door on the north-east wing of the New House, or a gateway on the south-east side of the same, unfortunately both sites have been badly disturbed by the construction of the later canal. In each case, the locations are both flanked by a half-moon.

The failure of these attacks, increasing bad weather, and reports of the imminent arrival of a Royalist relief force under Lord Hopton forced Waller to lift his siege, and withdraw to his base at Farnham to lick his wounds. Hopton's party arrived two days later, followed shortly by a large number of Royalist troops from Oxford. A number of days of skirmishing between Hopton's troops, who based themselves at Odiham, and Waller's at Farnham followed until eventually part of the Royalists retired to winter quarters whilst Hopton took the rest on a raid into Sussex. According to a member of

10 Professor John Adair (ed.), *They Saw It Happen: Contemporary Accounts of the Siege of Basing House. 'Siege Diary'* (Hampshire County Council, 1993), p. 14.



Figure 5.9 (top) The Great Barn showing Civil War damage.
Figure 5.10 (below) 1950s view of Great Barn from the north-west. (Author's photo)



Clockwise from top left:
5.11 Selection of case shot from the Common.
5.12 Basing ruins, interior of Garrison Gate flanking loophole.
5.13 Garrison Gate with the Author indicating location of musket loop.
(Author's photos)

5.14 Garrison Gate showing gatepost socket,
which is possibly evidence of strengthening during the siege. (Author's photo)

the garrison, this '…affords the liberty of further fortifying, which thus (as time and number would permit) made up, is rather strong than regular.'[11]

With the threat lifted, the Marquess left his home to pay court to the King at Oxford. Whilst he was away, his brother Edward began secret negotiations with Waller to betray Basing in the coming spring. This was thwarted when Waller's new cavalry commander, Sir Richard Grenville, deserted to Oxford and warned the King of this subversion. Lord Edward was arrested and after a spell in the infamous Oxford Castle jail was forced to become garrison hangman at Basing, executing his own accomplices in the plot.

This 1644 campaigning season started early with, in March, a major battle being fought at Cheriton between the armies of Waller and Hopton which resulted in a major victory for the Parliamentarians. Hopton, with many of his cavalry, made a well-staged retreat to the shelter of the walls of Basing, before retiring to Oxford.

The Marquess was well aware that this left Basing once more as an isolated outpost, and that it would soon come under threat again. The Siege Diary comments that, 'The ensuing spring, the Rebells, as well consulting the importance of the place, in the

11 Adair, p. 36.


A Pitard and Madrier
The Madrier is a thick Plank of Wood guarded with plates of Iron, with a hole to receive the Pitard, which is made of red and yellow Copper with Tin, and being filled with powder serves to break Gates, draw Bridges, Barriers &c.

Figure 5.15 Seventeenth-century illustration of a petard.

injuries suffered by it, both in their trade and force, resolve (having before assayed it by surprize and storme) to try starving it…'[12]

As the Parliamentarian forces began to assemble in the surrounding villages, the Marquess tried a pre-emptive strike upon the town of Odiham with the intention of burning it to the ground before it could be used as an enemy base. He set out on the night of 1st June at the head of a party of 80 horse and 200 foot, carrying dark-lanterns and combustibles from Basing House, presenting each man with five shillings before he himself withdrew back to the fortress. The raid was a complete disaster for the Royalists, as Colonel Jones, the local Parliamentarian commander, received advance warning from a turncoat member of the garrison and was able to intercept them at Warnborough Mill, a mile outside Odiham. Jones' infantry brought the Royalist party to a halt, giving time for Colonel Richard Norton's cavalry to arrive and fall upon them. The Royalists lost nearly 80 men, mostly taken prisoner, and were forced back into Basing. This so weakened the garrison that they were never again able to mount such a full-scale raid.

On 4 June Norton faced the house with his horse, and stopped food supplies entering the garrison. A week later, he was reinforced by the arrival of the infantry of Colonel Herbert Morley's Blue Regiment from Sussex and Colonel Richard Onslow's Red Regiment from Surrey as well as Companies of Colonel Jones' Green Coats from Farnham. Initially the Parliamentarians quartered mostly in Basingstoke and the surrounding villages, but on 17 June Jones' troops began to fortify St Mary's Church in Basing. Over the next days, there was constant skirmishing around the House with the Royalists burning the remaining houses between them and St Mary's, which was now occupied by men from Morley's Regiment who used the church tower as a lookout post and its bells for ringing alarms. On 24 June, the Siege Diary records:

12 *Ibid.*

Figure 5.16 Author standing on Slaughter Close mound, possible site of Parliamentarian battery. Photo taken facing east, towards Basing House. (Author's photo)

> Finding a sufferance by our liberty, resolving now more straightly to begirt us, two companies more from Portsmouth being joined to those from Farnham and the towne, the Regiment of Blew is drawn in the parke, and Colonell Onslowe's to the lane and close towards Basingstooke, where having fixed their quarters they presently breake ground, shutting us up on three sides with the foot, and on the other side their guards of horse keep on Cowdrey's Downe, at night busying themselves with spade and pick-axe to secure their quarters…[13]

Over the next days, a platform was constructed to mount a demi-culverin in Slaughter Close to the west of the House and the gun, protected by cannon baskets, commenced bombardment of the Old House.

On the Park side, Colonel Morley's men began the building of a strong sconce to protect their hutted encampment. By 5 July, *The Weekly Account* states that, '…we have closely besieged the same, and are intrenched within pistol shot of the House, so that none can enter in or out. Since our throwing up a trench against them the enemy are very still, which before were lavish in their powder…'[14]

13 Adair, p. 40.
14 *Ibid*., note on p. 44.


THE SIEGE OF BAZINGE HOUSE
A. THE OLDE HOVSE. B. THE NEW. C. THE TOWER THAT IS HALFE BATTERED DOWNE. D. THE KINGES BREAST WORKS. E. THE PARLIAMENTS BREAST WORKS.

Figure 5.17 *The Siege of Basing House.* Engraving, attributed to Wenceslaus Hollar, 1644–45.



Figure 5.18 1644–45 engraving, partially redrawn to show actual configuration of earthworks, with a plan.
Figure 5.19 (below left) Fragment of stone shot from Basing House.
Figure 5.20 (below, right) Fragments of cast iron mortar shells found in Basing ruins. (Author's photos)



Very little evidence of the sconce has yet been found in the park, despite various geophysical and aerial surveys of its supposed site. The famous engraving of *The Siege of Bazinge House*, published circa 1645 and previously believed to be by Wenceslaus Hollar, shows part of this fort in the foreground, suggesting that the original sketch upon which it is based would have been executed from a slightly elevated position within the fort.

Various items of Parliamentarian correspondence refer to a certain Captain Baxter being sent to the besiegers at this time. Baxter was Captain of Hurst Castle, and a professional soldier so he was probably called in to assist in setting out the siege lines and the positioning of the artillery. By this stage the besiegers had taken delivery of two mortar pieces which, once emplaced within the trenches, began a steady bombardment of the house using both explosive grenadoes and solid stone shot. The Siege Diary states, that 'These for a while seemed troublesome, but afterwards became a custom, so familiar to the soldiers, that they were called, as they counted them, Bawbles, their mischiefs only lighting on the house, and that the lesser, our courts being large and many.'[15]

However by 30 July, which was the first anniversary of the house becoming a garrison, the effects of the shelling were beginning to tell, and further works were being thrown up against the side of the house. A gun platform was erected between the village and the park and connected by a communication trench to the fortified St Mary's Church. This new work was to threaten the house's 'Basing-Bulwork' which all available defenders were then set to work strengthening. The site of the new Parliamentarian platform is lost, but sections of the communications trench have been observed during construction work next to the churchyard and in the grounds of St Mary's School.

On 10 August the besiegers received reinforcements in the form of five companies of foot from the newly raised regiment of Colonel Richard Whitehead, who set up camp at Oliver's Delve upon Cowdery's Down. Their arrival was marked by the guns in the park works bringing down a tower in the Old House. The Royalists retaliated by raiding the besiegers' front line and briefly taking the platform in Slaughter Close where they put out of action the demi-culverin before retiring back to the house. That night the Royalists hastily began construction of a temporary work at the foot of Cowdery's Down so that they could secure the meads, next to the River Lodden, which were their only source of fodder for their horses. An unsuccessful attempt to take the Delve was carried out on the night of 14 August, which resulted in the Parliamentarians further fortifying it with gabions and arming it with a culverin which began firing on the house. Over the next week, the new work on the Basing side was completed and mounted with a demi-cannon which quickly breached a corner tower of the New House. A tremendous amount of ammunition was expended resulting in the issue of 400 hundred rounds of culverin and 150 demi-cannon shot from the Tower of London.[16] During lulls in the

15 *Ibid*., p. 44.
16 National Archives, WO47/1.

Figure 5.21 St Mary's Church, Basing. (Author's photo)

bombardment, arrows were also shot over the defences with propaganda notes attached, '…with proffers of preferment to the souldier, persuading mutinies, and labouring divisions 'twixt the Regiments…'[17]

Although the writer of the Diary claims these attempts at subversion were in vain, the antipathy between Rawdon and the Marquess and their regiments was growing, news of which was being brought to the notice of Parliamentarian commanders by deserters.

By the end of August, provisions for the garrison were growing desperately low, and with an advance line from the Delve blocking their access to the Meads, horse fodder was no longer available. The Royalists abandoned their new work on this side, as it had '…now growne too hot and wanting men to keep it',[18] and were forced to build a dam near the present-day Barton's Mill Public House to keep the river level up for the defence of the Grange. The Parliamentarians were recorded as having water levelling devices in use for countering this.

Colonel Richard Norton, the senior Parliamentarian commander, was well aware of the plight of the garrison and on 2 September sent a drummer with the demand for the surrender of the house. This was immediately refused by the Marquess, who was expecting the imminent arrival of a relief force from Oxford. There then followed a six-hour long heavy bombardment, which brought down one of the great towers in the New House, forcing the defenders to construct a second line of defence behind it. The relief force was meant to arrive on 4 September, but instead of this, Sir William

17 Adair, p. 48.
18 *Ibid*., p. 50.

Waller appeared. With an advance guard of cavalry from his army, he was belatedly making his way west to support the army of the Earl of Essex in Cornwall. This unexpected visit did not put off the garrison from executing a successful sally on the lines of the besiegers in the fen, which had been intended to assist the promised arrival of relief from Oxford.

Figure 5.22 Buttress on St Mary's Church, showing possible Royalist artillery damage. (Author's photo)

The next two days saw the rest of Waller's army pass by without making any attempt upon the House and things remained quiet until the night of 10 September when Edward Jeffery, the Marquess's messenger, slipped through the lines with the welcome news that Colonel Henry Gage with troops and supplies would be with them early next morning. Gage had managed to get his force as far as Aldermaston without detection, but there his quartermasters had a brush with a party of Parliamentarians from Reading who sent warnings to Norton who responded by gathering his forces together on top of Cowdery's Down across Gage's path. The morning of 11 September was a foggy one, and the Marquess set a beacon on top of the Great Gatehouse to act as a marker for Gage. At this point, Gage had planned to have assistance from the Royalist garrison at Winchester who were meant to have started diversionary attacks on the Parliamentarian lines on the park side, whilst he brought supplies in from the north. However, the presence of the Parliamentarian cavalry near Winchester prevented Colonel Ogle, the Royalist governor, from sending his men, apart from one officer who reached Gage's column at Chineham, two miles from Basing, with the unwelcome news. This compelled Gage to alter his plan and to prepare for a full-scale all-out assault on what was then, because of the fog, an invisible enemy. Gage's force consisted of around 450 musketeers drawn variously from the Queen's Regiment; Colonel Stephen Hawkins' Regiment; a detachment from the Wallingford garrison, and 250–300 horse from other regiments. He arrayed with the infantry in the centre with cavalry on either flank and all were ordered to tie a white tape, ribband or handkerchief about their upper right arm as a field sign (to prevent any friendly-fire incidents the Marquess had been informed by messenger that they would do this). When Gage was within one mile of the house, he ordered all his drums and trumpets

to sound in an attempt to alarm the besiegers, but they were already waiting for him and replied with their music and a volley of shot which Gage described as, '…more terrible than damageable.'[19]

At this stage, Gage's position was probably the site of the present day Daneshill roundabout, an area massively altered in the 20th century by road and factory development. However, in recent years, a strip of land between the footpath and the factory fence has produced a number of musket balls. The Parliamentarians held a position near the crest of Cowdery's Down, protected by a hedgerow, which despite housing development, still exists in garden boundaries. Gage led the advance through gradually lifting fog, up the hill with Swing Swang Lane on his right. He sent forward his wings of horse to engage the five or six troops of enemy cavalry which opposed him, which after a small fight broke and fled towards Basingstoke. The Parliamentarian foot was made of sterner stuff, and Gage reported that, '…after two hours disputing the business beat them from hedge to hedge, till at last they abandoned all their quarters and works on that side, and gave us free entry into the house.'[20]

This action was supported by a commanded party of musketeers from the house, under Lieutenant Colonel Johnson, who sallied out from the Grange. Twelve barrels of gunpowder and 12 cwt of match (of which the garrison was desperately short) were brought in on the backs of pack horses. Gage had brought no food with him but had chosen the day of relief to coincide with market day in Basingstoke, where he now proceeded with the bulk of his forces. With the Marquess he left 100 of Hawkins' whitecoats who joined with men from the garrison in successfully taking the works in the fen and St Mary's Church where parts of two companies of foot were taken prisoner.

The large work in the park proved too strong to attack and into it withdrew most of the Parliamentarians along with the majority of their artillery pieces. In the meantime, Gage had occupied Basingstoke after minor opposition and had begun to strip the market and town of foodstuffs as well as discovering fourteen barrels of gunpowder. These he sent into Basing House, along with cattle, sheep and other food. With night coming on, and the Parliamentarian forces regrouping, Gage set about the staged withdrawal of his exhausted troops back into the shelter of the walls of the garrison. Early next morning, his scouts reported that Basingstoke was still clear of enemy forces so he again occupied it, and stripped it of remaining provisions, before again withdrawing that evening. This time, instead of entering Basing House, Gage ordered the start of the long march back to Oxford under cover of darkness.

Over the next day or so, all was quiet about Basing, with the opportunity for the garrison to gather more provisions and strip the Parliamentarian works of timber and planks. After this brief respite, Colonel Norton returned and there was a sharp skirmish in the burnt-out village, and although the Royalists escaped, they lost a number of men and Lieutenant Colonel Johnson was mortally wounded. By

19 *Ibid*., p. 63.
20 *Ibid*.

23 September Norton's men had reoccupied the church, and according to the siege diary, '…they now enlarge themselves and keepe us to our works, of late too loosely grown familiar in the towne.'[21]

Six days later the garrison's Major Cuffaud led out a party of 100 musketeers in an attempt to surprise the defenders of the church, but having taken the outer defence, probably the bank formed by Church Lane, they could not force the door of the church itself and were forced to withdraw with a number of casualties.

The Delve work had not been regarrisoned at this time, which allowed the Marquess's cavalry to ride out to gather supplies, although there were occasional brushes with the enemy's horse. This went on throughout early October until disrupted on the 17th by the arrival of the forces of the Eastern Association under the Earl of Manchester, and over the next couple of days these were joined by the armies of Waller and the Earl of Essex. This massive rendezvous of Parliamentarian forces was intended not for the reduction of the house, but for an attempt to trap the King as he returned from the West Country, for which purpose they eventually marched off on the Reading road to the indecisive Second Battle of Newbury. The day after their departure the house was hit by high winds, which because of the condition it was now in brought about the collapse of one of the damaged towers, which fell on and injured a number of the garrison.

The search for provisions continued, and on 5 November the Siege Diary reported, '…our beere being now spent, the officers content themselves with water having for ten dayes passed spared one meale a day, and now persuade the souldiers who has yet had two, this causeth one at night to run away, telling out wants unto our enemies…'[22]

Two more weeks passed, and then to the joy of the defenders the Parliamentarians began to show signs of lifting the siege. First wagons and guns were withdrawn and then the foot after burning their huts marched off in the directions of Odiham and winter quarters with the cavalry acting as rearguard. The following night Colonel Gage appeared with 1,000 horse, each trooper carrying a bag of provisions, and around their waists a skein of match cord. Gage had expected to have to battle his way through to Basing House, but bad weather had fortunately delayed him and saved him the fight. The condition in which he found the garrison was not good, and in a coded message he sent to Prince Rupert, on 22 November, he writes from Basing:

> I beseech you my Lord be pleased to acquaint ye King that there is a genneral want of clothes, shooes and stockings and danger of a mutiny the officers and soldiers being disgusted my lord desired much to have the garrison changed. I beseech you my lord let ye Kinge know it will be almost impossible for me to go forwards with my designe with these ill commanded men…[23]

21 *Ibid*., p. 54.
22 *Ibid*. p. 56.
23 British Library Add. Ms. 18981 4323.

Were these 'ill commanded men' the entire garrison, or is Catholic Gage referring to Protestant Rawdon and his regiment in an attempt to support his fellow Catholic the Marquess, in removing the governor from his post? Rawdon certainly thought this was the case, and after a quiet winter, the Marquess succeeded in petitioning the King to make Basing a Catholic garrison. Thus, on 1st May 1645, Rawdon and his men were ordered to leave, marching away to become the governor and garrison of Farringdon. To replace this loss, according to the *Moderate Intelligencer* of 15 May, '…they have forced into Basing House, instead of those that have gone aboard with Col. Royden, almost as many out of the counties, and of them the most 18 years old, and some not 12.'[24]

The 1645 campaigning season started with a reorganised Parliamentarian army, the New Model, under Lord General Sir Thomas Fairfax, taking the field, which on 14 June inflicted a decisive defeat on the King at Naseby. At this stage Basing was left mostly unmolested with its cavalry troopers acting very much like highwaymen on the main roads passing through the county. To counter this a force of horse and dragoons was to be supplied by the neighbouring counties and by August, plans had been made for a further and hopefully final siege of Basing House. Colonel John Dalbier put himself up for the task. He was a professional soldier of Dutch or German extraction and until its disbandment had served as senior officer in the cavalry of the Earl of Essex's army. For the Basing expedition, he was employed on a temporary contract, which the Royalist newsbooks took great delight in making fun of. Dalbier arrived in Basingstoke on 20 August with around 800 horse and foot, not enough to blockade Basing House. Further reinforcements were promised by the local County Committees, who were supposed to be supplying them but they were distracted at the time by a number of Clubmen uprisings that were occurring in the south of England. Despite these problems, Dalbier set about his task, and commenced operations against the New House from the ruins of Basing village, period accounts stating that he '…hath with him, many good engineers and pioneers, such as use to dig cole pits.'[25]

Gun platforms and saps were constructed, and Dalbier took delivery of scaling ladders, heavy artillery and mortars which soon began to blow breaches in the walls of the New House which he had judged to be the weakest part of the garrison defences.

By the middle of September, the besieging force had finally been reinforced and hopes were growing that the House would soon fall. To add to the discomfiture of the Marquess and his garrison, Dalbier had, according to the news book *Mercurius Britannicus*, '…this last week tried to smoke him out with straw, just as they use to serve eeles in old walls…'[26]

24 Godwin, p. 306.
25 *Ibid*., p. 320.
26 *Ibid*., p. 325.

Mercurius Veridicus also commented, '…if the house will not burn the straw and other combustible matter will smoke, which, advantage of wind, may seeme another element, and make the enemy scarce find their port-hole…'[27]

During this time, on 11 September, Bristol, the second city of the kingdom, fell to Lord General Fairfax. He decided, before marching on into the Royalist-held West Country, to eliminate the King's garrisons threatening his rear that, '…like vipers in the bowel, infested the midland parts…'[28]

Lieutenant General Oliver Cromwell was given the mission of taking Devizes Castle, Winchester and Basing, for which he was granted £100 for 'contingent charges'.[29] For this task he was assigned a brigade consisting of the foot regiments of Colonels Pickering, Montague and Sir Hardress Waller together with the cavalry regiments of Colonels Hammond, Fleetwood and Sheffield. His artillery train was formed of five heavy pieces, including a cannon royal, under the able control of Captain Richard Deane. Devizes surrendered to Cromwell on 23 September, and Winchester Castle on 6 October. Now it was the turn of Basing House to be visited by the Lieutenant General. Cromwell's advance guard arrived in Basingstoke on the morning of 8 October, with the rest of the brigade shortly after drawing up in a field between Hackwood Park and the town. Tradition has it that the Lieutenant General set up his lodgings at the Fleur de Lys Inn in London street, Basingstoke, a building long since demolished, which stood next to the present-day Post Office. He then met with Dalbier and together with their staffs, they rode out to view the house. Upon their return, preparations were made to throw up new platforms for Cromwell's guns to the south-east of the New House, whilst Dalbier continued his bombardment on the eastern side where he had already affected a breach. By the evening of Saturday 11 October, the great guns were mounted and ready to open fire. At this point Cromwell summoned the house with their last opportunity to surrender, but this was refused by the Marquess, and so the cannon began to roar. On Saturday night, Colonel Hammond and Major King, whilst riding the rounds, were captured by a party of the Marquess's cavalry and taken prisoner into the house. Cromwell immediately sent a message demanding their exchange, threatening the Marquess that if any harm befell them, he would answer for it. This was refused, although the next morning all other prisoners held within the garrison were exchanged.

By the night of 13 October, two 'practical' breaches had been made in the defences of the New House, and preparations were made for the storming the next morning. It used to be an old Hampshire saying, that, 'Clubs were trumps when Basing fell', implying that the watch was caught off guard playing cards when the attack commenced. Nothing could be further from the truth; the garrison knew perfectly well what was going to happen the next morning and were preparing for it. Cromwell's

27 *Ibid*.

28 Joshua Sprigge, *Anglia Rediviva* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1854), p. 138.

29 NA, SP 28/140/part 2.







Facing page:
Figure 5.23 Conjectural model of the Old and New House viewed from the direction of Pickering's attack.
Figure 5.24 Hand grenade fragments.

Above:
Figure 5.25 (above left) Postern Gate excavation.
Figure 5.26 (above right) Battle-damaged, decapitated skull, found in the Postern Gate.
(Figures 5.23, 5.24, 5.25, Author's photos. Figure 5.26 by kind permission of David Allen)

plan was for a three-pronged assault to commence at around 6:00 a.m., signalled by the firing of four of the great guns. Dalbier's forces were to come through the Grange, on the north side of the garrison, Colonel Pickering would lead his regiment through the breaches in the New House, whilst the regiments of Colonels Montague and Waller would storm the earthworks on the park side.

Pickering's party seized the lower courtyard of the New House without too much difficulty, the defenders having withdrawn to make a stand in that part of the House that surrounded the raised inner yard. The assailants clambered in through windows, and very soon took the whole building, the surviving defenders retreating into the Old House which was then under mortar fire. *Mercurius Civicus* reports that, '…they in the Old House hung out some black ensigns of defiance, and set fire on a bridge over which



Figure 5.27 Reconstructed plan of Old House gatehouse showing evidence of Civil War strengthening.

our men were to pass, disputing the passage at sword's point, and the rest in the House threw out grenadoes amongst our men…'[30]

It is usually assumed that the bridge in question is that which connected the bailey to the Great Gatehouse of the Old House. I would suggest that it is in fact a wooden bridge that once ran directly from the New House to a small postern Gate to the east of the Great Gatehouse. This now blocked postern was partially excavated in the 1990s, and the decapitated, battle-damaged skull of a young man was revealed lying in a gutter in its floor.

By attacking across this bridge, Pickering's men would have been sheltered by the western wing of the New House from the fire of the defenders until the actual crossing, whereas if they approached the Great Gatehouse, they would have to cross the exposed Outer Bailey. From archaeological evidence, the Great Gatehouse doors appear to have been strengthened by a large timber frame which would have taken time to breach, and the main bridge crossing here is built of brick and not therefore susceptible to burning. On either side of the Great Gatehouse, two brick towers had been built up from the Tudor cellars, and through the standing service wings, to form gun platforms whose pieces could sweep the bailey making it an even more dangerous approach.

As Pickering's men pushed home their attack, the storming of the park side defences, which Cromwell considered the strongest of the enemy works, was successfully carried out. Waller's and Montague's soldiers then brought up scaling ladders, crossed the old Norman ringwork ditch, and set them against the walls of the Old House. At some point which may have been before the fall of the New House, or at the commencement of the storming of the Old House, accounts differ, the Royalists attempted a parley, which according to Cromwell, '…our men would not heare.'[31]

30 Godwin, p. 352.
31 Adair, p. 71.



Figure 5.28 Site plan of Basing House, based on Godson's map circa 1760 (showing outline of some now vanished earthworks). (Author's photo)



Figure 5.29 (above) Foundations of East Gun Tower.
Figure 5.30 (below) Foundations of West Gun Tower.
(Author's photos)



Figure 5.31 Redrawn north-east elevation from John Dunstall's engraving, showing the House after the siege.

Figure 5.32 A veteran's souvenir of the storming, obverse (left) and reverse. (Author's photos)

Overrun in all directions, the defence collapsed, and *Mercurius Civicus* records that, 'At last our men came on with such courage that they entered the Old House too, crying 'Fall on, fall on; all is our own'.[32]

So, at about 7:00 a.m., on the morning of 14 October 1645, Basing House, the last Royalist garrison in Hampshire, fell to the forces of Parliament after one of the longest sieges of the Civil War. The Marquess was taken prisoner, protected by Colonel Hammond and Major King, who had been treated civilly by him during their short incarceration. That night Cromwell reported to the Speaker of the capture of Sir Robert Peake, along with:

> …divers other officers, whom I have ordered to be sent up to you. We have taken about ten pieces of ordnance, much ammunition, and our soldiers a good encouragement. [And he went on] I humbly offer to you, to have this place utterly slighted, for these following reasons: it will ask about 800 men to manage; it is no frontier; the country is poor about it; the place exceedingly ruined by our batteries and mortar pieces, and by a fire which fell upon the place since our first taking it.[33]

Hugh Peters, chaplain to the Train of Artillery visited the House shortly after its fall, and described its pillaging by the victors and, '…what the soldiers left the fire took hold on; which made more than ordinary haste; leaving nothing but bare walls and

32 Godwin, p. 353.
33 Adair, p. 72.

chimneys, in less than twenty hours; being occasioned by the neglect of the enemy in quenching a fire-ball of ours at first.'[34]

Within a day or so, Cromwell's brigade marched back into Wiltshire to the capture of Longford Castle. Parliament passed an ordinance for the destruction of Basing House, not by gunpowder, but by allowing the local people to demolish it, stating that, '…whoever will come for the brick or stone shall freely have the same for his pains.'[35]

Although most of Basing village and its church was rebuilt or repaired with material removed from the house, an engraving produced by John Dunstall in c.1652 shows a large proportion of the structure still standing, as it would for the next 30 years or so.

The Marquess survived imprisonment in the Tower of London, eventually being released because of ill health to take the waters at Epsom. At the Restoration he had his lands returned to him but received no financial recompense for his losses. He therefore retired to his wife's house at Englefield near Reading where, on 5 March 1674, the 5th Marquess of Winchester died. He was buried in the local church where his monument is still to be seen. His eldest son Charles inherited his title and estates and having married a wealthy wife set about a new building programme. Hackwood was developed into a large country house with extensive gardens whilst at Basing, next to the Great Barn, a new hunting lodge was constructed on the site of buildings burnt down in 1643, only to be demolished itself in the second half of the 18th century. Across the road from the New Lodge, the standing ruins of Basing House were either removed completely or landscaped. The remains of the Old House were turned into a vineyard, the vestiges of which baffled archaeologists in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, as it was very short-lived before falling into dereliction, and hardly appears in the written record. The construction of the Basingstoke Canal through the site in the 1790s removed much evidence and again distorted historians' ideas of the appearance of the House in its heyday and during the Civil War. During the Second World War, the site was used for Home Guard exercises; a veteran telling the author, 'What Cromwell started, we finished.'

Despite numerous vacillations in fortune, Loyalty House still retains many mysteries and will doubtless provide material for the enquiring archaeologist and historian for many years to come.

34 Sprigge, p. 1.
35 Godwin, p. 336.

6

'His Majestie's Scenographer': the Military Art of Wenceslaus Hollar

David Flintham

The arrival of gunpowder on the battlefield fundamentally changed warfare, and such were the resulting developments in warfare during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that some historians have looked upon the period as a 'military revolution': a theory first put forward in the 1960s and debated ever since.[1] Nowhere is this more marked than in the development of fortifications, where the castle and tall stone medieval wall gradually (but not entirely) gave way to artillery fortifications which were both lower and thicker in order to withstand bigger and heavier cannon, and as the range of cannon increased, so did the area covered by such fortifications. Military engineering (that is, the design and construction of fortifications and the conduct of sieges) had become something of a science by the middle of the seventeenth century, and especially in Continental Europe it was dominated by defensive fortifications protecting towns and cities. The advances in fortifications are typified by the *trace italienne* (the basic star-shaped fort first encountered by the French in northern Italy in the mid-fifteenth century), and it was from this that the fortifications which came to dominate military thinking during the seventeenth century evolved. These low-level, geometric schemes that enabled relatively small garrisons to withstand sieges by larger armies would be taken to new heights of sophistication by the great military engineers such as Menno van Coehoorn (1641–1704) and Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban (1633–1707).[2] Masonry-constructed defensive schemes were engineered to last (in some places still proving their value in the World Wars, as Ypres and Calais, for instance, both testify). Others, earth-built, were temporary and designed to be

1 See Jeremy Black, *A Military Revolution? Military Change and European Society, 1550–1800* (Basingstoke: Macmillan Education, 1991) and Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

2 See Christopher Duffy, *Fire and Stone* (Edison: Castle Books, 2006) and the Fortress Study Group (http://www.fsgfort.com/).

thrown up quickly and cheaply. There are still towns and cities across Europe (and further afield as European practices spread to Africa, the Americas and Asia) that have retained at least some remnant of these defences. Elsewhere, they have been lost: destroyed in battle or simply disappearing over time under urban expansion. Traces of their very existence are limited to topography and to (all too rare) contemporary sketches, engravings and paintings.

Another invention which was to have a profound effect on Early Modern Europe was the invention of the printing press around 1440. This enabled the mass circulation of the printed word, and was one of the most important inventions in human history. Indeed, had it not been for the printing press, it is feasible that the Reformation may have taken a different course, but certainly it would have taken longer. Initially, engraved wooden blocks were used for the purpose of print making, but by the sixteenth century longer-lasting metal sheets had taken over, and in so doing making printed material even more accessible. No less important was the printed illustration, and as print-making technologies advanced, these illustrations became more sophisticated, becoming an art form in their own right.

One of the first artists to recognise the potential of printing was Albrecht Dürer, a painter, printmaker, and theorist of the German Renaissance. Born in Nuremberg in 1471, Dürer established his reputation and influence across Europe when he was still in his twenties due to his high-quality woodcut prints. His *Siege of a fortress* of 1527 (the year before he died), is an excellent example of his woodcuts, although from 1494 he started engraving metal. Arguably, Dürer's greatest contribution to fortress warfare was his *Etliche underricht zur befestigung der stett schloss und flecken*,[3] written between 1525 and 1527: it is a discussion, design and plan of an ideal fortified royal city, and actually marks the theoretical end of the story of the reinforced castle.

Map makers were also quick to grasp the potential of engraving; the mid-sixteenth century Copperplate map of London, formally attributed to Ralph Agas, is an excellent example of an engraved metal plate. Surveyed between 1553 and 1559, it is the earliest true map of London and may have been engraved by mapmakers from the Low Countries, an important centre of surveying and printing at the time, and as its date coincides approximately with the joint reign of Queen Mary I and her husband Philip of Spain (whose realms also included the Spanish Netherlands), it might be that Phillip, who was a keen collector of town and city plans, may have commissioned or patronised the Copperplate map. A plate on display in the Museum of London is one of three surviving plates from a probable total of 15, and shows the Moorfields area, just to the north-east of the City itself. The plate is heavily worn, indicating that it was used for printing many times – depending on the quality of the plate and the engraving, a plate could be worn after just 300 impressions, but if touched up, perhaps as many as 4,000 times.

3 *Etliche underricht zu Befestigung der Stett, Schloss und Flecken* (Nuremberg: Hieronymus Andreas Formschneider, 1527).


WENCESLAUS HOLLAR
Gentilhomme ne a Prage l'an 1607, a esté de nature fort inclin p.r l'art de meniature principalement pour esclaircir, mais beaucoup retardé par son pere, l'an 1627, il est party de Prage aiant demeuré en divers lieux en Allemaigne, il s'est addonné pour peu de temps a esclaircir et apliquer l'eau forte, estant party de Cologne avec le Comte d'Arondel vers Vienne et d'illec par Prage vers l'Angleterre, ou aiant esté serviteur domestique du Duc de Lorck, il s'est retiré de la a cause de la guerre a Anvers ou il reside encores.
Le Keepsens pinxit et excudit.

Figure 6.1 Wenceslaus Hollar, *Wenceslaus Hollar*, etching, 170 x 120 mm. (The Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library, University of Toronto) (P1419).

Another example of a map was John Speed's atlas of Britain, which was drawn at the end of the reign of Elizabeth I, and engraved in Amsterdam by Jodocus Hondius. The single uncoloured maps from the 1627 edition were in great demand by the armies of both sides during the Civil Wars.

During the 17th century, the chemical process of etching appeared. The primary difference between engraving and etching is an engraver uses sharp tools to cut lines directly into a surface, while an etcher burns lines into a surface with acid.

One of the foremost artists of the first half of the seventeenth century to specialise in military themes was the Swiss engraver Matthäus Merian der Ältere. Born in Basel in 1593, he worked in Frankfurt for most of his career, where he also ran a publishing house. Generally acknowledged to be a leader in his field, he engraved a number of views of the Thirty Years' War, including this view of the Siege of Frankfurt (13–15 April 1631). Merian died on 19 June 1650 in Bad Schwalbach, Germany.

But whilst Merian may have been the leader, he was certainly not the only artist in this field: others include Jean Lepautre (1618–82), Theodore Matham (1606–76), Pierre Mortier (1661–1711), Johan Huusman (1634–1715), and Israel Silvestre ('the Younger', 1621–91).[4] Erik, Count Dahlberg (1625–1703), a Swedish soldier and military engineer, known as the *Vauban of Sweden*, and his engraver, the Frenchman Lepautre, produced one of the great works of the period, the *Siege of Copenhagen* (1658).[5]

Whilst all were skilled, none approached the geographic breadth of Wenceslaus Hollar (Fig. 6.1). Also known as Wenzel or, in Bohemian, Vaclav, he was born in Prague on 23 July 1607, and has the reputation as one of the foremost etchers of the seventeenth century. Best known for his illustrations of the City of London before and after the Great Fire of 1666,[6] he produced a great number of works illustrating warfare – battles, sieges, fortifications and military plans – works that at the time were considered "useful for all commanders".[7]

From Central and Western Europe, the British Isles and as far afield as North Africa, he depicted people and places at peace and at war, and war forced Hollar to flee home on at least two occasions. Thus, for someone whose life was dominated by conflict it is of no surprise that a considerable number of his works should feature military subjects. Yet it needs to be remembered that Hollar was more than just a war artist: his government commission demonstrated his value to the state, as exemplified by his work in Tangier in 1669.

Hollar's own lifetime witnessed changes in the way war was fought, and equally crucially, the balance of European power shifted. When Hollar was born, Spain was dominant on both land and sea, but by the time of his death, 70 years later, France dominated on land and the Dutch at sea. In 1607, the Eighty Years' War (1567–1648) between the Netherlands and the Spanish had been going for 40 years, and the Thirty

4 Martha Pollak, *Cities at War in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). In the otherwise excellent chapter on the images of seventeenth century fortifications, Pollack neglects to mention Wenceslaus Hollar.

5 Pollak, p. 140.

6 Probably his most widely known work is *London after the Fire*, 1666 (Pennington P1003). Richard Pennington, *A descriptive catalogue of the etched work of Wenceslaus Hollar 1607–1677* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1982), p. 169, no. 1003. All Hollar prints in this paper are identified by their Pennington citation number e.g. P1003.

7 See the author's earlier ' "Useful for all Commanders": Wenceslaus Hollar's Views of Castles, Fortifications and Sieges', in *Perspectives on the Art of Wenceslaus Hollar (1607–77)* (Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 2016). This essay draws heavily on this earlier research.

Years' War (1618–48) broke out when Hollar was 11. He lived through the Franco-Spanish War (1635–59), the Civil Wars in Britain (1639–52), the Anglo-Dutch Wars (1652–54, 1665–67 and 1672–74) and two of Louis XIV's wars (the War of Devolution, 1667–68 and, between 1672 and 1678, the first of several wars with the Dutch). He lived in Prague at the start of the Thirty Years' War (the city was sacked in 1620) and subsequently moved about a war-torn Europe. Unsurprisingly, then, a number of Hollar's works feature not only fortifications but sieges, and battles as well. But he also produced views of fortified cities in peacetime with the citizens going about their daily business: prints in which the fortifications are mere backdrops to the primary subject.

Influenced by Dürer (one of his earliest known works is a copy of Dürer's *Virgin and Child*, dating from 1625–6), Hollar went to Frankfurt in 1627 where he was apprenticed to Matthäus Merian. A year later he was in Stuttgart, and between 1629–30 he was working for Jacob van der Heyden's publishing house in Strasbourg, as well as spending time in both Mainz and Koblenz. During this time he portrayed the towns, castles, and landscapes of the Middle Rhine Valley, and one of the earliest of Hollar's etchings with military interest is from his time in Strasbourg. Fortifications had an important role to play in times of peace, something that is illustrated by Hollar's *View of Strasbourg: the toll house* (P701) (Fig. 6.2). As the view shows, the toll house itself lies behind substantial earthen ramparts, with sentry boxes located at each corner, from which a watch could be kept over neighbouring waterways. A toll house such as this, controlling the movement of people, livestock and produce in and out of the city, would have been important to local security as well as a means of collecting local tolls. Sometime in 1630–1, he returned to Frankfurt to again work with Merian, and it was here that Hollar produced his *Capture of Oppenheim* of 1631 (P538) (Fig. 6.3). Oppenheim lies on the Upper Rhine between Mainz and Worms and was a key river crossing to the north of Mannheim (the key to the Lower Palatinate). During the early stages of the Thirty Years' War (on 14 September 1620), it was overrun by Spanish troops who occupied the town until December 1631 when the King of Sweden, Gustavus Adolphus, crossed the Rhine prior to his conquest of the Lower Palatinate.[8] It is this crossing which Hollar features in his etching: an image of an excellent example of an opposed river crossing during this period. The *Capture of Oppenheim* is attributed to Hollar (the print is unsigned but the lettering is very characteristic of Hollar). However, it does bear certain likenesses to Merian's *Entry of Gustavus Adolphus into Frankfurt* (1631)[9] in terms of style and composition, so perhaps the similarities between these prints are a case of a talented pupil learning from a master.

The *Capture of Oppenheim* is primarily a view of a battle rather than of a fortification, and in this marvelously detailed work, Hollar pictures the Swedish army as it begins the crossing of the river. The Swedish vanguard has already crossed and has engaged with Imperial troops: several regiments of *reiters* (mercenary German heavy cavalry).

8 Peter H. Wilson, *Europe's Tragedy: A New History of the Thirty Years' War* (London: Penguin 2010), p. 477.
9 Pollak, p. 140.

Swedish reinforcements are being ferried across the river, urged on personally by Gustavus Adolphus (identified on the print by 'B'), who is typically leading from the front (a habit that would cost him his life less than 12 months later at the Battle of Lützen). Waiting to cross are further regiments of Swedish cavalry, followed by infantry, drawn up in what is known as the 'Swedish method', with pike in the centre and muskets on each flank. Behind them (i.e. near the foreground) are horse-drawn artillery and dragoons (identified by their distinctive *guidons*), whilst in the centre foreground are some heavily armoured cuirassiers. To the right of the picture, opposite the town of Oppenheim itself is the *Stern Schantz* (identified by 'F'), an Imperial six-pointed star fort, pictured under attack by Swedish forces.

Hollar also active around Mainz when it was attacked by Gustavus Adolphus. Mainz, a city on the Rhine, occupied an important strategic location on the river and changed hands several times during the 1630s. It was captured by Gustavus in 1631 and became a base for his German allies the following year. It was from Mainz that Gustavus was able to regain the momentum following the Imperial victory at Lech in March 1632, and following his death at the end of 1632 Mainz remained a Swedish garrison, but Swedish influence was on the wane and by 1635 Mainz's Swedish garrison had been replaced by a French one.[10] Hollar's *Mainz* of 1634 (P736) (Fig. 6.4) shows Mainz's existing medieval walls surrounded by the newer earthworks, featuring defensive ditch, ramparts and bastions.

Between 1633 and 1636 Hollar lived in Cologne (his first book of etchings was published there in 1635, when he was 28), although he did visit the Netherlands in 1634. The town of Deutz, on the opposite bank of the Rhine to Cologne, was fortified and is shown clearly in a number of his works. The Imperial city of Cologne,[11] whilst outwardly neutral, because of its Catholicism continued to lend money to the Imperial cause. Even so, it was a convenient venue for negotiations and financial transactions. But such was the nature of the Thirty Years' War that neutrality was virtually an impossible position to maintain, and a few years after Hollar's departure, disruption of Cologne's trade forced the city's active participation in the latter stages of the war.[12] The Kölnisches Stadtmuseum holds a copy of Hollar's *Köln und Deutz* (P859) of 1636. In his drawing of *Deutz* (P746) (Fig. 6.5), Hollar illustrates a number of the features common to modern artillery fortifications, in complete contrast to the medieval defences of Cologne, across the river in the distance.

It was in Cologne in 1636 that an impoverished Hollar first met Thomas Howard, Earl of Arundel (1585–1646); a meeting that was to have a profound effect on Hollar's career, and under Arundel's patronage Hollar moved to England where, in the years before the outbreak of the English Civil War, he completed a number of prints of

10 Wilson, pp. 519–22.

11 Pennington (p. vii) comments that Hollar's 'long views of London and Cologne far surpass the work of his master Merian'.

12 Wilson, p. 634.



Figure 6.2 Wenceslaus Hollar, *View of Strasbourg: the toll house*, etching, 60 x 93 mm. (The Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library, University of Toronto) (P701). From Hollar's set of prints *Amoenissimæ aliquot locorvm … Effigies* (Cologne: 1635).



Figure 6.3 *Capture of Oppenheim*, etching, 200 x 320 mm. (The Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library, University of Toronto). Unsigned copy after Hollar's *Capture of Oppenheim* (P538).

Figure 6.4 Wenceslaus Hollar, *Mainz* (1634), etching, 81 x 131 mm.
(The Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library, University of Toronto) (P736)



Figure 6.5 Wenceslaus Hollar, *Deutz*, etching, 60 x 140 mm. (The Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library, University of Toronto) (P746)



Figure 6.6 Wenceslaus Hollar, *Deale Castle* (1639), etching, 56 x 133 mm.
(The Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library, University of Toronto) (P936)



Figure 6.7 Wenceslaus Hollar, *Tower of London*, etching, 150 x 260 mm. (The Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library, University of Toronto) (P908)

English fortifications including his 1639 view of *Deale Castle* (P936) (Fig. 6.6). Deal Castle was just one of several castles, forts or other defences built to defend England's south coast which were drawn by Hollar, several of which are grouped together in his *Divers views after the Life*, even though they were drawn between 1642 and 1676, i.e. over a period of some 34 years.[13] As a result, Richard Pennington catalogues *Deal Castle* together with the images of *Fort Elizabeth* (P922–25; *Dover Castle* (P927); *Pevensey Castle* (P932); and *Plymouth Sound* (P933–34), as one of a group of views made by Hollar from the viewpoint of the English Channel.[14] Whilst they are linked geographically, since they were drawn over a period of more than a decade, they will be discussed chronologically.

Deal was the largest of the three masonry coastal forts (the others being Sandown and Walmer) built as part of Henry VIII's 1529 defence programme to protect the Downs in Kent. Building commenced in April 1529 and was completed by the autumn of the following year at a total cost of £27,092 for the three forts. At Deal Castle's core was a strong central tower which was surrounded by three semi-circular bastions. These smaller bastions sat on six large rounded bastions, the whole being surrounded by a moat and a curtain wall. Hollar shows several of the guns mounted at Deal Castle (it was originally armed with 66 guns on four tiers[15]). In Hollar's view, the castle is in the left foreground, looking across the English Channel towards Calais. There are a number of ships in the Channel, and on inspection, it can be seen that several fly the flags of other nations (in contrast to the Union flag being flown from Deal Castle itself). Typical Channel traffic perhaps, but what Hollar was actually recording was the naval actions between the Dutch and the Spanish in the autumn of 1639. These culminated in the Battle of the Downs (21 October 1639) when the Dutch fleet under the command of Admiral Maarten Tromp defeated the Spanish Armada under Antonio de Oquendo.[16] This action ended Spanish naval superiority and led to the Dutch becoming Europe's major maritime power for more than a generation.

In 1639, war broke out between England and Scotland, and Hollar featured the first campaign against the Scots, showing manoeuvres and camps near Newcastle (P544–47). In 1640, he drew the *Tower of London* (P908) (Fig. 6.7), a view of the Tower taken from the south across the River Thames, and focusing on the eleventh century square keep known as the White Tower. In front of the White Tower, and opening to the river though a low arch is Traitors' Gate (the point of entry for prisoners from the river). Surrounding the White Tower are the walls and buildings developed over a 500-year period which made the Tower an important prison and fortress, arsenal and palace. The Tower of London also featured in Hollar's 1641 work, the *Execution*

13 Graham Parry, *Hollar's England: a Mid-Seventeenth Century view* (Salisbury: Michael Russell Publishing Ltd., 1980).

14 Pennington, p. 151

15 Peter Harrington, *The Castles of Henry VIII* (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2007), p. 8 and p. 20.

16 Wilson, pp. 662–3.

of Strafford (P552) (Fig. 6.8). The differences between these two views of the Tower of London reflect the fact that they served different purposes. According to Pennington the *Tower of London* belonged to a set of prints of London, and was marketed by the dealer Peter Stent as a set.[17] The *Execution of Strafford* is a hastily-produced view, in which the Tower serves as the backdrop in a print which demonstrates the execution as an important event. The Earl of Strafford was one of Charles I's most important supporters, sacrificed by Charles in the hope of appeasing Parliament.

Another of Hollar's castle studies is *Kenilworth Castle. Three views* (P986), a print of three views set one above the other, which is accompanied by a separate plan: *Kenilworth Castle Plan* (P985). The castle dates from 1120 and was developed over several centuries, evolving from medieval castle to a palace fortress and finally to a Renaissance palace. Kenilworth was occupied by Parliamentarian forces during the Civil Wars and was partly destroyed by them in 1649, to prevent it being used by Royalists. Whilst Hollar's work is not dated, it probably dates from before 1649, given that the castle looks largely intact. It illustrates Sir William Dugdale's *The Antiquities of Warwickshire Illustrated* (London: Thomas Warren, 1656), the most famous county history of the period.[18]

Hollar's 1640 study of *Kingston upon Hull* (P984) (Fig. 6.9) shows the old town walls and the newer ramparts on the opposite bank of the river. Hull was a major base for the campaign against Scotland and, as a result, had become the largest arsenal in the kingdom after the Tower of London. At the outbreak of the Civil Wars, Hull declared for Parliament, actually shutting its gates in the face of the King in 1642 when he attempted to take the much needed arms and munitions from Hull's arsenal, and a year later, the Royalists returned but were equally unsuccessful in taking Hull. Hull was one of many towns in England that was fortified or refortified during the English Civil Wars, and as contemporary plans, maps and views of Civil War defences are not common, Hollar is an important resource for English Civil War research.[19] Both in terms of the design and layout of urban fortification and Hollar's works themselves, it is of value to compare this work with his earlier study of Hamburg (P851 – Fig. 6.10). Here, Hollar illustrates the fortifications designed by the Dutch engineer Johan van

17 This is among four prints named in Stent's 1662 catalogue. The other prints in the set of four are of major London buildings: the Royal Exchange, Covent Garden, and St Mary Overy: P907, P909, and P910.

18 Dugdale financed each illustration by finding a sponsor, identifiable on the sponsored print by the inclusion of his arms and a dedicatory inscription. In P986, there is a coat of arms and Latin dedication to Richard Leveson. According to *A History of the County of Warwick: Volume 6: Knightlow Hundred* (Victoria County History, ed. L.F. Salzman) (London: Victoria County History, 1951), pp. 132–143, in 1655, Richard Leveson and his wife (a descendant of Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester, to whom Elizabeth I had originally granted Kenilworth) were dealing with claims to Kenilworth, which had been occupied by Parliamentarians early in the Civil Wars. P986 and P985 seem to be precise records of Kenilworth Castle, with keys to help reader of *The Antiquities of Warwickshire* – an extremely expensive book – identify sections of the castle.

19 Lieutenant-Colonel W.G. Ross, RE, *Military Engineering during the Great Civil War, 1642–1649*, reprinted in the Ken Trotman Military History Monographs series (London: Ken Trotman, 1984).

Valckenburgh (c.1575–1625) who worked on Hamburg's fortifications from 1615 to his death in battle in 1625, creating what became known as *Bastion Henricus*, within which the Hamburg Museum now stands. He introduced a second layer of fortifications in response to the impact of the Thirty Years' War, creating the *Neustadt* ('New Town') whose street names still date from van Valckenburgh's[20] grid system of roads.

Hollar's *Map of the British Isles* (P543 – Fig. 6.11), is a map of Britain at the outbreak of the English Civil War. It features warfare in England, Ireland, Scotland as well as the Thirty Years' War on the Continent. Hollar's plan of *Oxford* (P1055) (Fig. 6.12) depicts Oxford Castle, as well as a profile view of the city at upper left, a map at lower left showing Oxford's position in the countryside in relation to Cambridge and London. As Pennington notes, this print was probably produced to satisfy a new interest in Oxford as a result of its Royalist connections (it was the Royalist capital from 1642 until its surrender to Parliament in 1646).[21] Like Windsor Castle (which will be discussed later in this chapter), at the centre of Oxford Castle was a circular stone keep, atop a steep-sided motte. Another important Royalist city to receive Hollar's attention was *Chester* (P964).

King's Lynn, a major medieval English seaport, was still prosperous in the mid-seventeenth century. The city joined the rest of East Anglia in declaring for Parliament at the outbreak of the Civil War, but declared for the King in August 1643 following a Royalist *coup d'état*. Parliament lost no time in sending an army to King's Lynn under the Earl of Manchester, but under the governorship of Sir Hamon Le Strange[22] the Royalists repaired the town's medieval walls and added earthworks and bastions. The siege commenced in late August and the defenders, with no prospect of relief, surrendered on 16 September 1643.[23]

As soon as the Parliamentarians had possession of the town, they took steps to repair any damage and to improve any weak points. But this alone was deemed to be insufficient, and plans were drawn up for a new defensive scheme, a modern, bastioned enceinte, which would see King's Lynn become the strongest fortress in East Anglia. These plans were drawn up by Richard Clampe,[24] most well-known for his plan of the siege of Newark in 1645–6. The new fortifications consisted of two sets of entirely new ramparts and ditches, as well as additions and adaptions of the existing defences. It is these defences that are central to Hollar's plan of *King's Lynn* (P987b) Fig. 6.13).

20 Van Volckenburg is commemorated by a plaque on Hamburg's city walls, and also by a bridge named after him.

21 Pennington, p.186 (at P1055).

22 In 1603, Le Strange rode from Richmond Palace to Edinburgh to inform King James VI of Scotland of the death of Queen Elizabeth I.

23 Susan Yaxley, *The Siege of King's Lynn, 1643* (Dereham, The Larks Press, 1993) and Peter Kent, *Fortifications of East Anglia* (Lavenham: Terence Dalton Limited, 1988), pp. 223–37.

24 The plan of the southern defences in the Norfolk Record Office (NRO BL (4) 14/17) is initialled 'R.C.', and the Chamberlains accounts for 1643–1644, ref. KL/C 39/102, show that men were paid to help Clampe survey land around the town, as well as paying for his 'board and bread'.

This is not Hollar's original but a copy, and combines two views.[25] It is unknown whether Hollar actually visited King's Lynn or whether his work is based on someone else's description. He left England sometime in 1644, and probably did not return to England until the early 1650s. So whilst it is not impossible that he visited King's Lynn in person, it would have had to have been in 1643–44 or in the early 1650s.

Sometime in 1643 Hollar moved to Oxford, and between 1643 and 1644 he served in the Royalist regiment of Marmaduke Rawdon, and may have served at Basing House in Hampshire. Given that he was a serving Royalist soldier, the next two views this paper describes are somewhat surprising as the first was used to accompany some Parliamentarian propaganda, whilst the second could only have been drawn if the artist was inside Parliament-controlled London.

Whilst frequently assaulted, besieged and blockaded by Royalist forces, Plymouth was the only major town in Devon to hold out for Parliament throughout the English Civil War, and as such, it was a constant thorn in the side of the Royalists. Hollar's *Siege of Plymouth* (P554) (Fig. 6.14) originally accompanied a contemporary pamphlet, *'A True Narration of the most Observable Passages in, and at, the Siege of Plymouth…'*, c.1644, which celebrated the defeat of the most determined siege (between September and December 1643), when Prince Maurice's Royalist army invested the town and established the ring of forts illustrated on Hollar's plan.[26] It is regarded as something of a 'classic' amongst known plans of Civil War defensive and siege works. The ability of Parliament to keep the town supplied by sea, along with deteriorating weather, forced Maurice to abandon the siege. The Royalists' landward blockade continued, though, resulting in an abortive Parliamentarian relief attempt in the summer of 1644. The Royalist threat to the town was finally lifted by the Parliamentarian invasion of the West Country in 1645–6.[27] Again, the print illustrated is a copy of the Hollar original and can be distinguished (according to Pennington) by the spelling mistake in the title: 'DISCRIPTION' instead of 'DESCRIPTION'. Hollar's depiction of the *Siege of Plymouth* was not the only occasion he drew the city. Yet this map of Plymouth has been drawn quickly, compared with his two views of Plymouth Sound (*Plymouth* (P933–34).

Parliament responded to the threat of Royalist attack on London by constructing the largest urban defence scheme of the entire Civil Wars. Built in 1642–3, London's fortifications were slighted in 1647, so virtually no traces of them survive. Until 2010, there was no known contemporary view of any part of these defences, save for

25 The upper part of the print, with (in the top of the design) *The Prospect of Kings Lyn/from the West*. It is a distant view of the town seen across the river (P987a), and is unsigned. P987b is the lower part of the print, with *THE GROUNDPLAT OF/KINGS LYN* in the top of the design. See also David Flintham, *King's Lynn: The Southern Defences* (King's Lynn Under Siege ECW Archaeological Project, 2018).

26 British Library, Thomason Tracts, E31[15].

27 R.R. Sellman, *Plymouth in the Civil War* (Exeter: Devon Books, 1985). Also see Stephen Wass, *The Fortifications of Plymouth* (http://www.polyolbion.org.uk/Fortifications/Plymouth/Plymouth-Fortifications.html).

THE TRUE MANER OF THE EXECUTION OF THOMAS EARLE OF STRAFFORD, LORD
Lieutenant of Ireland, vpon Tower-hill, the 12th of May, 1641.
A. Doctor Vsher, Lord Primate of Ireland.
B. the Sheriffes of London.
C. the Earle of Strafford.
D. his Kindred and Friends.
Execution des Grafen Thomæ von Stafford Statthalter in Irland auf dē Towers platz in Londen 12 Maj 1641.
A. Doct. Vsher Primat in Irland.
B. Rahts Herren von Londen.
C. Der Graf von Stafford.
D. Seine anverwanten vnd freunde.

Figure 6.8 Wenceslaus Hollar, *Execution of Strafford* (1641), etching, 190 x 260 mm.
(The Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library, University of Toronto) (P552)



Figure 6.9 Wenceslaus Hollar, *Kingston upon Hull*, etching, 262 x 305 mm. (The Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library, University of Toronto) (P984)

Figure 6.10 Wenceslaus Hollar, *Hamburg*, etching, 280 x 360 mm.
(The Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library, University of Toronto) (P851)



Figure 6.11 Wenceslaus Hollar, *Map of England and view of Prague with scenes of the beginning of the Civil War* (1642), etching. (The Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library, University of Toronto) (P543)



Figure 6.12 Wenceslaus Hollar, *Oxford* (1643) etching, 231 x 315 mm.
(The Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library, University of Toronto) (P1055, state 1)



Figure 6.13 Wenceslaus Hollar, *King's Lynn*, etching, 320 x 420 mm. (The Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library, University of Toronto) (P987b)

A TRVE MAPP AND DISCRIPTION OF THE TOWN of Plymouth and the Fortifications thereof, with the worke and approaches of the Enemy at the last Seige Ao 1643
Cornwall
Wallie
Plymouth Sounde
A Scale of Miles

Figure 6.14 Copy after Wenceslaus Hollar, *Siege of Plymouth*, etching, 263 x 363 mm. (The Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library, University of Toronto) (P554)



Figure 6.15 Wenceslaus Hollar, *Sketches of Hyde Park Fort*, graphite with ink overdrawing. (John Rylands University Library, Manchester, English MS. 883: Copyright of University of Manchester)

a single woodcut from a 1643 broadside.[28] Yet a chance discovery in the University of Manchester's John Rylands Library uncovered two drawings,[29] depicting the fort in London's Hyde Park during 1644 (Fig. 6.15).

Hyde Park Fort was constructed, probably by volunteer labour, sometime between autumn 1642 and early spring 1643. It guarded the western approaches into London and formed part of London's overall defence scheme, often referred to as the 'Lines of Communication'. In May 1643 a Lanarkshire tailor, William Lithgow, walked the entire length of London's defences and described what he saw in *The present surveigh of London and England's state*. Concerning the forts at Hyde Park, he wrote:

> …Head Park Corner Fort, which is a maine great Strength, having one fort above and within another, and the third fort closing the roadway standeth breasting the other two. The utmost invelopped fort, overtopping the other two, is garnished with eight cannon reall, and on the inferior bulwark northward, being a second part of the fort's maine body, there bee intrusted there five brazen half-cannons more, and before it towards the fields a breasting countercarp. The third defendant fort standeth enstald with six demi-culverine; amounting to 19 of all. This great fortification is but only pallosaded and single ditched, yet wonderfull strong and of great bounds. All the three having 17 angles.[30]

Hollar's drawings of the Hyde Park Fort (which may well have been drawn for the purposes of espionage) are among the last sketches he made in England before leaving for the Low Countries. It has been erroneously suggested that Hollar was captured alongside the architect Inigo Jones[31] when Basing House in Hampshire fell to the forces of Oliver Cromwell in October 1645. It is a notion that endures to this day, despite the fact that Hollar lived in Antwerp between the end of 1644 and 1652, and during his time there, he made a number of studies featuring its defences. Antwerp, along with Turin, was one of the first cities to be fortified in the style that would be recognised as typical of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Antwerp's citadel,

28 The woodcut was of Mount Mill Fort in north London and accompanied *Malignants' Treacherous and Bloody Plot against the Parliament and City of London by God's Providence happily prevented* (London, 31 May 1643). In 1852, a set of drawings of London's defences was discovered. Known as '*Eyre's Fortifications of London, 1643*', they were reportedly the work of Captain John Eyre, who was also supposed to have shared an artistic camaraderie with Hollar. The drawings were exhibited at the Archaeological Association in 1852, but in 1853, the drawings were discovered to be forgeries, the work of Peter Thompson who also crafted a complete biography and genealogy for Captain John Eyre. As a result, Thompson's own collection of Hollar's works was also called into question.

29 The author is very grateful to Simon Turner for discovering these drawings and bringing them to his attention. The author was actually researching Hyde Park Fort at the time, so the timing of the discovery could not have been better. See David Flintham, 'A Tale of Two Forts', *Fort: the International Journal of Fortifications and Military Architecture* (Fortress Study Group), 38 no. 2 (2010) 3–10.

30 William Lithgow, *The present surveigh of London and England's state* (London: 'Printed by J.O.', 1643), in Ross, p. 84.

31 At the end of 1644, Charles I sent Jones to Basing House as chief engineer.

built in 1567 by Pacciotto of Urbino (1521–91), and widely regarded as a model of its kind,[32] served as defence in war and as park in peacetime, as Rubens recognised. But the citadel was pulled down by Antwerp townspeople in revolt against their Spanish rulers in 1576. The defences were rebuilt under Dutch rule in 1583, only to fall to the Duke of Parma a year later, and the city was still in Spanish hands when the Eighty Years' War ended in 1648. As Spain's hold on the Northern Netherlands had weakened during the war, so the importance of Antwerp as a port had increased. Therefore, the need to protect the River Scheldt became ever more critical.

Hollar's study of the Philips Skantz[33] (*Fort St Phillip on the Scheldt*, c.1650 (P774)) (Fig. 6.16), features one of the forts built to protect the Scheldt, with Antwerp itself featured in the background.[34] Hollar emphasises the fact that urban fortifications were not purely militaristic in their function; they inspired confidence with external trading partners and provided the town's authorities with control over the population, enabling tolls and taxes to be collected, and regulating both the movement of goods, merchandise and livestock and the movement of the population itself. A fortified circuit also defined the town's boundaries (in the case of London, the fortifications of 1642–47 set the administrative boundary of London for several decades). The wide open expanse immediately outside the circuit of defences was designed both to give the defenders a clear field of fire and to deny cover to any attacker. In times of peace, these areas might be planted with trees, so giving the defenders a supply of timber.

Returning to England (he would finally return to London in 1652, and concentrated thereafter on book illustration and cartography), Hollar's two different views of *Dover Castle* (P927 and P930) probably date from 1650–51. With Roman origins, the castle itself dates from the end of the eleventh century. Improved by Henry VIII, at the outbreak of the Civil War it was held initially for the King, but it was taken by Parliament (without a shot being fired) in 1642. Around the same time, Hollar made several studies of *Elizabeth Castle* on Jersey (P922–25). It may have been that Hollar was at the exiled Charles II's Court (alongside his former pupil, James, Duke of York).[35] This is not a view shared by Pennington, as he does not think that Hollar would have been in the Channel Islands at the time, but instead based his views of Elizabeth Castle on someone else's sketches.[36] Elizabeth Castle was close to the island's capital, St Helier, and

32 Duffy, p. 67.

33 Whilst it was referred to as 'Philips Shantz', 'Philips Skantz' would seem to be the correct name as the word 'skans' is still in common usage today in South Africa, used by both Afrikaans- and English-speakers, indicating a 'bulwark, ditch, redoubt, trench, fort, earthwork or entrenchment'. On careful viewing, the lower part second letter of 'Shantz' on the print has a small tuck-in on the right side, making it a 'k' and not an 'h'.

34 Pennington (p. 129) thinks that the original drawings on which this print is based actually date from 1632, when Hollar travelled down the Rhine from Cologne. This would place Hollar's original sketch for this print within the period of his *Capture of Oppenhein* (P538), and *Siege of Maastricht* (P538A).

35 Graham Parry, taking as evidence the dates of 1650 on P923 and P924, suggested that Hollar was at the English royal court in exile, then in Jersey. See Parry, pp. 21 and 65.

36 Pennington, p. xxxiii. Alternatively, given the fact that the views in P921–P936 are from the sea, it could be that they were all sketched by Hollar travelling along the Channel, landing from time to time on shore

Philipp Shanke


Harley

Opposite:
Figure 6.16 (above) Wenceslaus Hollar, *Fort St Phillip on the Scheldt (Phillips Shanz)*, etching, 44 x 140 mm. (The Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library, University of Toronto) (P774)
Figure 6.17 (below) Wenceslaus Hollar, *Elizabeth Castle, Jersey*, etching, 60 x 140 mm. (The Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library, University of Toronto) (P923)

was built during the sixteenth century as a replacement for the existing Mont Orgueil Castle which was by then deemed insufficient to defend the island and the port of St Helier. The main citadel was designed by Paul Ivy in 1594,[37] whilst the lower islet was strengthened by a bastion wall in 1636 (both are prominent in P923 (Fig. 6.17), which is dated 1650, whilst P924 is dated 1651). In 1643 the Parliamentarians were driven out of Jersey, and over the next few years the Royalist governor, Sir George Carteret, made further improvements to the defences. The Prince of Wales visited the castle in 1646 and again, but then as Charles II in September 1649, staying in the Governor's House, having been proclaimed King by Carteret, despite the abolition of the monarchy in England, in February 1649. In 1651, a windmill was constructed halfway between Fort Charles and the Lower Ward, and in the same year, the Parliamentarian forces landed in Jersey and bombarded the castle with mortars. The destruction of the medieval abbey church in the heart of the castle complex which had been used as the storehouse for ammunition and provisions forced Carteret to surrender on 15 December 1651 after being besieged for seven weeks. Jersey was held by Parliamentarians for the next nine years until the restoration of the monarchy.

Calais was captured by the English in 1346–7, and during the fifteenth century the English built a number of artillery fortifications; in 1556 the engineer John Rogers became surveyor of works. The French captured Calais just two years later, and during the 1560s they employed the Italian engineer Castriotti to improve the town's defences, but in 1596 the Spanish took the town by surprise and then undertook to further strengthen the defences themselves. Spanish occupation lasted two years, and in 1598the French engineer Jean Errard was charged with strengthening and modernising the fortifications. Over the next decade he extended and remodelled the fortifications, both the town's defences and outlaying fortifications. Further work was undertaken during the 1630s, and by 1640 the town was considered to be a well-protected up-to-date fortified town. As a result, the fortifications remained largely unaltered until the last quarter of the seventeenth century when the great military engineer Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban visited Calais (in 1675) to survey the fortifications, and as a result, the fortifications were considerably remodelled.[38]

in order to sketch all sides of a fortification (e.g. at Dover, at Fort Elizabeth and at Pevensey).

37 Also known as Paul Ive, he was the Queen's Engineer. He wrote *The Practice of Fortifications* (London: Thomas Orwin, 1589), and was active in Jersey in the 1590s, when he was responsible for work at both Elizabeth Castle and Mont Orgueil.

38 See http://www.fortified-places.com/calais/. In 1824, Joseph Mallord William Turner sketched Calais, with the Fort Rouge and Fortifications. This work is part of the Tate's collection.

Figure 6.18 Wenceslaus Hollar, *Calais*, etching, 60 x 140 mm.
(The Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library, University of Toronto) (P935)

Hollar's *Calais* (P935 – Fig. 6.18) features the pre-Vauban harbour fortifications of Calais.

Hollar also etched several other castles during this time including *Queensborough Castle* (P948) on the Isle of Sheppy. Built during the reign of Edward III to protect the Thames Estuary against French raids, it was stormed in 1450 by Jack Cade. Repaired in 1530 (Henry VIII's influence is obvious in Hollar's view) and again in 1588, it was condemned and destroyed by Parliamentarian forces in 1650. Hollar made several etchings of *Bramber Castle* in Sussex (P944–6), which by 1650 was in a ruinous state (local legend has it that the eleventh century castle was the site of a skirmish fought in the village in about 1642. Apparently, Parliamentarian cannon were set up in the transepts of the church).

During the first half of the seventeenth century, Windsor Castle underwent almost a continual process of survey and repair, but works ceased in 1637. One of the earliest acts of the Civil War, in October 1642, was the occupation of the castle by Parliamentarian forces. Whilst the plate and ornaments of the castle were seized and sold, the actual fabric of the castle escaped relatively lightly.[39] Windsor Castle remained in Parliamentarian hands throughout the Civil Wars, until the Restoration of Charles II in 1660.

Yet even prior to the Restoration, Elias Ashmole was already collecting materials for his great work on the Order of the Garter.[40] Amongst its illustrations are Hollar's views of the castle, drawn between 1659 and 1663.[41] The bird's-eye view, *Windsor Castle* (P1072) (Fig. 6.19) from the south-east is remarkable and demonstrates Hollar's skill as no other work by him does. As Gillian Tindall says, Hollar's "breathtaking view of Windsor Castle was a triumph of calculated perspective from a viewpoint he could never actually have adopted, either in reality or by any mechanical device".[42] Christopher Wren drew the profile view of the castle and Hollar etched his drawing.

During his lifetime, Hollar produced studies of a number of other fortifications. He drew the medieval walls of *Brussels* (P731), *Reinbruck Zolhaus* (P790) and the defences at *Schenkenschanz* (near Cleves) (P769). In addition to these works specifically of military subjects, there are a number of Hollar prints featuring fortifications as a backdrop, or as part of a wider landscape. Examples included *Coblentz* (P709), *Wesel* (P714), *Kampen* (P772) and *Edinburgh* (P973); the latter, viewed from the south in 1670, featuring both the castle and the city walls. He was in London during the summer of 1665 when the Great Plague was at its height, and at least one of Hollar's

39 St George's Chapel had the lead stripped off its roof by Parliamentarian troops, although Hollar shows the roof to be intact. See Anne Thackray, *Caterpillars and Cathedrals* (Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library, University of Toronto, 2010), catalogue entry no. 64, pp. 82–83.

40 *History of the Most Noble Order of the Garter and the Several Orders of Knighthood in Europe* (London: J. Macock for Nathanael Brook, 1672).

41 The illustrations were etched, with some details finished with engraving, as was Hollar's normal practice.

42 Gillian Tindall, *The Man who Drew London: Wenceslaus Hollar in reality and imagination* (London: Chatto & Windus, 2003), p. 132.



Figure 6.19 Wenceslaus Hollar, *Windsor Castle*, etching with engraving, 300 x 362 mm. (The Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library, University of Toronto) (P1072). From Elias Ashmole, *The Institution, Laws & Ceremonies of the most Noble Order of the Garter* (London: 1672).

views of the City of London from Islington (*By Islington*, P916), features the remains of Fort Royall, the northernmost fort in London's defences. In 1666, he was named *Scenographus regius* by Charles II but the Great Fire of that year brought to an end Hollar's projected view of the entire city.

A Portuguese possession from 1471, Tangier, a city covering several square miles on the south side of the entrance to the Mediterranean was given to Charles II as part of the dowry when he married Portuguese Infanta Catherine of Braganza. Sir Martin Beckman, a draughtsman and military engineer, visited the city in 1661 and made plans of Tangier and proceeded to erect a number of fortifications. His plans were sent back to England and on 28 February 1662 Samuel Pepys wrote in his *Diary* that he presented to the Duke of York from Lord Sandwich "a fine map of Tangiers, done by one Captain Martin Beckman, a Swede, that is with my lord. We stayed looking over

it a great while with the duke."[43] In 1663, Beckman informed the new governor of Tangier, the Earl of Teviot, that to adequately fortify the city would cost in the region of £200,000. Beckman was subsequently dismissed.

Hollar had already attempted to map Tangier from a written description (and possibly from Beckman's earlier plan), but finding this method unsatisfactory, he successfully petitioned King Charles II in 1668/1669 for permission to travel to Tangier, saying:

> …for although there is a large Map [of Tangier], & done by my owne Hande, but the same being performed onely upon the Authors tradition by Word of mouth, and my owne bringing into Method (Except the dimensions of its Circumference which I question not) I conceive, that if one should compare the Print, with the thing it selue as I intende to doe if I come thither he should fine but little likeness, and perhaps quite another thing whereof partly I know some Considerable faults already…[44]

Appointed as '*his Majestie's Scenographer or Designer of Prospects*', he joined the 1669 expedition led by Henry Howard, grandson of Hollar's former patron. Hollar's 'first prospect' of the town's fortifications was dated September 1669, by which time the fortifications were quite extensive and included works called by such names as 'Peterborough Tower', 'Whitehall Fort', 'Monmouth Fort', and 'Charles Fort', which was one of the strongest points of Tangier's outer defences, finally succumbing to Moorish attack in 1680.

His views of Tangier represent his greatest single contribution to the illustration of seventeenth-century military engineering and are worthy of study in their own right.[45] He worked in Tangier in an official capacity, undoubtedly working closely with the military, although his appointment was not a military one. He drew the city from various perspectives. *Tangier from the S.W.* (P1199) (Fig. 6.20) is one of the best general views of the defences. It shows the southern defences, both the ramparts and the forts and bastions, including Peterborough Tower, Catherine Fort and the Irish Battery. A feature of Tangier's defences typical elsewhere was the use of masonry for the construction of the main defences, whilst smaller outer works were often constructed from earth, turf and wood. Such works were quick and easy to construct.

A feature of Tangier's defences typical elsewhere was the use of masonry for the construction of the main defences, whilst smaller outer-works were often constructed from earth, turf and wood. Such works were quick and easy to construct. *Prospect of Tangier from the S.E.* (P1077) (Fig. 6.21) is another view featuring a number of

43 Samuel Pepys, *Diary*, https://www.pepysdiary.com/diary/1662/02/.

44 *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic, 1668–1669*, ed. F.H. Blackburn Daniell (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1894), p. 256.

45 Gillian Williams, 'Wenceslaus Hollar in Tangier', *History Today*, Vol. 33, no. 3 March 1983, and Simon Turner, *Things Resembling Graves & Solid Rocks: Wenceslaus Hollar and Tangier in 1669*, unpublished lecture, York, September 2012.



Figure 6.20 Wenceslaus Hollar, *Tangier from the South West* (1673), etching, 156 x 450 mm. (The Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library, University of Toronto) (P1199). From Hollar's *Divers Prospects in and about TANGIER…* (London: John Overton, 1673)



Figure 6.21 Wenceslaus Hollar, *Tangier from the S.E.* (1673), etching. (The Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library, University of Toronto) (P1201, state 1). From Hollar's *Divers Prospects in and about TANGIER…* (London: John Overton, 1673)



Figure 6.22 Wenceslaus Hollar, *Henrietta Fort* (1673), etching, 130 x 230 mm (The Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library, University of Toronto) (P1197). From Hollar's *Divers Prospects in and about TANGIER…* (London: John Overton, 1673)



Figure 6.23 Wenceslaus Hollar, *Part of Tangier from above* (1673), etching, 130 x 220 mm. (The Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library, University of Toronto) (P1189). From Hollar's *Divers Prospects in and about TANGIER…* (London: John Overton, 1673)

components of Tangier's defences including York Castle and the Upper Castle. On the right is the Mole (which took 10 years to complete) jutting out into the sea,[46] and in the background Spain, demonstrating just how close Tangier was to Europe. This view also demonstrates how the new fortifications were built to complement the existing defences, and is a good example of the differences between the older taller masonry defences and the lower, thicker new fortifications. By way of contrast, Hollar's view of *Henrietta Fort* (P1070) (Fig. 6.22) shows that some of Tangier's fortifications were quite simply built. *Part of Tangier from above* (Fig. 6.23) features the city from outside of the old Water-gate and, in the foreground, two members of the British garrison is one of the best general views of the defences. It shows the southern defences, both the ramparts and the forts and bastions, including Peterborough Tower, Catherine Fort and the Irish Battery. Finally, *A Prospect of the Lands and Forts within ye Line of Communication* provides an extraordinary view from the Castle of Tangier. This exceptional pen and ink drawing with watercolour, now in the British Museum,[47] demonstrates the marriage of old and new fortifications: crenellated stone walls and modern[48] artillery fortifications, largely designed by Bernard de Gomme, Britain's greatest military engineer of the seventeenth century. Whilst the tower of the castle itself, heavily armed with eight artillery pieces, is central to Hollar's prospect, much of the other features are De Gomme's designs, following on from Beckman's earlier work. De Gomme was in Tangier in 1664 and 1665, and his proposed defensive works for 1665 alone were estimated at £32,230.00. Therefore, it is no surprise that British rule at Tangier would last just two decades. In 1679, Sultan Moulay Ismail of Morocco made an unsuccessful attempt to seize the town. He then imposed a crippling blockade which ultimately forced British withdrawal in 1684, the British destroying the town and its port facilities as they left.

Hollar's return from Tangier was not without incident as the fleet taking him back to England encountered Barbary pirates off the coast of Spain.[49] Hollar was on board

46 The Mole was built by Yorkshire miners who also built a settlement on the Atlantic shore between the river and the town, naming it 'Whitby'. See Gillian Williams, 'Wenceslaus Hollar in Tangier', *History Today*, 33, no. 3 (1983), 36–41.

47 http://www.britishmuseum.org/research/collection_online/collection_object_details.aspx?objectId=751067&partId=1&searchText=A+Prospect+of+the+Lands+and+Forts+within+ye+Line+of+Communication&page=1 . Tate Britain's 2011 Watercolour exhibition featured this work. See also Simon Turner's Drawings for prints by Wenceslaus Hollar (http://www.academia.edu/3279577/Drawings_for_prints_by_Wenceslaus_Hollar.

48 'Modern' is relative, since British design was a step or two behind contemporary continental practice. In saying this, however, it needs to be remembered that Tangier was a situation when the engineers Sir Martin Beckman and then Bernard de Gomme were responsible for constructing fortifications under battle conditions, where resources were scarce. Therefore, resourcefulness rather than textbook rules was the order of the day. See Andrew Saunders, Fortress Builder: Bernard de Gomme, Charles II's military engineer (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 2004), pp. 88–105, and also Paul Beckmann's forthcoming book *Fire and Water, Blood and Stone' – the life of Sir Martin Beckmann c.1628–1702.*

49 Tindall, *The Man Who Drew London*, pp. 186–190.

one of the ships involved, and recorded the subsequent action, fought off the coast near Cadiz, on the 18–19 December 1669. Hollar's *Kempthorne's fight with the pirates* (P1247) features the English frigate *Mary Rose* (under the command of Rear-Admiral John Kempthorne), escorting several merchantmen as they encounter several pirate ships.[50]

Returning to London, Hollar spent his last remaining years in poverty, dying on 25 March 1677. He is buried in St Margaret's Church, Westminster.

Undoubtedly, Hollar was a master etcher, and his work is still much appreciated by connoisseurs. During his lifetime, he illustrated a number of books and produced the celebrated *London before and after the fire* of 1666; in all, some 3,000 plates are credited to him. He was first and foremost an artist, and as such, he sometimes presented an entire event in a single image (as did other artists of his time), and some of his works are copies of others. Therefore, one should not automatically take the information about seventeenth-century fortifications conveyed in his prints and drawings at face value. The remarkable 'truth-to-reality' quality which Hollar manages to convey in his prints, even ones in which we know he must be depicting what was not there – e.g. some of his interior views of 'St Paul's Cathedral' – adds to the risk of considering everything he drew to be accurate reportage. Sometimes it is clear that he is depicting a view which he could not possibly have seen: his *Windsor Castle* (P1072) is a convincing but constructed bird's-eye view.

Of course his works contain the occasional inaccuracy and inconsistency: for instance, his 1670 view of *Edinburgh* (P973). In this otherwise impressive work (and a personal favourite of the author's), Hollar has omitted the 'Telfer Wall' which should be plainly visible, whilst his location of certain of the towers and gates along the city wall does not match with other accounts, nor does his naming and numbering of various landmarks. Given these facts, and the lack of other Scottish views by Hollar (which would be expected to exist if he had visited Scotland in person), it could be concluded that Hollar did not actually make this study of Edinburgh from real-life, but based it on the accounts and views of others. Added to this, there is at least one instance (Tangier) of Hollar expressing his preference for drawing from real life, not from the descriptions of others.

At the outbreak of the Civil Wars, few British towns had permanent artillery fortifications (the exceptions being Berwick-upon-Tweed, Plymouth and Portsmouth, the latter noted by the Earl of Clarendon as "the strongest and best fortified town in the Kingdom"[51]), and the fortifications constructed during the Civil Wars were built quickly, and largely demolished soon after. Urban fortifications across mainland

50 In his view, the *Mary Rose* and another warship are protecting three merchantmen. In a calm sea, six pirate ships pass the English fleet, whilst there is a French ship to the lower left. On the horizon, another pirate ship is chasing a single merchantman, possibly the *King David.* Captured by pirates, she was the only English loss. Despite being damaged in the action, the *Mary Rose* held off the pirate fleet and Hollar made it safely home to London. After repairs at Cádiz the *Mary Rose* reached England in April 1670, and Kempthorne was knighted for his valour.

51 Quoted by Ross, p. 17.

Europe were far more permanent affairs, highlighting that warfare was relatively commonplace on the Continent. This comes across in Hollar's works: so many of his Continental views feature contemporary fortifications, whilst in Britain, such features represent the exception rather than the norm. But this doesn't mean that his non-British views should be ignored by Civil War historians; quite the opposite in fact, as given European influence on Civil War military engineering, there were considerable similarities between fortifications particularly in the Low Countries and those in Britain. Returning to Hyde Park Fort, what was previously known about it is based upon a single contemporary account, and the interpretation of eighteenth and nineteenth century maps, the interpretation of the remains of a short section of earthwork in Hyde Park itself, and finally the knowledge that a substantial fort had to be built at this location to protect a major route into London from the west. So his drawings present a unique glimpse of what the forts defending London would have actually looked like, and the look and size of the fort's features in his drawings compare favourably with the dimensions of other known forts. Indeed, such is the scarcity of contemporary illustrations of English Civil War fortifications that Hollar's drawings represent not only an important contribution to the study of London's defences, but also to the study of Civil War fortifications in general.

Though Wenceslaus Hollar was neither an architect nor a military engineer, and his images were not intended as technical illustrations, they are not just vague impressions either. He was not the only artist to cover mid-seventeenth century military subjects, yet few other artists can compare with either the range of subjects he featured, or their geographical spread; and Hollar's images of the fortifications of mid-seventeenth century England are often unique. As such, they are an important and fascinating resource for the student of seventeenth-century fortress warfare.

Finally, there are several places where digitised copies of Hollar's works can be viewed online. The Fisher Library at the University of Toronto is the third largest repository for his works after the Royal Collection and the National Gallery Collection of Prints and Drawings in Prague. The Fisher Library has been extremely generous to the author, particularly in allowing the reproduction of a number of images from their collection.

The Fisher Library's collection is at:
https://hollar.library.utoronto.ca/

The Royal Collection is at:
https://www.royalcollection.org.uk/collection/search#/page/1

The National Gallery Collection of Prints and Drawings can be searched at:
http://www.ngprague.cz/en/vyhledat/?search=hollar

The British Museum is at:
http://www.britishmuseum.org/research/collection_online/search.aspx.

7

Michael Jones and the Defeat of Royalist Ireland 1647–9

Jon Day

Introduction

Why should Michael Jones be of interest today? Quite simply, because of Oliver Cromwell. The nine months spent by Cromwell in Ireland remains the most contentious aspect of the Wars of the Three Kingdoms. But Cromwell fought a war of sieges. He did not face a single Royalist army in the field. Why that was so is one of the most significant questions posed by his campaign. Yet almost all accounts, past and recent, begin with his arrival in Dublin in summer 1649, with only a cursory look at the backstory to his consequent victories.

Michael Jones fills the gap. In 1647–49 the English Parliament's forces in Leinster commanded by Jones defeated two Royalist armies and neutralised a third so that Cromwell was not obliged to fight any battles at all. In doing so, Jones killed more Royalist soldiers than Cromwell was to do but without attracting the opprobrium that Cromwell did in his sieges. Indeed, he seems to have been the Roundhead the Irish found it easiest to do business with.

This period is not new ground from an Irish or indeed American academic perspective.[1] The English dimension pre-Cromwell has, however, been neglected. A 1920s hagiography by Archibald Kerr made Jones a hero of Ulster Unionism; and with a few honourable exceptions most subsequent accounts either ignore him or represent him as an apolitical bit-player in Cromwell's war. The evidence paints a different picture. It also casts fresh light on the brutality of the campaign on all sides.

Jones' Background[2]

Michael Jones was the second son of Lewis Jones, a worldly and mildly corrupt bishop in the Protestant Church of Ireland. The family had lent and married well, and was at

1 See especially work by Clarke, Gentles, Lenihan, Ohlmeyer, O Siochriu and Wheeler, which I will acknowledge properly when this paper is expanded into a book.

2 Muster rolls and pay warrants trace Michael Jones' military career under Ormonde until 1643. His political influence appears in the Journal of the Irish House of Commons and Ormonde's correspondence. Jones in Cheshire is covered in Dore's Letterbooks of Sir William Brereton, where much of the material was drafted by him.

the heart of the planter establishment. Michael's elder brother Henry, another cleric but an idealistic academic, played a prominent part in the 1641 Irish Catholic uprising, writing the first lurid account of the pogroms against Protestants and acquiring a taste for espionage. The brothers were to work closely together throughout the conflict.

Born around 1610, Michael was a pragmatic puritan who left Ireland for London to train as a lawyer at Lincoln's Inn and went to the bar before returning to Dublin in 1640. By then in his thirties, Michael was clearly highly political, exercising a surprising degree of influence in the Irish Parliament during the early years of the Civil War. Though not an MP, he seems to have been an expert adviser and clerk, and the preferred drafter of choice for legislation of all kinds. In November 1642 Parliament was delayed sitting for a week until Michael could be recalled from the Naas garrison where he commanded an infantry company.

Between 1641 and 1644, as the civil war in Ireland ebbed and flowed, Michael Jones successfully balanced these political and military commitments. He served with the Earl of Ormonde's Leinster army, Royalist Protestants whose commander sought to defeat the Irish Catholic Confederation while releasing troops to fight with King Charles I in England. Jones' company served under the notoriously brutal Sir Charles Coote and then the more liberal Earl of Kildare, enabling him to acquire wide practical military expertise, especially in garrison warfare.

In late 1643, as part of complex negotiations by Ormonde to agree a cessation of hostilities in Ireland, thereby releasing a surge of Royalist reinforcements for England, Jones authored a petition to the King urging him to protect Irish Protestant interests. It had little effect. Indeed, Jones came under pressure to take his own company to England to fight for the Royalists. Many officers in Ormonde's army felt stronger loyalties to Parliament than the Crown, and were convinced that the deal done with the Catholic Confederation amounted to a betrayal of English and Protestant interests. There is considerable evidence that Michael Jones took that view.

Despite promotion to major, in spring 1644 he disappeared from Ormonde's muster rolls in Dublin and reappeared as second in command of a new cavalry regiment raised by the English Parliament's leader in Cheshire, Sir William Brereton. His defection was engineered by Sir Robert King, a prominent Anglo-Irish politician, and he was joined by numbers of similarly minded officers, most notably Sir Charles Coote's younger son Chidley who became a trusted friend.

Around this time, Michael Jones married. This seems to have been both a political alliance and love match. Lady Mary Culme was a widow from a prominent Protestant family in Ireland and evidently shared Michael's politics. Most strikingly, she was already an in-law. Michael's elder brother Henry had previously been wed to Lady Mary's daughter, creating confusion amongst genealogists but reinforcing links between Jones and Culme, and presenting the otherwise childless Michael with a ready-made family.

Michael Jones was an attractive catch for England's Parliamentarians. He was by now an experienced soldier with political nous and extensive contacts in Dublin. Cheshire was the maritime gateway to Ireland, and both a threat and an opportunity.

Michael threw himself into England's war and rapidly proved a capable foil for the more cautious Brereton. He gained a deserved reputation for leading cavalry from the front and for being careless of his own safety. Brereton's Letter Books show Michael developing as a commander, learning the more nuanced requirements of strategy, command, logistics and intelligence, and acquiring the ability to meld together troops of different backgrounds and quality. He played critical roles in the battles of Rowton Heath and Denbigh Green, and was highly influential throughout the siege of Chester. His firebrand leadership was popular with officers and soldiers, and he was able to inspire on the battlefield, talk down mutineers and seduce defectors. But Jones was also a demanding subordinate, corresponding with London behind Brereton's back, scheming with Brereton's local political enemies and challenging Brereton's military authority in councils of war. And there are hints of the brutality with prisoners that he would show on return to Ireland.

Nonetheless, Colonel Michael Jones ended the English Civil War on a high note. Following the fall of Chester in January 1646 he was appointed Parliament's governor, a commensurate reward for five years' active service. He now had a military record that bore comparison with any of Parliament's regional commanders. Though sympathetic to the Independents, he had also remained aloof from sectarian politics in England and enjoyed widespread trust in Whitehall as a result.

Unfinished Business[3]

Like many Civil War officers, Jones' correspondence gives off a strong whiff of avarice. In this he was his father's son. But even with the Chester governorship, his financial circumstances were genuinely straitened. Though Parliament had been generous in its rewards, obtaining payment was another matter. In 1646, when the war in England petered out, Jones was owed £4,700 in arrears and debts; and with the Royalist Ormonde still in control of Dublin, he had no means of mobilising his family connections (Bishop Lewis Jones was owed £1,748 when he died that year).

So when Parliament's attention returned to the unfinished pre-war business of England's control of Ireland, it was unsurprising that one of the officers from regional armies keen to help the new Lord Lieutenant, Lord Lisle, reassert English domination was Colonel Michael Jones. Indeed, Jones persuaded Brereton, from whom he had been estranged, to support his case. This enthusiasm was as much about a regular income as politics. In July Jones was offered command of a cavalry regiment to be raised from disbanded units in Cheshire, along with the Deputy Governorship of Dublin, although it is likely that when recruiting started he took over the rump of Lisle's Regiment instead. Either way, the mutinous mood of Parliament's unpaid soldiery meant that raising the regiments for Ireland was delayed.

In the meantime the moderate Lisle became a victim of London politics as power shifted to the New Model Army and Cromwell's Independents. A number

3 This section seeks to integrate Irish academic analysis with detailed English records.

of candidates were touted to replace Lisle but on 9 April 1647 Michael Jones was appointed into the post of commander of Parliament's Leinster forces and Dublin's governor. Although he had no experience of leadership at the highest level, no one in London or Dublin was surprised by the choice. At the outset Jones himself seems to have seen his post as temporary but this may have been a tactic in his enduring campaign to cajole Parliament to send him reinforcements. Throughout his time in command there was little sense anywhere that Jones was not up to the job.

Since Jones' defection in 1644, the war in Ireland had swung against the Royalists and Ormonde. Though the notionally Royalist Catholic Confederation was internally divided, in autumn 1646 its two main armies under the Leinster moderate Thomas Preston and the Ulster hardliner Owen Roe O'Neill were temporarily united to march on Dublin. The campaign failed, largely because Preston and O'Neill could not overcome their political and personal differences. But it was a close-run thing and persuaded Ormonde that his position was no longer tenable. He could no longer balance loyalty to the King, who was now a prisoner of the Presbyterian Scots, with fighting a Confederation that was notionally Royalist, or with the reality of the English Parliament's raw political and military power. As the months passed Ormonde edged ever closer to a deal with London that would transfer Dublin and Leinster to a Protestant Parliament and pre-empt its loss to the Catholic Confederation. When money became a stumbling block Ormonde in effect sold Dublin to the highest bidder and waited for Michael Jones, his erstwhile subordinate, to take possession.

Parliament's takeover happened gradually while Preston, O'Neill and their political masters squabbled. The first English regiments had wintered in Ulster and marched south in March, initially to garrison Drogheda and Trim. A second wave followed to occupy Dublin. Finally, on 7 June 1647 Colonel Jones landed in Dublin accompanied by 2,000 more troops, a party of civilian commissioners including Jones' mentor Sir Robert King, and a full purse to pay his disaffected army and persuade Ormonde to leave.

The prodigal son had returned but his challenges were immense. The army, a mixture of Ormonde's war weary units and Jones' new arrivals, was small and lacked cohesion. Entire regiments were mutinying over pay. Most senior officers were political Ormondists. The commissioners wanted to quit. Thomas Preston and the Confederation's best equipped army was advancing to seize Dublin; and Leinster's Protestant elite fully expected them to succeed.

Round One: Jones and Preston[4]

After prolonged haggling, Ormonde finally disappeared on 28 July, by which time Michael Jones was already well advanced with his first priority, establishing control over his Dublin base. Mutinous troops, mainly the newcomers, were faced down, in

4 Lenihan's analysis of Dungan's Hill in his 2001 *Confederate Catholics At War* is masterly but as he points out he is focusing on Preston rather than Jones. The campaign is covered by seventeenth century accounts from both sides.

some cases using musket fire and the prospect of grapeshot. Discipline was imposed on newly arrived soldiers and local regiments who stepped out of line were threatened with disbandment. A comprehensive muster on 28 June was used as a baseline for a remodelling which reduced Ormonde's infantry regiments from 11 to seven. This was militarily sensible but also allowed Jones to remove some of the unreconciled Ormondists in the command chain. A similar process was used to streamline the 24 cavalry troops Jones had inherited. By high summer the Leinster army had been reorganised into 13 foot regiments with 6,700 pikemen and musketeers, three cavalry regiments of 1,460 horse and a mobile artillery train. Dundalk, Drogheda and Trim were garrisoned by reliable officers, and food was being gathered in to Dublin. Though the commissioners had contributed little, Jones had nonetheless started to assert his political primacy over Ormonde's Dublin establishment.

Jones' first move beyond Dublin will, however, have stretched the patience of even his strongest advocates. On 15 July Thomas Preston's 8,000 strong army advanced on Naas, one of the garrisons handed over by Ormonde. Jones demonstrated his self confidence and determination to take the initiative by advancing south to meet him. Preston had a justifiable reputation for avoiding pitched battles and had deployed defensively behind a bog. But Jones took with him only 3,000 men and even Preston was emboldened to attack. The Parliamentarian foot quickly broke under fire and would have been slaughtered had Preston followed up. As it was, Jones' cavalry mounted a fighting withdrawal to cover the rout, and Jones escaped with a salutary lesson about the risks of allowing an enemy too great an advantage in numbers. But Naas fell and was followed by Maynooth, where some of the Protestant garrison were executed. Dublin's mood was bleak, with Preston's appearance expected daily.

Yet the cautious Preston did not come. Instead of attacking Dublin he moved north-west to besiege Trim. Jones once again seized the initiative. In early August he reinforced his Dublin regiments from his last remaining garrisons in Drogheda and Dundalk, and bought in the services of English and Scots Protestants from Ulster. Everyone in Dublin knew that this was a desperate gamble. On 4 August Jones gathered 5,000 foot, 1,500 horse and nine guns at the Hill of Tara. It would have been the end for Parliamentarian Dublin, and probably Protestant Ireland, had he lost the ensuing battle. But Jones' reinforcements had changed the calculus. The two armies were now broadly equivalent: Preston still numbered at least 6,000 infantry in nine regiments, one of which comprised 500 Scots highland veterans, plus more than 1,000 cavalry and four heavy cannon. Nonetheless, when Jones advanced towards Trim, Preston raised the siege, withdrew and again took refuge behind bogs and the River Boyne.

This should have been stalemate. Jones' Ulster auxiliaries were reaching the end of their contracts, and O'Neill was marching to Preston's assistance and urging delay. Yet Preston acted with uncharacteristic bravado. Whether in response to faulty intelligence about the size of the Dublin garrison, overconfidence following the rout at Naas or jealousy of O'Neill, on 7 August Preston broke camp and marched for Dublin, expecting to leave Jones in his tracks.

Although Preston was unavoidably delayed when a wagon threw its wheel in a ford, most of his subsequent bad luck was self-inflicted. He misjudged his army's ability to outmarch Jones, especially with 2,500 sheep and cattle, heavy artillery and a baggage train in tow; he sent many of his experienced cavalry away on a raid and placed the remainder under an untried commander; and when Jones came into sight he drew up on Dungan's Hill in a formation which divided the already outnumbered cavalry into three penny packets. By contrast, Jones reacted quickly on discovering that Preston was on the move; used his cavalry to follow closely Preston's march; and seized the tactical initiative to turn the action into an encounter battle, which played to the Parliamentarians' strengths. The highly experienced Sir Henry Tichborne helped him to marshal the army as it deployed.

Neither side used their artillery effectively but once the Parliamentarian horse appeared en masse Jones attacked on both flanks.[5] All three of Preston's formations were quickly routed, one as it sought to debouch from a narrow lane. Many officers and men fled without making contact. The Parliamentarian right wing also overran the Confederate artillery. As usual Jones led the charge from the front, probably on the left where Preston's broken troopers were chased from the field.

The cavalry battle demonstrated the clear superiority of Jones' regiments. The balance of advantage between the infantry formations was, however, much closer. Both sides were experienced and similarly equipped, and Preston had placed eight of his nine regiments behind the thick hedgerows bordering a large wheat field which gave them the kind of protection enjoyed by Spanish troops in the Low Counties, where he had learned his trade. The infantry battle around this ad hoc fieldwork was therefore tougher and longer. Only when Jones' English regiments advanced under fire to within half pistol shot of the defenders, volleyed and then stormed the hedges was the wheat field breached.

Even then the 5,000 or so Confederate infantry behind the hedgerows did not follow the fleeing cavalry. At the western base of Dungan's Hill was a large bog which offered at least minimal protection from Jones' horse. Between the two features the Scots highland regiment known as 'redshanks' was still standing. As the regiments from the wheat field began to retreat towards the bog, the redshanks fought a bitter covering action, repeatedly charging down the hill to drive back the advancing Parliamentarians. Though their losses were heavy some redshanks escaped through the bogs. The reprieve they won for the Confederate foot was, however, only temporary. Some of their officers attempted to rally the 3,000 infantry in the bog but the Parliamentarian horse and foot quickly hemmed them in.

Jones' official report described in detail the subsequent massacre: 'our foot followed into the bog, where they put to the sword all not admitted to quarter; such of the rebels as left the bog fell into the power of our horse. Of the slain there were upon the place reckoned 5,470, besides those after gleaned up, which were very many; of the enemy's

5 Lenihan thinks an attack on both flanks at the same time is unlikely.

foot there could not escape above 500'. According to Jones the dead included 400 of the highlanders, all deserters from the Leinster Army and all Englishmen. Receiving quarter was in practice a class-based affair. Only 241 other ranks were taken prisoner but 126 officers were also captured and only one officer seems to have been killed. Confederate sources claimed that quarter was offered, granted and then breached, and painted a vivid picture of thousands of dead soldiers manacled together after having surrendered. They blamed the Ulster Scots, Tichborne and Moore's Regiment for the slaughter, though contemporary accounts suggested that the Leinster cavalry were also heavily involved. Jones himself protected officers seeking quarter when they were brought to him. By contrast, the Parliamentarian army lost fewer than 60 men though many more were wounded in the bitter fighting.

With hindsight it was in the interests of both sides to advertise the imbalance in casualties. Confederates stressed their enemies' brutality and Jones' willingness to breach the provisions of quarter. Jones' partisans emphasised the scale of his victory, the deterrent and attritional effect on their much larger opponents, and retaliation for the earlier atrocity at Maynooth. Either way, there could be no doubt that 8 August 1647 was an overwhelming Parliamentarian victory. Preston's army had been destroyed at Dungan's Hill and his reputation with it. Some said he had fled with his cavalry, others that he had stayed on for a time with the infantry. The truth did not matter. On the other side, Jones' reputation was made, especially when he sensitively refused to parade Preston's colours through Dublin's streets. Cromwell wrote a personal letter of congratulation, the first surviving correspondence between them.

On returning to Dublin two days later, Jones exploited his success by putting the onus on Parliament to follow it up. In a detailed letter of 12 August, he explained that he could have advanced deep into the Confederacy, and perhaps even defeated it, had he had the requisite pay, wagons, provisions and cavalry remounts. As it was, he had been obliged to abandon the campaign and even sequester 64 oxen seized from Preston and passed to the Leinster soldiers in lieu of pay; and he would be unable to prosecute the war speedily through the winter without replacement horses for the cavalry. In the absence of replenishment from London, Jones warned, the enemy would quickly recover. However, the enemy about whom he was concerned was now not Thomas Preston but Owen Roe O'Neill.

Round Two: Jones and O'Neil[6]

O'Neill is a hero of Irish freedom. At Benburb in 1646 his Ulster army won the Confederation's greatest victory of the war and he has retained widespread admiration for sticking to his religious and political principles at almost any price. But these principles made him anathema to the moderate faction controlling the Kilkenny-based Confederation in August 1647. They had also torn his army apart to such a degree

6 Henry Jones wrote a very detailed account of the Athboy campaign which should be set against Casway's biography of O'Neill.

that after Dungan's Hill, O'Neill was unable to move from Connaught to tackle Jones in Leinster until he had suppressed a major mutiny by more than half of his own regiments. He then remained near Kilkenny to deter an offensive by the Munster Parliamentarian Lord Inchiquin. It was only once Inchiquin retreated that O'Neill was able to advance north to fill the gap created by Preston's defeat. His army lived off the land, accompanied by a tail of families who terrified Leinster civilians and were often characterised as a malign caterpillar. From Michael Jones' perspective, O'Neill posed a very different challenge. Not only were his Leinster forces likely to be outnumbered, especially in infantry, but he would have to ensure that the caterpillar was unable to strip the Province clean of crops and livestock, thereby starving Dublin into submission. That meant establishing and retaining control of as much of the Province as possible, which in turn meant the planting of as many garrisons as his army could sustain.

Jones decided to kill two birds with one stone. In early October 1647, as O'Neill finally advanced, Jones gathered a similar-sized army to that deployed for Dungan's Hill. It comprised 3,600 foot, 1,000 horse and 6 cannon from Dublin, joined by substantial reinforcements from Ulster under Colonel Monk, Drogheda and Dundalk. By 7 October the army was over 8,000 strong, capable enough to face O'Neill, who had taken up a robust defensive position at Castle Jordan in the Boyne valley. O'Neill had reinforced Preston's network of garrisons but Jones was strong enough to capture and occupy them. If he did so, it was expected that O'Neill would come to their defence, thereby bringing on the rerun of Dungan's Hill that Jones wanted.

Delay suited O'Neill since Jones would be draining forces as he manned captured garrisons, Monk and the other auxiliaries would not stay indefinitely and Jones did not have a protected supply base. Jones therefore began by sweeping down the Boyne valley from Trim to trail his coat within 10 miles of Castle Jordan. In two days his army took four of O'Neill's strong points, three on quarter and one, Portlester, after a 42-shot cannonade. The Portlester garrison held out because O'Neill had promised to relieve them inside 24 hours; he did not appear and the garrison either fled or were executed. Jones put 120 musketeers into Castle Rickard and 10 into Donore Castle, and then changed tack, marching north to the town of Athboy, O'Neill's biggest garrison, strongly defended by six towers and more than 300 soldiers. Before Jones could formally issue a summons, some of the advance guard stormed the town gate without orders. To forestall a counter-attack Jones committed successive waves of reinforcements, who quickly took the town, though five of the towers held out. When eventually they too asked for quarter Jones pragmatically granted it to avoid unnecessary casualties. Athboy was of such strategic significance that Jones placed in it a full infantry regiment and a strong party of cavalry. O'Neill had again promised his garrison that he would raise any siege, in this instance within 48 hours. Once more he did not appear and the likelihood was that he was not prepared to sortie out in any circumstances.

Now that a pitched battle appeared improbable, Jones' other objective of planting garrisons would be easier to pursue. On 9 October his army therefore marched north through Kells to capture three especially well-defended strongpoints, Cruises and Nobber Forts, and Bellahoe Castle, all of which surrendered on quarter and received

Parliamentarian garrisons. With food running out, Jones also used the cavalry to escort convoys from Dublin and for rustling missions into Cavan (1,000 cows and 3,000 sheep on one day alone). On 14 October Jones and Monk decided to bring the operation to a close and return home by different routes. Monk borrowed a saker cannon and used it to capture two crannogs being used as larders. Jones planted four more new garrisons before re-entering Dublin on 19 October.

O'Neill remained a latent threat at Castle Jordan but the immediate danger was past and Jones had done a great deal to secure Leinster for the longer term, establishing 10 garrisons across the north of the Province and establishing control over the main routes in and out. The down side was that an additional two regiments of foot and one of horse were now manning those garrisons so that his pool of field army forces was reduced. That made him more vulnerable to O'Neill through the autumn and winter months, should the Kilkenny government choose to point him in Jones' direction.

They did. In late October O'Neill was ordered to march into the counties of Meath and Dublin to spend up to eight days burning crops and harassing Jones' garrisons. O'Neill was reluctant but feared losing his winter quarters if he refused so on 1 November he led an army estimated at 8,000 to 10,000 strong, including most of Preston's cavalry, across the River Boyne and past the unburied corpses on Dungan's Hill. The limited objectives were at odds with the forces allotted to the raid but a short destructive campaign could still have strategic effect.

The Parliamentarians' initial response seems to have been coordinated by Tichborne, who directed reinforcements to Trim as early as 29 October and took seven troops of horse to shadow the advance. Jones left Dublin with additional cavalry on 3 November and his cousin, Colonel Marcus Trevor, bumped into O'Neill's main force crossing a bridge near Clonee the next day. Jones immediately ordered out all available troops in Dublin but was still not strong enough to intervene as O'Neill began to torch the villages of the Fingale region north of the capital. Only at midnight on 4 November did Jones learn that Tichborne and three cavalry regiments had arrived in Dublin, allowing him at last an offensive option. He ordered a rendezvous the next morning at Piercetown. By this time, however, 200 fires were burning across Fingale and Parliamentarian garrisons were in ashes.

Jones' rapid reaction had, however, taken O'Neill by surprise. When on 5 November Ulster scouts found the Leinster cavalry advancing to cut off O'Neill's line of retreat, he recalled his raiding parties and withdrew westwards. The cautious Low Countries veteran felt himself under-prepared for a pitched battle but was unable to outpace Jones' cavalry. Near Ratoath he therefore deployed his regiments, not to fight but to intimidate before the Parliamentarian infantry could join them. This placed Jones in circumstances similar to Dungan's Hill and Tichborne was keen to attack. Jones, however, had reached very different conclusions: it would be foolhardy to fight such an old and experienced soldier without infantry. He had learnt in the preceding weeks that O'Neill 'will keep himself in his securities, and not fight but upon advantage'. That evening O'Neill marched his army away, 20 abreast for security, and Jones let him go, following to pick up stragglers but otherwise accepting that this tactical

stalemate was the best outcome he could hope for. O'Neill continued to burn crops but by 7 November his men had re-crossed the Boyne back towards Castle Jordan.

Jones fell back on a large scale raiding strategy to feed Dublin through the winter, marching deep into Wicklow and Kildare, and planting more garrisons. People complained at shortages yet there was no significant discontent. O'Neill was absorbed by intra-Confederate quarrels and posed little military threat. Indeed in April 1648 the London newsbooks reported that he and Jones were cooperating in a cessation of hostilities. Jones had in effect seduced the Ulster general, always a lukewarm Royalist, into a relationship that endured well into the next year. Though not as dramatic as his battlefield victories, Jones' patient strategy, described at the time as 'bread and elbowroom', was as great a success. Moreover, from Parliament's perspective, their colonel in Dublin was sometimes high maintenance but delivered what they required: a stable Leinster which provided a secure platform for the eventual reconquest of all Ireland. In mid 1648, however, the picture deteriorated.

Round Three: Jones and Ormonde

A May 1648 muster roll shows Jones' army at its likely peak.[7] He was paying 7,821 infantrymen and 2,169 cavalry, almost 10,000 men including 1,650 officers. Outside Dublin a chain of major garrisons ran from Drogheda through Trim, Athboy, Maynooth, Naas and Kildare to Wicklow. During the following summer and autumn Jones and Monk mounted more raids against Confederation garrisons such as the supposedly impregnable Ballisonan, using heavy artillery to hole castle walls, infantry to storm the breaches and the judicious offer of quarter to avoid Parliamentarian casualties. But by summer 1649 only Dublin remained in Parliamentarian hands, Monk had surrendered and Jones alone confronted a hostile coalition that could in principle field over 20,000 men.

This change in Ireland's strategic environment was the achievement of Jones' former commander, the Royalist James Butler, Earl of Ormonde. It was, however, initiated by Lord Inchiquin, Parliament's commander in Munster, who in April 1648 signed a truce with the Confederation and changed sides. Ormonde exploited the opportunity and landed in Cork in the following October. Although the immediate effect was to split the Confederation and provoke a Catholic civil war, isolating O'Neill as 'a traitor and rebel against the King', these events opened the door to a Royalist revival that quickly put Jones onto the strategic defensive.

In July Jones was a direct beneficiary of Inchiquin's defection, receiving more than £50,000 originally designated for Munster. But by November he was reporting that Dublin was once again in a desperate condition. In the meantime, Parliament's Derby House Committee had recommended that Jones prepare for Ormonde's arrival

7 Carte's biography of Ormonde should be balanced with Jones' voluminous correspondence with London. The Royalists' efforts to subvert Jones are especially interesting as are the contrasting styles of the generals' battle reports. The best account of Rathmines is still Irish Battles by Hayes-McCoy.

by purging the Leinster army of the Earl's former officers. Influential colonels past and present such as Flower, Giffard, Tichborne and Willoughby were among those recalled to England, and though the army's morale will have suffered, events proved this to be a prudent contingency. Jones himself was the target of political subversion. In May, Inchiquin had attempted to persuade him to defect and there is a hint that for a short time London worried about his loyalty. They certainly moved rapidly to settle some of his outstanding financial claims. But over the year Jones sent back sheaves of correspondence, with Inchiquin and latterly Ormonde, which demonstrated his continuing commitment to Parliament. Even the King's execution, which was a powerful recruiting sergeant for many Protestants in Ireland, left Jones publicly unmoved. Indeed, both he and Monk did their own deals with O'Neill to prevent the Royalist coalition from coalescing against Ulster and the Pale.

As a result, Ormonde's winter 1648–9 strategy, to strangle Dublin by land and sea and then prevent Cromwell, Parliament's new commander-in-chief, from gaining a bridgehead elsewhere in Ireland, was a failure. Ormonde therefore adopted an attritional campaign against Jones' garrisons but delayed the beginning of operations until April 1649, when negotiations with Jones had run their course and a new growth of spring grass had appeared to feed the Royalist cavalry. Nonetheless, by the end of June only Trim, Drogheda and Dundalk were still holding out, though O'Neill was still enabling Derry to survive as well.

At this stage, the vacillatory Ormonde held a council of war to choose between taking the three remaining garrisons and a final push on Dublin. Characteristically, he adopted both. Inchiquin quickly captured the garrisons: Trim was abandoned; Monk's Dundalk soldiers deserted en masse and forced him to surrender; and Drogheda followed suite after a 10-day siege. Jones reported that 'many formerly eminent in this army are now revolted, having drawn with them considerable numbers of horse and foot'. Meanwhile 5,000 Royalist foot and 1,800 horse maintained a loose investment of the capital.

With Cromwell assembling a 14,000-strong army in English and Welsh ports, Jones found himself in another race for Dublin, this time between Ormonde and Cromwell. But unlike 1647, in July 1649 Jones was on the spot. Politically, he maintained the strategically vital partnership with O'Neill until it no longer mattered and ensured that Dublin did not rise up against Parliament before Cromwell appeared. Large numbers of Catholics and disaffected Protestants were expelled. Militarily, Jones maintained a posture of active defence. In addition to the medieval walls, an enhanced ring of earth defences now surrounded the city, with over a dozen bastions to the most vulnerable south and half as many again to the north. From behind this platform, Jones launched a series of raids to keep the Royalists off balance. As Ormonde advanced, Jones took 4,000 men and four guns towards Naas to take the initiative and force the Royalists to deploy. Once Ormonde's blockade was in place, the garrison mounted regular sorties, including to preserve access to feed for cavalry horses beyond the walls. Not all succeeded but Jones' personal commitment was inspirational: one report noted he was 'not in his bed these ten nights'. This stage of fighting reflected the accumulated

bitterness of the conflict and the internecine nature of the armies. On 29 July, during a cavalry skirmish beneath the walls, the prisoners taken by Jones included one of his nephews, Richard Elliott, who had defected with Sir Thomas Armstrong's Regiment. Deserters could expect no leniency and Elliott was executed on the walls.

While Ormonde failed to exploit his advantages, in late July the balance around Dublin began to shift decisively against him. One of Cromwell's infantry regiments, Tothill's, had arrived as early as May but it was disaffected, mutinied and thereafter played little active part in the siege. Between 22 and 26 July, however, a more substantial advance guard of 2,000 or more foot and 800 horse arrived at the Ringsands port. Though some of Reynolds' cavalry had joined the Leveller uprising, most had helped to suppress it; and the foot regiments of Huncks, Moore and Venables were loyal and capable – Moore had been one of Jones' original colonels, Venables had recruited his men from Brereton's regiments in Cheshire and Huncks was a Munster veteran. Contemporary accounts are confused about the overall size of the Leinster Army but Clarendon's assertion that Jones deployed 6,000 foot and 1,900 horse is plausible if the figures include the militarily ineffective such as Tothill's foot, the potentially disloyal among Jones' ex-Royalist regiments and the outlying garrison of Rathfarnham. A more relevant figure is the fighting strength of 4,000 foot and 1,200 horse drawn out by Jones on 2 August.

By contrast with Jones' single-minded focus on Dublin, Ormonde continued to disperse his forces, sending Inchiquin with two cavalry regiments on a wild goose chase to Munster and dividing the remaining regiments (some 10,000 strong) between mutually unsupportable camps north and south of the River Liffey. He did, however, make a final effort to bring on a confrontation before Cromwell appeared. On 29 July, following a successful assault on Rathfarnham, his council of war decided to cut Dublin off from the sea by emplacing an artillery battery in the ruined castle of Baggotsrath overlooking Ringsands port. An adjoining breastwork would curtail the parliamentarians' use of the meadows around the city to feed their cavalry horses. The operation would begin by deploying 1,500 foot (plus supporting cavalry) to fortify Baggotsrath overnight on 1 August. Ormonde's expectation was that Jones would be forced to counter-attack on unfavourable terms.

But the attack went awry from the outset. By early morning on 2 August, when Ormonde rode out from his Rathmines headquarters to visit the advance guard, he found they had only just arrived and work on the defences had not begun. Worse, there were signs of Parliamentarian troops gathering south of the city walls. Sensibly, Ormonde ordered the rest of his army to advance and reinforce Baggotrath, but he underestimated Jones' willingness to take the initiative and returned to his tent, either to play cards, rest or complete a dispatch.

Ormonde's advocates sought to cast blame for the Royalists' defeat onto his subordinates. His own account of the battle for the King was a prolonged exercise in self justification. In truth, responsibility lay with the Earl's failure to exercise leadership when it was already apparent that his plans were misfiring. And Jones

ruthlessly exploited this mistake to turn what should have been a tactical skirmish into a second strategic encounter battle.

The appearance of 1,500 Royalist foot plus horse, artillery and pioneers overlooking Jones' main lines of supply prompted precisely the reaction Ormonde had envisaged. According to Jones' report, 'we found a necessity for removing them, and that speedily'. By nine o'clock the Parliamentarians had assembled most of their reliable troops in partially protected ground south and east of the city. Their attack hit the incomplete defences at Baggotsrath before Ormonde's orders to reinforce them were implemented. The Royalist cavalry commanded by Sir William Vaughan, formerly one of Jones' colonels, was smashed in the first charge and lost cohesion when Vaughan was killed. The infantry works were also taken, though 'not without strong dispute: most of the enemy's foot there were slain or taken, their horse having deserted them'.

While Jones had now achieved his initial objective, it was clear that his attack had caught the Royalists unprepared and vulnerable. Ormonde was seeking to rally the troops fleeing from Baggotrath and Inchiquin's experienced infantry were forming a defensive line to protect the camp at Rathmines. Otherwise the remaining regiments were beginning to disintegrate and Lord Dillon, commander of the 2,500 troops north of the Liffey, was refusing to march to the sound of the guns. Jones exploited the growing chaos. His infantry pressed south towards Rathmines, supported by cavalry attacks whenever resistance stiffened. Most destructively, the better part of the cavalry looped south-west along the Dodder valley, to take Rathmines from the rear. Inchiquin's regiments finally broke and fled or surrendered, and Ormonde joined the rout, narrowly evading capture but abandoning his seven artillery pieces, 200 oxen, stores, papers and money.

Rathmines lasted two hours. Unlike Dungan's Hill, there was no agreement as to losses. When Ormonde asked Jones for a list of prisoners he was met with a brush-off: 'Since I routed your army, I cannot have the happiness to know where you are, that I may wait on you'. Jones' private dispatch to London reported 4,000 Royalists killed and 2,517 captured. When these figures were made public, Ormonde rebutted them, claiming that only 600 Royalists were killed, mostly after accepting quarter. He had a political interest in minimising casualties but Royalist deaths were inflicted over a wide area as the broken regiments fled and his own account emphasises the number of officers seeking quarter. A total of around 3,000 killed or captured is therefore credible though possibly an underestimate. By comparison, there were only 20 fatalities among the Leinster Army, although many more were injured and 'the greatest loss fell on the horse, wherein Jones' regiment did much suffer'.

Though he admitted that his intent had been no more than to beat up the enemy's quarters, Jones was not inclined to play down his success: 'Never was any day in Ireland like this, to the confusion of the Irish, and … the restoring of the English interest'. There were no dissenting voices among Parliamentarians; Cromwell described Rathmines as 'an astonishing mercy'. Jones was promoted to lieutenant general, awarded £1,000 per annum and invited to 'choose six of the best horses in Tilbury race … as a gratuity from the House'. Ormonde received a vote of confidence from the new king and prepared to

fight a characteristically defensive war of attrition against Cromwell. His skills were political and he would never again fight on an open battlefield.

Rathmines was the peak of Michael Jones' success as commander of the Leinster Army. He tried to follow up with a *coup de main* against Drogheda but Ormonde had reinforced the garrison and the attempt failed. Cromwell's arrival in Dublin on 15 August brought a rapid changing of the guard. Although Jones became Cromwell's deputy and there seems to have been mutual trust between them in the subsequent campaign, the Leinster Army bequeathed by Jones was rapidly dismembered. Most regiments were disbanded or amalgamated. Only Castle's, Culme's (formerly Flower's), Fenwick's and Moore's foot, together with Jones' and Coote's horse, retained their identities. The perception grew, encouraged deliberately, that the ill discipline of Jones' forces and their overuse of free quarter had placed an intolerable burden on the population. The New Model Army would be different and win hearts and minds. By the time Cromwell was able to put this aspiration into effect, the storming of Drogheda and the slaughter of civilians in a predominantly Protestant town had placed a different perspective on the Irish war.

Jones' Army[8]

Contemporaries recognised Michael Jones' achievements, both as commander in 1647–49 and as Cromwell's deputy until he died from illness on 10 December 1649. Failure at Duncannon did not damage his reputation unduly. But if Jones had provided the launch pad for Cromwell, what were the factors he had been able to exploit? Did the nature of Parliament's Leinster Army give him material and morale advantages over his three opponents?

With few exceptions, books on the war in Ireland have painted Jones' army as an extension of the New Model, with a similar degree of net superiority over its enemies. Only Padraig Lenihan's excellent analysis of Preston's Confederates has pointed out that at Dungan's Hill Jones' regiments 'were not psalm chanting supermen but a ragbag force comprising ex-Royalists of doubtful loyalty that Ormonde left behind, mutinous Parliamentarians … and Old British hirelings'. It is a fair question to ask whether Lenihan's assessment goes too far.

Ex-Royalists

The regiments bequeathed by Ormonde in summer 1647 had indeed fought previously as Royalists. They were the remnants of the 14,000 strong forces raised in 1641–42 to suppress the Catholic uprising. Some were Protestant Irish settlers, some English volunteers. Many had been professional soldiers; others like Michael Jones became professionalised. From 1643 Ormonde had shipped thousands of them to England to

8 Lenihan was the starting point. My aim is to synthesise the wide range of sources such as muster rolls and other official papers; Firth and Davies' *Regimental History of Cromwell's Army*, and the current BCW Project. More work is needed.

join the King but many stayed behind. The vast majority would have been Protestant and Lenihan is right that most would have given their primary loyalty to the King. However, Jones was 'one of them', from a family still prominent in Dublin, and while he was seen to be protecting English and Protestant interests he was the lesser evil compared to a Catholic victory. He also won a decisive battle quickly, to establish his credentials as a successful commander.

By early 1647 the Dublin-based foot totalled only 3,500 in 10 regiments. As described above, Jones remodelled the whole force into seven foot regiments, and in 1648 he purged the remainder of their Ormondist senior officers. Nonetheless, the May 1648 muster suggests that 600 officers and 3,000 foot soldiers were still willing to serve Jones and Parliament. In 1649 some of these regiments capitulated easily to Ormonde, their old general, yet for most of the intervening period Jones seems to have been able to rely on Ormonde's veterans in the field and in garrison. The foot regiments of Colonels Bailey, Flower, Willoughby and Tichborne played major parts in Dungan's Hill and the Earl of Kildare's foot was Jones' reliable default garrison in Dublin when he was absent. But numbers fell in 1649 and are unlikely to have amounted to more than 1,000 infantry by the time of Rathmines. Although none of these regiments (by then commanded by Colonels Borlase, Culme, Kildare and Tichborne) survived under Cromwell, Michael Jones could not have maintained control of Leinster without them.

The ex-Royalist cavalry played a less prominent role. The 24 troops taken over by Jones were of highly variable quality and up to half disappeared during the subsequent remodelling into two regiments. Nonetheless numbers remained at around 650 into 1648 when Ormonde's return in October began a stream of defections including a regimental commander, Sir Thomas Armstrong, and Jones' cousin Colonel Marcus Trevor. By the time of Rathmines it is unlikely that more than 100 or so remained in Dublin.

Muster records suggest that despite Jones' complaints to Parliament, the infantry inherited from Ormonde were equipped to broadly English standards. A detailed 1644 muster of 25 companies identified almost 600 pikes and 1,100 matchlocks, close to the approved one-to-two ratio. A major resupply from London in March 1648 included 468 matchlocks, 200 firelocks and 500 pikes. This gave Jones' local regiments a significant advantage in firepower compared to their Confederate opponents. Preston's army, the best equipped, fielded only a one-to-one ratio of muskets and pikes. The ex-Royalist cavalry troops were less well equipped. One muster of seven troops produced only one pistol per head and one carbine for every three troopers. This was probably the norm but the Confederate horse were unlikely to have been any better.

Whether the Dublin Royalists were indeed of doubtful loyalty depends therefore on when during the period you are considering. Perhaps the tipping point was spring 1649 when Ormonde, their long-standing commander, took the field against them. Until then, most of the veterans served and fought effectively under Jones, and appear to have been largely trusted by him in return.

Mutinous Parliamentarians

According to Lenihan the second element in Michael Jones' army was 'mutinous Parliamentarians'. Some of the English troops raised from disbanded regional forces like Jones' in Cheshire were undoubtedly disaffected or even in arms over outstanding pay arrears before Dungan's Hill. But so was much of the New Model, some of whom were also political dissidents (there is no evidence of Leveller or other extremist activity in Leinster). And the alternative to volunteering was often destitution.

Six infantry regiments were raised across England and Wales, comprising Fenwick's and Hungerford's from Shropshire, Moore's from Lancashire, Castle's from Warwickshire and Worcestershire, Long's from Somerset and Kynaston's from North Wales. They trickled into Ireland from December 1646. They should have numbered 800 soldiers apiece but their summer 1647 musters already totalled only some 3,900 pikemen and musketeers, plus up to 100 officers each. In May 1648 the overall figure had fallen to 3,400 soldiers – although almost 650 officers were now eating up resources. By the time of Rathmines, Jones' outer garrisons had almost all fallen and even English Parliamentarians had defected to Ormonde. Thereafter Cromwell retained and remodelled only three of the six regiments, which suggests that the pool of trusted English veterans was by then no more than 2,400 strong.

Fenwick's Regiment deployed initially to Ulster. From March 1647 it garrisoned Trim, suffering more from disease than Preston's siege. Thereafter it moved to Kildare, Jones' southern front line, and in 1649 was taken on by Cromwell. Four hundred of Moore's men were drowned in a shipwreck en route to Ulster. The remainder occupied Dundalk before fighting at Dungan's Hill and then joining the Dublin garrison. Moore himself raised a new unit and served briefly under Cromwell. Colonel Castle shipped his regiment directly to Dublin in March 1647. It fought at Dungan's Hill and formed part of Jones' Dublin-based marching army. Retained by Cromwell, Castle was killed leading the regiment at Drogheda. Hungerford's foot arrived in Dublin in late April 1647. Following Dungan's Hill it was Drogheda's long term garrison until surrendering to Inchiquin before Rathmines, when 600 soldiers changed sides. Hungerford was recruiting in England but the regiment was still disbanded by Cromwell. Long's arrived in June, served at Dungan's Hill and then garrisoned Dublin and Wicklow. It too was disbanded by Cromwell. If any unit deserved Lenihan's criticism it was Kynaston's foot which came with Jones and promptly mutinied. Jones ordered other regiments to fire on them and some were killed. It seems not to have been at Dungan's Hill and spent most of Jones' era in the Dublin garrison before Cromwell disbanded it.

Notwithstanding their variable quality, the six English regiments formed the core of Jones' army. They were as experienced as Ormonde's veterans, better equipped at the outset and at least as reliable in combat. At Dungan's Hill it was the English foot who shattered Preston's entrenched infantry, 'never discharging a musket until they were within half pistol shot of their ditches'. Five of the six colonels had served alongside Jones in England. All six survived through to Cromwell's arrival, giving

Jones a measure of continuity among his senior commanders. Strikingly, the very different backgrounds of Ormonde's Royalists and the Parliamentarian newcomers did not undermine the army's cohesion. Regiments from both backgrounds were routinely brigaded together and complaints to London about pay and conditions drew no distinction between soldiers' origins. At Athboy 'many were out of clothes and most all were bare-footed and bare legged'.

On receiving an injection of money and supplies in mid 1648 Jones lamented his shortage of infantry: 'Had I but men, I should (God assisting) soon end this war'. However, the decisive contribution made by Jones' Parliamentarians was delivered not by the infantry but by his three English cavalry regiments. Chidley Coote's Cheshire regiment came over via Ulster in early 1647; Jones' regiment accompanied him to Dublin in June; and Ponsonby's Northern Association arrived that October. At Dungan's Hill they probably numbered about 750 but by May 1648 they had expanded to 1,200 plus 240 officers. Despite the loss to Inchiquin of almost all of Coote's Regiment at Drogheda, Jones retained some 1,000 English horse at Rathmines. These figures demonstrate the relative priority attached to cavalry throughout Jones' tenure. They tipped the balance at both Dungan's Hill and Rathmines, enabled Jones to live largely off the land and protected Parliaments own garrisons. Jones' own regiment, probably taken over from Lord Lisle and drawn from the Eastern Association, became his elite strike force and followed him into Cromwell's army. The three units together provided a capability no other Irish army possessed, and both officers and men were well equipped before deployment. They were also better remunerated: a month after Dungan's Hill the 10 English troops uniquely received a generous payment of four weeks in advance. Not surprisingly, there was real concern in Dublin at the impact of an outbreak of horse murrain.

All told, therefore, the nine English regiments who came with Jones to Ireland were not as a whole the mutineers Lenihan suggests. Certainly their record is at least as good as troops from other Parliamentarian regional armies, with whom they should sensibly be compared.

British Hirelings

Lenihan's final claim is that Parliament's success at Dungan's Hill, and by implication more widely, had also depended on those forces he described as 'British hirelings'. He suggests that a significant proportion of Jones' army was made up of these Protestant auxiliaries, co-religionists who were at war with the Confederation and Catholicism, and who were keen to cooperate in fighting them, but did so in return for payment. Many pro-Irish sources argue that the same mercenary impulses motivated others of Jones' allies. It is the case that before raising the siege of Trim his Dublin forces were joined by 700 horse, 1,200 foot and a pair of cannon. Yet a detailed breakdown of the reinforcements shows that most were parts of Jones' own Leinster army, drawn

from Drogheda, Dundalk and other small garrisons[9]. The British contingent under Colonel Conway played a prominent part in the battle, especially the initial cavalry clash, but their role did not compare to that of Ormonde's ex-Royalists or Jones' Parliamentarians.

Indeed, the British contribution to Jones' operations was greater on subsequent occasions. The key to that was his close partnership with Parliament's commander in eastern Ulster, Colonel George Monk, who took over the role in early September 1647. Monk had served originally in Ireland at the same time as Jones but had then fought for the King in Cheshire before being captured and changing sides. Until Ormonde's return, Monk and Jones mounted a series of joint raids which kept O'Neill in particular at bay. The Athboy raid in October 1647 involved 600 horse and 1,400 foot under Monk, and the targets reflected Monk's priorities as well as Jones'. Latterly they both did covert deals with O'Neill which delayed Ormonde's advances. In none of these cases can Monk's forces be dismissed as hirelings.

Other Factors

Lenihan does not try to be comprehensive. There are therefore a number of additional factors which need to be considered as contributing to Jones' success. The first is the arrival of Cromwell's advance guard in the weeks before Rathmines, which is generally seen as the game-changer that tipped the scales in Jones' favour. Reinforcement by a strong regiment of 800 horse and more than three regiments of 3,000 foot undoubtedly enabled Jones to take the offensive and forestall the building of the Royalist artillery battery overlooking Ringsands port. But whether that would of itself have prevented Cromwell's landing is questionable. Moreover, according to Forth's detailed analysis of the New Model, the advance guard was another mixed bag. Tothill's Regiment mutinied on arrival over pay and could not be trusted with weapons; while half of Reynold's cavalry regiment had supported the Levellers. Although Jones could not have won his final victory without reinforcements, neither was it inevitable that without them he would have lost Dublin before Cromwell's vanguard arrived. Either way it seems that even the real New Model Army were not all psalm-singing supermen.

Another factor in Jones' success was his relative advantage in artillery compared to all of his opponents. Preston brought four demi-culverins to Dungan's Hill and lost them. O'Neill seems to have few if any guns. Ormonde assembled only seven to take Dublin and then also lost them. By contrast, Jones could draw on the Dublin arsenal and routinely marched with trains of six, seven or eight including a pair of culverins or demi-culverins which could batter down any of the town or castle walls in the Pale or its surrounds. According to one contemporary report he took 21 cannon on one sortie against O'Neill. Though not decisive in either of Jones' pitched battles, the artillery train commanded by Gunner Engineer Miles enabled him to take and retain strongpoints that were essential for his strategy of bread and elbow room.

9 At this stage Dundalk was responsible to Jones.

A third factor was logistics. Jones had seen at first hand in Naas and Cheshire how operations depended on money and supplies. One of his critical roles in Dublin was to convince Parliament to maintain the flow of both. He brought with him 240,000 pounds of meal and £4,000 worth of cheese but it did not last long: during the Dungan's Hill campaign his army consumed 26,000 pounds of both every four days. Thereafter supply from England was erratic and usually inadequate. In practice all armies relied for the most part on exploiting local resources. Here Jones' experience in Cheshire had made him an expert in large scale cattle rustling. In September 1647 he brought back 7,000–8,000 cattle from a single raid into Wicklow. But cooperation with the civilian population was also essential to ensure consistent supply and Jones worked hard to maintain it. Instructions issued in the same month directed garrisons to compound rebels in order to pay for their troops, give protection to all farmers and labourers, and encourage farmers to grow crops. The dialogue was, however, two way. In 1648 the civilian authorities in Louth complained to Jones that his weekly tax of £14 was disproportionate, that 20 local men were being forced to build sconces in Dundalk and that despite the presence of Coote's cavalry a dozen villages had been burned and plundered by the enemy. From his correspondence, Jones' greatest frustration was with the shortage of carts. Ideally he wanted more than 500 and fell well short. But the evidence is that he generally overcame logistic limitations. During his Athboy raid in October 1647 he marched an army of 7,700 men for 17 days across a countryside he described as 'but slenderly inhabited, wasted barren [and] without victuals' and he continued mounting similar operations into 1649.

Summing Up[10]

Jones undoubtedly enjoyed tangible advantages in his three campaigns against Preston, O'Neill and Ormonde. He might nonetheless have lost all of them. For this reason my provisional conclusion as set out at the Helion conference is that the factors that made most difference in 1647–49 were intangible.

In the first place, despite the political infighting in London and the turmoil of renewed civil war across the other two kingdoms, Michael Jones appears to have received unambiguous support from his Parliamentarian chain of command, whether political, military or naval. The early victory at Dungan's Hill helped and gave him a national public profile. He complained eloquently about shortfalls in men, money and supplies but at no point did the relationship between Dublin and London fray, even in the face of the professional misinformation campaign mounted by Ormonde in the wake of the King's execution. By contrast Jones' enemies had different and often conflicting objectives, and their leaderships were riven by enduring disputes.

Second, the leaders Jones faced on the battlefield were militarily second rate. Preston was timid except on the one occasion when that mattered. O'Neill was ageing and unable to reproduce his victory at Benburb. Both were victims of their background in

10 I am grateful to the Helion Conference for discussing my provisional conclusions.

the static warfare of the Spanish Netherlands and their mutual antipathy. Ormonde on the other hand was overwhelmed by the challenges of managing his coalition. Inchiquin had similar characteristics to Jones himself but was not allowed the chance to display them.

Most important, Michael Jones was the right man at the right time. He brought unique politico-military expertise to Leinster. He was tactically agile, a charismatic battlefield leader and a capable strategist. He was a highly professional logistician. People believed him and in him, both in London and in Ireland. His seduction of O'Neill required an extraordinary degree of trust but was not the only example. Throughout the Civil Wars he successfully bridged the divide between politics and the army. Following Rathmines he slotted easily into the New Model command structure as Cromwell's deputy. Had he survived it is plausible to suggest that Michael Jones could have taken George Monk's place on the Protectorate's greasy pole.

Atrocities[11]

But Jones was no untarnished hero, even by seventeenth century standards. Cromwell is linked forever with two atrocities which occurred during the months following his arrival in Ireland – Drogheda and Wexford. Over 4,000 soldiers and civilians were slaughtered in the storming of these towns. Debate continues about Cromwell's culpability and the applicability of the Laws of War. The issue remains bitterly political. For his part, Jones did not kill civilians in large numbers but there is no doubt that 3,000 Confederate infantry were cut down by his army in the bog beneath Dungan's Hill. Jones claimed to have killed another 4,000 men in the rout at Rathmines, although Ormonde admitted losing only 600. The actual figure was probably between the two. Either way the overall losses in the four actions were comparable.

Yet Jones has received little of the opprobrium heaped on Cromwell. Indeed, only Lenihan and O'Siochru have drawn any recent attention at all to Jones' role. O Siochru sees Jones' actions as reflecting an escalation of unrestrained brutality from England to Ireland as the wars spread. These claims deserve testing. And it cannot be denied that Jones could be ruthless and saw the execution of prisoners in their thousands during or after battle as a legitimate weapon, whether as retaliation, deterrence and coercion, evening the odds or getting rid of hungry mouths. Such brutality was, however, a feature of Irish warfare when Jones was serving with Ormonde and it spread to Cheshire only with the return of Irish veterans. Moreover, it was Ormonde's legacy cavalry troops who seem to have played the biggest part in the slaughter at Dungan's Hill. What influenced Jones to be so relaxed in relation to the massacre of prisoners on a very large scale is therefore hard to say, though it does put in context his willingness to shoot mutineers and execute deserters, including one of his own

11 I need to do much more work on the relative culpability of Cromwell and Jones before going beyond this assessment. In the meantime Lenihan on Dungan's Hill and O'Siochru on the wider picture cover the bases – except perhaps the part played by Henry Jones under both generals.

nephews. In both cases the evidence suggests that, like Cromwell, he believed he was acting within the Laws of War. That is certainly the impression given by his brother's account of the October 1647 Athboy raid, during which nine out of 10 towns, castles or forts were allowed to surrender on quarter. This was in part a hearts and minds operation to pacify the Pale but in four instances Michael went further in his leniency than the letter of the law by granting quarter after the garrison displayed resistance.

This article is too short for me to do justice to Michael Jones' culpability as a commander and as Cromwell's subordinate. Nor does it look in any detail at his role in the military and political dimensions of Cromwell's 1649 campaign. It does, however, allow me to argue that prima facie Jones was at least as bloody a leader as Cromwell in pursuing Parliament's interests in Ireland, and more responsible than Cromwell for the consequent defeat of Royalist Ireland. I hope to return to these arguments at a later date.

ANNEX A: Parliament's Leinster Army, 1648

Ex-Royalist Regiments: Foot

Colonel Robert Bailey (Athboy)
Sir John Borlase (Dublin)
Colonel William Flower (Dublin)
Earl of Kildare (Maynooth)
Lord Moore/Lord Castlestewart (Trim)
Sir Henry Tichborne (Trim)
Colonel Francis Willoughby (Dublin)

Ex-Royalist Regiments: Horse

Sir Thomas Armstrong (Dublin?)
Sir Thomas Meredith (Dublin?)

Parliamentarian Regiment: Foot

Colonel James Castle (Dublin)
Colonel Roger Fenwick (Kildare)
Colonel Antony Hungerford (Drogheda)
Colonel John Kynaston (Dublin)
Colonel Thomas Long (Wicklow)
Colonel John Moore (Dublin)

Parliamentarian Regiment: Horse

Colonel Michael Jones (Dublin)
Colonel Chidley Coote (Drogheda)
Colonel John Ponsonby (Athboy)

New Model Army Reinforcements 1649

Colonel John Reynolds' Horse
Colonel Hercules Huncks' Foot
Colonel Robert Tothill's Foot
Colonel Robert Venables' Foot

ANNEX B: Parliament's Leinster Army, 1647–1649

Foot	Mid 1647	May 1648	Mid 1649
6 regional English Parliamentarian regiments	3,800	4,300	2,000
7 Irish ex-Royalist regiments	2,900	3,400	1,000
Horse			
3 regional English Parliamentarian regiments	840	1,500	1,000
Irish ex-Royalists	620	600	100
New Model reinforcements: 1 regiment of horse, 3 of foot			3,000 Foot 800 horse
	8,160	**9,800**	**7,900**

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

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